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PREFACE 
This thesis consists of four chapters examining the concept, measurement, and 
relevance of individual competitiveness. Research reported in Chapter II is joint work 
with my supervisors, Werner Bönte and Diemo Urbig. Chapter III reports data from an 
experiment I conducted at the newly established behavioral economic laboratory of the 
Schumpeter School of Business and Economics. Research reported in Chapters IV and 
V is joint work with Werner Bönte, Vivien Procher, and Diemo Urbig. This research is 
part of a project of the Jackstädt Center of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research. 
For the co-authored chapters, I have contributed significantly to all aspects of the 
research process, including theory development, design of the empirical approach, 
analyses, discussion, and the writing process.  
An earlier version of Chapter II has been published in Personality and 
Individual Differences under the title “Economics meets Psychology: Experimental and 
Self-reported Measures of Individual Competitiveness” (Bönte, Lombardo, & Urbig, 
2017a). A previous working-paper version of this chapter is available online as 
Schumpeter Discussion Paper No. 6 under the same title (Bönte, Lombardo, & Urbig, 
2016). Analyses presented in Chapter II of this thesis provide substantial extensions to 
these previous versions. Furthermore, an adjusted version of Chapter IV has been 
accepted for publication (January 2019) and is forthcoming in Small Business 
Economics under the title “Entrepreneurs embrace competition: evidence from a lab-in-
the-field study” (Urbig, Bönte, Procher, & Lombardo, 2019). Moreover, all of the 
chapters in this thesis have been accepted and presented at the following scientific 
conferences and seminars: Conference on Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Decision 
Making, WZB, Berlin (2015); 16th conference of the International Schumpeter Society, 
Montreal (2016); London Experimental Workshop (2016); 15th TIBER Symposium on 
Psychology and Economics, Tilburg (2016); EIC JERSeminar at Friedrich-Schiller-
Universität, Jena (2017); Berlin Behavioral Economic Seminar, German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW), Berlin (2018); 4th ZEW Conference on the Dynamics of 
Entrepreneurship (CODE), Mannheim (2018); Jahrestagung der Wissenschaftlichen 
Kommission Technologie, Innovation und Entrepreneurship (TIE), Hamburg (2018); 
22th G-Forum - Interdisziplinäre Jahreskonferenz zur Gründungsforschung, Stuttgart 
(2018); 17th  International Schumpeter Society (ISS) Conference, Seoul (2018). 
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Chapter I 
An Introduction to 
Individual Competitiveness 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Competition is an integral part of life: “plants compete for sunlight and water, 
animals for territory and food, and humans for mates and income” (Leibbrandt, Gneezy, 
& List, 2013, p. 9305). While competition is omnipresent in current societies, 
institutions can differ in the importance they place on competitiveness (Niederle, 2017) 
and the deliberate design of competition within and between organizations, such as 
promotion contests or innovation contests, has been intensively studied for more than 30 
years (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014).  
In addition to standard economic explanations, the role of individual preferences 
to enter competitive environments has only recently gained prominence (Niederle, 
2017). During the past decade experimental studies in behavioral economics have 
intensely investigated individual’s self-selection into competitive environments 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal, & Schunk, 2009; Shurchkov, 
2012; Leibbrandt, et al., 2013; Buser, Niederle, and Oosterbeek, 2014; Wozniak, 
Harbaugh, & Mayr, 2014; Reuben, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2015; Niederle, 2017; 
Reuben, Wiswall, & Zafar, 2017). In their seminal study Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) investigate the self-selection of men and women into a competitive tournament. 
They find that men are more likely to self-select into competition than women and 
conclude that there is heterogeneity in preferences for entering competition. Their 
empirical findings have been reproduced and extended for many tasks and contexts (e.g. 
Kamas & Preston, 2009; Vandegrift & Yavas, 2009; Ertac & Szentes, 2010; Dohmen & 
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Falk, 2011; Booth & Nolen, 2012; Mayr, Wozniak, Davidson, Kuhns, & Harbaugh, 
2012; Shurchkov, 2012; Gupta, Poulsen, & Villeval, 2013; Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, 
List, & Maximiano, 2013; see Niederle 2016 for a review).  Moreover, several studies 
provide evidence for heterogeneity in self-selection into competitive environments 
between individuals from different countries (Cárdenas, Dreber, von Essen, & Ranehill, 
2012), different cultures (Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009; Leibbrandt et al., 2013), and 
different age groups (Mayr et al., 2012).  
Potential heterogeneity among individuals regarding preferences to enter 
competitive situations has substantial and practically relevant consequences for 
economic decision-making, for instance, for behavior in labor markets (Buser et al., 
2014; Flory, Leibbrandt, & List, 2015; Reuben et al., 2015). Reuben, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2015), for instance, find that individuals having a preference to enter 
competitive situations earn more than less competitive individuals and are more likely 
to work in high-paying industries. Individuals who tend to be reluctant to enter 
competitive situations might be less likely to pursue very competitive career paths, such 
as a managerial or entrepreneurial career. Even high-performing individuals may refuse 
high-profile jobs, which are very competitive, and this may lead to inefficient allocation 
of labor. Moreover, many experimental studies indicate that men are, on average, more 
competitively inclined than women (Croson & Gneezy, 2009) and this gender 
difference in competitiveness has been suggested to partly explain gender differences in 
labor market outcomes (Buser et al., 2014; Flory et al., 2015; Reuben et al., 2015).  
While current research on individual competitiveness is creating valuable 
insights, it focuses solely on revealed preferences derived from observed behavior and 
has made little effort to explain the widely observed phenomenon. Most studies agree 
that there are large differences in competitiveness between individuals that cannot be 
readily explained by genetic endowments, abilities, or risk attitudes (cf. Leibbrandt et 
al., 2013). Hence, it remains unclear why individuals self-select into competition. To 
explain these differences, sometimes studies refer to competitive preferences (e.g. 
Croson & Gneezy, 2009), or preferences for competition (e.g. Shurchkov, 2012), while 
others consider competitiveness as a taste for competition (Reuben et al., 2015), or even 
as a behavioral trait (Niederle, 2017). In their seminal study Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) refer to preferences for performing in a competition, but Ifcher and Zarghamee 
(2016b) conclude that performing might not be necessary for heterogeneity in 
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competitiveness. Explicit definitions, however, are rarely provided and the economic 
interpretation of individual competitiveness remains unclear. This conceptual ambiguity 
may substantially impede the identification of the nature and drivers of the 
phenomenon, that is, we do not know what drives individuals to self-select into 
competitive environments or to shy away from these environments.  
This thesis provides an interdisciplinary approach to enhance the understanding 
of the nature of self-selection into competition. I address the gap in conceptual 
foundations of individual competitiveness by introducing concepts from psychological 
research, where competitiveness has been studied for more than 100 years (cf. Triplett, 
1898). The presented research tests the compatibility of psychological and economic 
competitiveness research and examines how these psychological concepts can help us 
improve the economic understanding of individual competitiveness. For this purpose 
this thesis conceptually and empirically examines two related research questions that I 
consider essential to improve the conceptual foundations of individual competitiveness 
and better understand its relation with career choices:  
Research Question 1: 
What drives individuals’ decisions to self-select into 
competitive versus non-competitive environments? 
This first research question emphasizes the conceptualization and measurement 
of individual’s competitive preferences itself. In current behavioral economic literature 
the identification of competitive preferences typically relies on some kind of group 
heterogeneity in the self-selection into competition, e.g. that men are, on average, more 
likely than women to self-select into competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). After 
controlling for some confounds, such as risk preferences and confidence in winning, a 
residual group difference suggests heterogeneity in competitive preferences (e.g. 
Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), but without such group differences individual 
competitive preferences could not be identified. In order to identify a single individual’s 
competitive preference, I seek to develop a positive conceptualization of competitive 
preferences indicating why individuals would enter competition and what they value 
about competitive environments. With this conceptualization I seek to develop 
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measurement techniques that allow the identification of competitive preferences on the 
individual level based on the individual’s self-selection into competitive versus non-
competitive environments. 
Research Question 2: 
How are individuals’ decisions to self-select into competitive versus non-competitive 
environments in economic experiments related to these individuals’ decisions to pursue 
certain career paths rather than others? 
This second research question emphasizes the relation between an individual’s 
competitive preferences and other economic decisions. While experimental studies have 
provided ample evidence for a substantial and practically relevant relationship between 
self-selection into competition and career choices (Buser et al., 2014; Flory et al., 2015; 
Reuben et al., 2015), previous research has provided little evidence in regard to possible 
explanations for this relationship. Neither do we know why self-selection into 
competition is related to certain career paths and occupational choices, nor does the 
literature derive predictions indicating for which career paths and occupational choices 
we can expect the strongest relationships with self-selection into competition. In this 
thesis I seek to provide a better understanding of conditions for the relationship between 
competitive preferences and certain career choices. Moreover, I attempt to provide a 
systematic approach to predict the relevance of an individual’s competitive preferences 
for choices between certain career paths and occupations.  
As a further operationalization of these research questions I set up the research 
agenda shown in Figure 1.1 for this thesis. First, I identify potential motives of self-
selection into competition. Current economic literature provides little information about 
what drives individuals to self-select into competitive environments. I draw on 
psychological literature on individual competitiveness, which has studied several 
different motives of individual competitiveness as personality characteristics. In a first 
study my co-authors and I empirically test whether and to what extent these different 
motives are related to the self-selection into competition studied by behavioral 
economists. This analysis contributes to economic literature on individual 
competitiveness by better explaining what drives individuals to self-select into 
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competitive environments. Moreover, it contributes to both economic and psychological 
competitiveness research by examining the link between these previously rather 
isolated, but conceptually related literatures. 
 
Figure 1.1: Research agenda of this thesis 
 
 
Second, I test whether these motives constitute preferences for competitive 
environments. While the identified motives of self-selection into competition shed some 
light on the interpretation of this phenomenon, it is not per se clear, whether such 
personality characteristics reflect well-known economic preferences, or whether 
economic theory can benefit from the inclusion of these personality characteristics as 
model parameters (see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & Weel, 2008). I link self-
Research Question 1: 
What drives self-selection into 
competition? 
Research Question 2: 
How does self-selection into competition 
predict career choices? 
Research Gap: 
No clear economic interpretation of self-selection into competition and its effects on economic 
decisions - due to a lack of conceptual foundations in competitiveness research 
Agendum 1: 
Identify potential 
motives to enter 
competition 
Agendum 2: 
Link motives to 
preferences in a 
utility model 
Insight 1: 
Identified motives 
related to self-
selection into 
competition 
Insight 2: 
Identified 
preferences for 
competition  
Agendum 3: 
Show relevance of 
self-selection due 
to preferences for 
career choices 
Agendum 4: 
Show mechanism 
relating 
preferences to 
career choices 
Insight 3: 
Relevant 
preferences for 
competition  
Insight 4: 
Conditions for 
relevance of 
preferences for 
competition  
Contribution 1: 
Better economic interpretation of self-
selection into competition 
Contribution 2: 
Better understanding of the relationship 
between self-selection into competition and 
career choices 
Overall Goal: 
Improving conceptual foundations of competitiveness research 
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selection into competition to an individual’s utility maximizing behavior by providing a 
utility-based model that includes the identified motives in the individual’s utility 
function. Furthermore, I experimentally quantify the individual value of these motives 
and provide evidence for a genuine preference for competing. Linking self-selection 
into competition to an individual’s utility function contributes to the theoretical 
foundation of competitiveness research by facilitating the economic interpretation of 
self-selection into competitive environments. 
Next, I demonstrate the relevance of the identified drivers for the relation 
between self-selection into competition and the respective individual’s career choices. 
Identifying preferences in the lab does not imply that these preferences are relevant for 
economic decisions in less artificial contexts. In current economic competitiveness 
literature the practical relevance of self-selection into competitive environments (in the 
lab) builds in large parts on the demonstration of its predictive power for career choices 
(see Buser et al., 2014; Flory et al., 2015; Reuben et al., 2015; Buser, Peter, & Wolter, 
2017). In order to test the external validity (Loewenstein, 1999) of the identified 
preferences underlying self-selection into competition, I examine their relation to these 
main findings of competitiveness literature. Individuals’ decisions to start a business 
and become an entrepreneur provide an ideal case for this study, since the 
competitiveness of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship has been prominently theorized 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973), yet empirical evidence is scarce (see Bönte & 
Piegeler, 2013 as exception). This analysis contributes to the behavioral economic 
literature by empirically confirming the importance of individual competitiveness for 
entrepreneurship entry. Moreover, it contributes to the entrepreneurship literature, 
which has only conceptually described the competitiveness of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurship, by providing empirical evidence for these conjectures. 
Finally, I investigate the general mechanisms by which the identified 
competitive preferences influence the relation between self-selection into competition 
and the respective individual’s career choices. Previous research has provided evidence 
that self-selection into competition relates to particular career choices. For instance, 
Buser and colleagues (2014, 2017) demonstrate that high school students, who self-
select into competition in an experiment, are more likely to choose a math-intensive 
academic track later. Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) find that competitive MBA 
students are more likely to work in consulting and finance industry. Furthermore, it has 
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been conjectured that competitive individuals are more likely to become top-level 
managers (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). While 
these studies make valuable contributions, they have not provided a systematic 
approach to predict the relevance of an individual’s competitive preferences for choices 
between certain career paths or occupations. Based on individuals’ beliefs regarding 
competition in a broad variety of occupations my co-authors and I investigate 
conditions for the relationship between competitive preferences and certain career 
choices showing why self-selection into competition is more strongly related to entry 
into some occupations than to entry into others. This study makes two main 
contributions to the existing literature: First, it demonstrates the relevance of 
individual’s beliefs about competition. Second, it shows for which occupational choices 
self-selection into competition can be expected to be most predictive.  
 
1.2 GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
1.2.1 Competitive Individuals and Competitive Environments 
The examination of individual competitiveness presented in this thesis largely 
builds on a strand of experimental studies in behavioral economics that have 
investigated self-selection into competitive environments over the past decade. In the 
seminal experiment by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) subjects are given a choice, 
whether to be paid according to a piece-rate scheme or according to a winner-take-all 
tournament. The piece-rate depends only on the subject’s own performance, while the 
winner-take-all tournament includes the comparison with the performance of other 
subjects. The current behavioral economic literature on individual competitiveness 
consists of a large body of experimental studies that either adapt the experimental 
design by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) or use similar designs (e.g. Bartling et al., 
2009; Kamas & Preston, 2010; Cárdenas et al., 2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Buser et 
al., 2014, 2017; Reuben et al., 2015). In this work I adopt this perspective and apply a 
broad definition of individual competitiveness, which is consistent with this strand of 
research: 
 
8 
Individual competitiveness is an individual’s general tendency to select into 
competitive environments. Competitive individuals are those individuals who favor 
competitive over non-competitive environments (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Smither 
& Houston, 1992).  
This thesis investigates such individual heterogeneity in self-selection into 
competitive environments. In particular, I study why and to what extent some 
individuals are more competitive than others and under which conditions individual 
competitiveness can predict career choices. This perspective on competitive individuals 
introduces heterogeneity within the individual response to competitive environments. 
Hence, it is essential to clarify what constitutes a competitive environment and to 
unambiguously distinguish between competitive and non-competitive environments. 
For this purpose I use a broad definition of competitive environments provided in 
Deutsch’s (1949) Theory of Competition: 
Competitive environments are characterized by institutions where individuals’ 
goals are not simultaneously achievable given the sets of possible strategies. In 
competitive environments every attempt of individuals to get closer to their own goals 
makes it less likely for other individuals to achieve their goals (Deutsch, 1949).  
Competitive and non-competitive environments differ in how individuals’ 
actions and resulting performances relate to their payoffs. Situations where payoffs 
solely depend on an individual’s own performances or where an individual’s rewards 
relate positively to increases in the performances of other individuals are considered as 
non-competitive environments. Hence, competitive environments require strategic 
interaction between at least two individuals. If the degree of goal achievement of 
individual A depends negatively on individual B’s action or strategy towards B’s own 
goal, then individual B can be considered a competitor for individual A. This does not 
imply that individual A is also a competitor for individual B. The definition allows for 
asymmetric goal relations: If B is a competitor for A, but A’s attempts to reach A’s goal 
relate positively (or are not at all related) to B’s goal achievement, then A is not a 
competitor for B. Zero-sum games and winner-take-all situations represent examples of 
extremely competitive environments (Lazear, 1999).  
My focus on individual heterogeneity in self-selection into competitive 
environments is conceptually distinct from individual heterogeneity in the behavior and 
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performance within competitive environments. In ecological as well as economic 
context competitiveness is sometimes defined as individual ability to win competitions 
or to perform better than others (e.g., Manning & Taylor, 2001; Hönekopp, Manning, & 
Müller, 2006). Individual heterogeneity in the performance within competition can not 
only be due to differences in ability, but also due to heterogeneity in individual’s 
willingness to increase efforts to leverage odds of winning (Ryckman, Hammer, 
Kaczor, & Gold, 1990). Marshall (1920), for instance, asserts that “a manufacturer or a 
trader is often stimulated much more by the hope of victory over his rivals than by the 
desire to add something to his fortune” (p.19) and, hence, accepts lower profits within a 
competition for the sake of winning. Aggressive behavior within competitive 
environments does not necessarily imply, however, that individuals generally favor 
situations in which they compete with others. For instance, individuals who dislike 
competitions may be forced to enter competitive environments and may respond to this 
by competing aggressively. Yet, such behavioral tendencies within competitive 
environments are distinct from a tendency to enter competitions. 
Similarly, individuals maximizing relative rewards are sometimes considered as 
competitive individuals (e.g., van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). While significant correlations between such distributional preferences 
and individual competitiveness have been reported (Bartling et al., 2009), distributional 
preferences also differ from my conceptualization of individual competitiveness, 
because they relate to behavior in contexts where individuals’ rewards are mutually 
dependent on one another, that is, to behavior within competitive environments, but not 
to a tendency to self-select into such environments. 
1.2.2. Motives & Preferences 
While each individual’s self-selection into competitive or non-competitive 
environments is a distinct observable behavior, which can be considered a revealed 
preference, the economic interpretation of this observed behavior is not obvious. In the 
simplest case self-selection into either competitive or non-competitive environments 
reflects the individual’s payoff-maximizing decision. In experimental studies on 
individual competitiveness subjects choosing between a winner-take-all tournament and 
a piece-rate payment usually maximize their payoff by selecting the tournament, if they 
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expect to win it, and selecting the piece-rate otherwise (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007). Yet, empirical results provide ample evidence for substantial deviation from such 
payoff-maximizing behavior (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Mayr et al., 2012; 
Shurchkov, 2012; Reuben et al., 2015). 
While payoff-maximization alone cannot explain the observed individual 
heterogeneity in self-selection into competitive environments, the observed results 
might be composed of well-established beliefs and preferences. As any competition 
implies a chance of winning and a risk of losing, both an individual’s risk preferences 
and (over-)confidence may make competitive environments more attractive. Hence, risk 
taking or optimism in terms of confidence in winning may make individuals appear as if 
they favor competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003).  
However, in the conceptualization of individual competitiveness presented 
above, competitive individuals select into competitive environments, because they have 
preferences over particular institutions linking individuals’ performances to their 
rewards. While payoff-maximization, risk preference, and (over-)confidence are likely 
to influence self-selection into competition, they are conceptually distinct from 
individual competitiveness as they do not relate to a unique preference for competitive 
versus non-competitive environments (Niederle, 2017; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
From current economic literature it is an open question, whether the empirical findings 
imply such a unique preference for competitive environments, or whether differences in 
self-selection into competition might be fully explained by overconfidence and risk 
preferences (Van Veldhuizen, 2017). 
As outlined above this thesis aims to contribute to the clarification of this 
question. In order to identify potential drivers for self-selection into competitive 
environments, which are unique for choices between competitive and non-competitive 
environments, I draw on psychological competitiveness research. Recent psychological 
research considers individual competitiveness as a multidimensional construct (e.g. 
Houston, Mcintire, Kinnie, & Terry, 2002a; Houston, Harris, McIntire, & Francis, 
2002b; Newby & Klein, 2014) and investigates different motives to seek or avoid 
competitive environments. It has been suggested that individuals are motivated to enter 
competitions, for instance, because they consider it “as a means of maintaining or 
enhancing feelings of self-worth” (Ryckman et al., 1990, p. 630) or “for the purposes of 
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demonstrating self-competence, mastery, achievement and self-improvement” (Newby 
& Klein, 2014).  Three of the different motives of competitiveness that have been 
identified are examined in recent psychological research (e.g. Houston, Edge, Anderson, 
Lesmana, & Suryani, 2012):  
(1) seeking personal development in competition,  
(2) a desire to win in competition, and  
(3) an enjoyment of competition.  
Individuals motivated for competition by opportunities for personal development 
value competition because it helps them to improve their competence, to be the best 
they can be, and to judge their level of competence (Newby & Klein 2014; Ryckman, 
Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1996). Individuals motivated for competition by a desire to 
win implied by the concept of hypercompetitiveness, which refers to an individual’s 
indiscriminate need to compete, win, and to avoid losing at any cost (Horney, 1937; 
Ryckman et al., 1990). Individuals with a desire to win compete for the sake of winning 
itself, independent of associated rewards. Individuals, who enjoy competing against 
others, gain non-monetary benefits related to the institution of competition itself, 
independent of the outcome of a competition. Such an enjoyment of competition has 
been associated with emotional arousal in the state of competing against others 
(Nakamura & Csikszentnihalyi, 2003; Schneider et al., 2005, Newby & Klein, 2014). 
I examine how each of these motives is related to an individual’s self-selection 
into competitive environments, and whether any of these motives constitutes a unique 
preference for competitive environments that goes beyond the effects of payoff-
maximization, risk preference, and (over-)confidence. In doing so I follow Borghans, 
Duckworth, Heckman, and Weel (2008) who show how economic theory can benefit 
from the inclusion of personality characteristics as model parameters. 
 
1.2.3 Critical contingencies 
In my conceptualization, individual competitiveness represents a general 
tendency to enter competitive environments, but an individual’s observable self-
selection is always a choice between specific environments. Depending on their 
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motives, individuals may react differently to different types of competitive 
environments. Individuals can be expected to favor a specific competitive environment 
to the extent to which this competitive environment allows the satisfaction of motives 
that make competition attractive to them. Hence, the relation between each motive and a 
specific environment depends on a critical contingency, i.e. a belief that the individual 
holds about that specific environment. Figure 1.2 illustrates the general framework 
proposed in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.2: A general framework of individual competitiveness 
 
 
Individuals competing to satisfy personal development goals, do not focus on 
winning a competition, but rather seek mastery of a given task (Ryckman et al., 1996). 
Hence, personal development motives can be expected to be especially relevant for 
selection into competition based on tasks that require and challenge individuals’ skills 
and competencies. In contrast, such personal development motives are likely to be 
irrelevant, if competition does not offer opportunities to develop or demonstrate mastery 
of skills. 
In order to win in a competition, it is inevitable to enter a competition. Hence, 
the desire to win can be an important motivation to enter competitive rather than non-
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expectations of winning the competition. Individuals might even shy away from 
competitions they believe they are not able to win (Conelly et al., 2014; Coffey & 
Maloney, 2010), because they have a strong desire to win and to avoid losing at any 
cost (Ryckman et al. 1990). 
Individuals, who enjoy competing, can be expected to generally seek 
competitive environments. The critical contingency for this motive is the individual’s 
belief about the intensity of competition associated with certain environments. An 
environment allows satisfaction of the enjoyment of competition motive to the extent to 
which it is believed to be sufficiently competitive. Hence, the relationship between 
individual competitiveness motivated by enjoyment of competition and self-selection 
into an environment depends on the individual’s perceptions of the intensity of 
competition in the respective environment.  
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis empirically investigates the framework proposed above in Figure 1.2 
and provides empirical evidence in regard to the four tasks (Agendum 1-4) in the 
research agenda shown in Figure 1.1. In the following chapters I present results of 
primary data from five empirical studies with a total 2,405 observations from 889 
participants. Table 1.1 provides an overview of these studies.  
This thesis makes methodical contributions to the literature on individual 
competitiveness by introducing several refinements and extensions of experimental 
designs for competitiveness measurement. In order to examine self-selection into 
competitive environments, all chapters include behavioral measures of individual 
competitiveness as typically used in behavioral economic studies. While all these 
measures can be considered applications of the seminal Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
experiment, where individuals perform a task and choose between piece-rate payments 
and winner-take-all tournaments, the specific design of each of the studies is tailored to 
the respective research question (and will be discussed in detail in the respective 
chapter). Throughout this thesis my I present multiple methodological approaches to 
identify different drivers of self-selection into competitive environments.  
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Table 1.1: Overview of empirical studies 
Chapter Type Sample Competitiveness Obs. (Ind.) 
II 
Classroom experiment 
+ Classroom Survey 
Students 
Behavioral  
(Quiz) 
+ Self-reported 
186  (186) 
III Lab Experiment Students 
Behavioral 
(Math + Dice) 
300   (50) 
IV Lab-in-field study 
General 
Population 
Behavioral 
(Math + Dice) 
224 (224) 
V Classroom Survey Students 
Self-reported 
+ Perception 
887 (227) 
V Lab-in-field study 
General 
Population 
Behavioral  
(Math + Dice) 
+ Perception 
808 (202) 
Note: Obs. = number of observations; Ind. = number of individuals T
First, my co-authors and I relate behavioral measures of self-selection into 
competitive environments to self-reported measures of individuals’ different motives 
of competitiveness. Psychological research has investigated individual competitiveness 
as a multidimensional construct and has developed multiple psychometric item scales to 
elicit different motives of individual competitiveness (Ryckman et al., 1990, 1996; 
Houston et al., 2002a, 2002b). We apply psychometric scales consistent with those 
proposed by recent psychological research as self-reported measures. 
Second, based on the standard behavioral measure of competitiveness (Niederle 
& Vesterlund, 2007) I introduce refined experimental designs that allow for 
distinguishing behavioral responses that indicate different preferences of entering 
competitive environments. I show within-subject designs, where subjects can choose to 
self-select into competitive environments multiple times under varying conditions, i.e. 
different tasks, different chances of winning, or different outside options (piece-rate 
payments). Analyzing the within-subject effects of these varying conditions on self-
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selection into competition provides additional information regarding the subjects’ 
underlying motives and preferences. 
Third, together with my co-authors I investigate effects of moderation by 
critical contingencies of the respective drivers. As proposed in my general framework 
the influence of each motive on an individual’s self-selection into an environment 
depends on the individual’s beliefs about the respective critical contingency. We use the 
moderations of these critical contingencies with behavioral (and self-reported) 
competitiveness measures to separate the effects of different motives: Through the 
inherent interaction between confidence in winning a competition as a belief, and the 
desire to win as a preference, we are able to empirically discriminate between a desire to 
win and other motives of individual competitiveness. Furthermore, varying the degree 
to which a competition depends on individuals’ skills provides a way to indirectly 
identify the potential influence of personal development motives on individuals’ 
tendencies to enter competitions. Finally, the interaction of competitiveness measures 
with an individual’s perception of competitive intensity within an environment helps to 
isolate the effect of enjoyment of competition from the effects of other motives. 
Examining my research questions with multiple methods facilitates the presented 
research in two ways. First, it allows for broadening the scope of my investigation, since 
each of the methods is best suited for the respective study designs and contexts. Second, 
it reduces the threat of incurring a common method bias (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and scrutinizes the robustness of 
results. 
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II focusses on the identification of potential motives of individuals’ self-
selection into competitive environments. For this purpose my co-authors and I introduce 
a multidimensional competitiveness concept from psychological literature and examine 
the relationship between economic and psychological measurement of individuals’ 
competitiveness. While psychologists typically use self-reported psychometric scales, 
economists tend to use behavioral measures obtained from economic experiments, 
where subjects confronted with specific paid tasks have to self-select into either a 
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competitive tournament or a non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme. Both 
measurement approaches have remained largely isolated from one another. The study 
presented in Chapter II investigates three different motives of competitiveness that have 
been identified by psychological research: (1) seeking personal development in 
competition, (2) a desire to win in competition, and (3) an enjoyment of competition.  
Our study demonstrates that a standard behavioral measure and a psychometric 
scale of individual competitiveness are positively associated and that this association is 
primarily driven by the enjoyment of competition. However, we also show that the two 
measurement approaches are distinguishable with respect to the role of personal 
development motives. While self-reported competitiveness also emerges from personal 
development motives, the behavioral measure does not reflect such motives. The 
distinction between both measures is validated based on divergent associations with 
personality and interests in a competitive management career. In conclusion, our study 
identifies the enjoyment of competition as a motive for self-selection into competitive 
environments, while personal development motives do not seem to drive self-selection 
into competitive environments and the evidence regarding the desire to win is less clear. 
Chapter II provides four implications for future research: 
(1) Since personal development motives are unrelated to current behavioral 
competitiveness measures, researchers who intent to cover personal development 
motives in their behavioral measures, need revised experimental designs. 
(2) Behavioral measures of individual competitiveness may be approximated by 
self-reported multi-item scales focusing on enjoyment of competition. 
(3) Personal development motives and a desire to win both seem to be relevant 
for career choices, and that effect is unrelated to self-selection into competitive 
environments in the lab. 
(4) Their respective relations to the Big Five personality dimensions confirm the 
association between the enjoyment of competition and self-selection into competition. 
Our study shows how personality frameworks can be employed to better understand 
economic behavior. 
17 
In Chapter III I provide an attempt to disentangle a genuine competitive 
preference from utility maximizing behavior that can be explained by other factors. I 
suggest a utility model of an individual’s self-selection into competitive environments. 
The model distinguishes environments, where individuals provide their maximum 
feasible performance, from environments, where individuals optimize their performance 
by providing a lower performance level. I analyze an individual’s choice between a 
competitive winner-take-all tournament and its non-competitive piece-rate equivalent. 
As shown in Chapter II self-selection into competition is related to individual 
competitiveness which is not due to personal development motives. Hence, the model 
includes the phenomenon that individuals enjoy competing as well as an individual’s 
desire to win in competition and separates these competitive preferences from the 
effects of other factors, such as risk aversion and (over-)confidence. 
To examine the usefulness of the model empirically I introduce an experimental 
treatment that allows manipulating the probability of winning the competition 
exogenously and calculating a non-monetary value of competing as well as a non-
monetary value of winning. In support of the model I identify a causal effect of the 
treatment on subjects’ piece-rate equivalent. This effect does not differ between a math 
task, where performance depends on ability and effort, and a dice task, where 
performance is the result of pure luck. Subjects’ deviation from the benchmark model 
provides evidence for a positive value of competing, but no evidence for a value of 
winning among the subjects. Moreover, the individual value of competing increases the 
likelihood of entering the tournament in a classical Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
experiment substantially. Chapter III provides four implications for future research: 
(1) Individuals value competing. Hence, competitive preferences are shown to 
be a distinct phenomenon, which is not fully explained by other factors such as risk 
preferences and (over-)confidence. Further theoretical and experimental examination of 
these preferences is therefore a promising field for behavioral economists. 
(2) Individuals do not seem to value winning. I am not able to identify a non-
monetary value of winning and additional research might be required to understand the 
role of winning for self-selection into competitive environments. 
(3) Measuring the value of competing allows the investigation of individual 
competitive preferences as a comparison between the observed decisions and a utility 
18 
based benchmark, which is conceptually and empirically independent from the 
identification of group differences in such preferences. 
(4) Self-selection into competition might be most effectively studied in 
environments, where individuals provide a maximum feasible performance, e.g. due to 
restrictions to effort provision.  
 
Chapters II and III have identified an enjoyment of competition as a relevant 
motive of individuals’ self-selection into competition and indicated that such a non-
monetary value of competing constitutes a competitive preference. Chapter IV aims to 
transfer these findings from the lab to less artificial contexts.  My co-authors and I 
examine the relevance of the enjoyment of competition for the relation between self-
selection into competition and career choices. Referring to Israel M. Kirzner (1973) and 
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934), who emphasized the competitive nature of 
entrepreneurship, Chapter IV investigates whether entrepreneurs are more competitive 
than non-entrepreneurs. We provide a conceptual framework that links entrepreneurship 
to the three motives of individual competitiveness: a desire to win, striving for personal 
development, and an enjoyment of competition.  
Following recent economic research linking competitive behavior in 
experiments to career choices (e.g. Buser et al., 2014, 2017; Reuben et al., 2015), we 
conduct a lab-in-the-field study and demonstrate that both potential and revealed 
entrepreneurs are more likely to enter competitions than non-entrepreneurs. Accounting 
for individual desires to win and mastery-related achievement motivations, our results 
indicate that entrepreneurs tend to enter competition for the sake of competition itself 
rather than for the prospect of winning a competition or for personal development in 
competition. Our results suggest that enjoyment of competition might be an additional 
factor driving entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions beyond well-known factors like 
(over-)confidence and risk taking. This study demonstrates that an individual’s 
enjoyment of competition is a sufficient constituent for the relation between that 
individual’s self-selection into an artificial competitive environment and the 
individual’s career choices. Chapter IV provides two implications for future research: 
(1) While our results suggest that entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions are to 
some extent explained by individuals’ enjoyment of competition, considering a non-
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monetary value from competing itself might also explain why entrepreneurs do not give 
up so easily, once winning becomes less likely, but continue competing. 
(2) Future research studying the link between competitive behavior in economic 
experiments and selection into particular sectors or industries (e.g. Reuben et al., 2015), 
might additionally control for whether a career will be pursued as an entrepreneur or in 
paid employment; the relationships may differ substantially. 
Chapter V seeks to further scrutinize the findings of the previous chapters and 
investigates the mechanisms by which the condition that some individuals enjoy 
competing more than others influences the relation between self-selection into 
competition and the respective individual’s career choices. In Chapter V I introduce 
individual heterogeneity with respect to the perceptions of intensity of competition and 
argue that such individual beliefs about competitive intensity in various occupations 
moderates the relation between self-selection into competition and self-selection into 
the respective occupation. Together with my co-authors I examine individual and 
systematic perceptions of competitive intensity in 27 different occupations. We focus on 
a comparison between entrepreneurship versus paid employment and further distinguish 
these groups with respect to business founders versus other self-employment as well as 
managerial employment versus non-managerial employment. The empirical analysis is 
based on two complementary studies with 429 participants with 8,553 judgments of 
competitive intensity of particular occupations; the first study with 227 students 
includes 10 forms of entrepreneurship and 17 forms of paid employment and employs 
self-reported measures of both competitive preferences and the intentions for particular 
occupational categories. The second study with 202 people from the general population 
includes reduced sets of 3 forms for each of these four occupational categories and 
employs incentivized behavioral measures of competitiveness from a lab-in-the field 
experiment and revealed occupational choices.  
Both studies provide empirical evidence for the moderating effect of individuals’ 
perceptions of competitive intensity. Competitive individuals are shown to be more 
likely to prefer and enter those occupations, they perceive as more competitive, while 
non-competitive individuals tend to avoid those occupations. Our findings suggest that 
the differences in relations between self-selection into competition and preferences for 
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respective occupations are largely explained by the competitive intensity individuals 
perceive in the respective occupations. Moreover, our results indicate that individuals 
assess entrepreneurship, on average, as more competitive than paid employment. 
Furthermore, our analyses support entrepreneurship research calling for a distinction 
between more growth-oriented entrepreneurship and self-employment as we find 
substantial differences in perceived competitive intensity between start-up founders 
versus other self-employment as well as between managerial employment versus non-
managerial employment. Chapter V provides four implications for future research: 
(1) Since individual heterogeneity in perceived competitive intensity moderates 
the influence of competitive preferences on career choices, future competitiveness 
research might explore ways to influence such perceptions e.g. by providing 
information regarding certain career paths. In some cases changing beliefs about 
competitive institutions rather than changing the institutions might be an alternative tool 
to affect individuals’ responses to these institutions in a similar way. 
(2) Our studies of perceived competitive intensity provide a systematic approach 
to the relationship between self-selection into competition in economic experiments and 
different career choices and enables future researchers to predict which occupational 
choices are most likely influenced by individuals’ preferences for competition. 
(3) Depending on the specific research question and definition of individual 
competitiveness future research might either control for heterogeneous perceptions, or 
include the role of heterogeneous perceptions in the interpretations of findings. 
(4) Winner-take-all tournaments are perceived as highly competitive, while 
piece-rate payments are perceived as far less competitive. Hence, our results confirm 
that experimental designs where subjects choose between these payment schemes, 
reflect the subjects’ deliberate decision to self-selection into (or avoid) competition. 
 
Chapter VI discusses general conclusions from the results presented in Chapters 
II to V and summarizes the main contributions of this thesis. I derive implications and 
outline directions for future research.  
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Chapter II 
 
 
 
Economics meets Psychology: 
Experimental and Self-reported Measures  
of Individual Competitiveness 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we focus on the identification of potential motives of individuals’ 
self-selection into competitive environments. Individuals’ competitiveness has only 
recently received greater attention in economics and economic research has shown little 
interest in individuals’ motivation to enter or avoid competition. Related research on 
individual competitiveness, however, has a tradition of more than 100 years in 
psychology (e.g., Deutsch, 1949; Triplett, 1898), where competitiveness is generally 
recognized as playing a significant role in interpersonal processes (Houston et al., 
2002a). While economic research typically examines individuals’ self-selection into 
competitive environments and employs behavioral measures obtained from incentivized 
experiments as indicators for competitive preferences (e.g., Niederle & Vesterlund, 
2007), psychological research rather conceptualizes individual competitiveness as a 
multidimensional personality characteristic and builds on self-reported psychometric 
scales (e.g., Newby & Klein, 2014; Smither & Houston, 1992). Research streams 
employing these different measures of individual competitiveness remained largely 
isolated from one another. 
In this chapter we bring together economic and psychological research on 
individual competitiveness to improve the understanding of how specific behaviors are 
related to deeper psychological motives and how these differences relate to the 
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respective measures of competitiveness. We argue that economic and psychological 
measurements of individuals’ competitive preferences build on common conceptual 
ground and are positively related, but differ systematically. While competitiveness 
resulting from needs to gauge or enhance one’s own abilities is a key component of 
competitiveness in psychological research (Newby & Klein, 2014), it plays a less 
important and possibly unintentionally marginalized role in economic measures of 
competitiveness. To investigate the difference between economic and psychometric 
measures of competitiveness, we separate competitiveness driven by such personal 
development motives from competitiveness not driven by them, but instead driven by a 
desire to win and enjoyment of competition, and relate these motives to our behavioral 
measure of self-selection into competition. Furthermore, we demonstrate distinct 
relationships with the Big Five personality dimensions and career interests. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the 
economic and the psychological approach to individual competitiveness and derives 
hypotheses about the relationship between the respective measures. Section 2.3 
describes the dataset, study design, variables, and the empirical approach. Section 2.4 
presents the results including validations and robustness checks. Section 2.5 provides a 
discussion of the findings and derives implications for future research.  
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
We define competitiveness as an individual’s general tendency to select into 
competitive environments. This conceptualization of competitiveness is compatible, but 
not necessarily identical, with both, economic and psychological definitions. In both 
disciplines competitive individuals are usually seen as those individuals who favor 
competitive over non-competitive environments (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Smither 
& Houston, 1992). Competitive environments are characterized by institutions where 
individuals’ goals are not simultaneously achievable given the sets of possible 
behaviors, i.e. in competitive environments every attempt of individuals to get closer to 
their own goals makes it less likely for other individuals to achieve their goals (Deutsch, 
1949; Lazear, 1999). Hence, competitive and non-competitive environments differ in 
how individuals’ behaviors and resulting performances relate to their payoffs. In 
competitive environment, such as tournaments and contests, individuals compete for 
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prizes that are awarded based on individuals’ relative performances. Zero-sum games 
and winner-take-all tournaments represent examples of extremely competitive 
environments (Lazear, 1999). Situations where payoffs solely depend on an individual’s 
own performances or where an individual’s rewards relate positively to increases in the 
performances of other individuals are considered as non-competitive environments.  
Our conceptualization of competitiveness as tendency to self-select into 
competitive environments differs from individuals’ responses within a competitive 
environment (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), such as their willingness to increase efforts to 
leverage odds of winning. We also distinguish competitiveness from tendencies to 
maximize own relative to others' rewards. While individuals maximizing relative 
rewards are sometimes considered as competitive individuals (e.g., van Lange et al., 
1997; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), the defining feature does not relate to the selection into, 
but to the behavior within competitive environments. Finally, while risk taking or 
optimism in terms of confidence in winning may make individuals appear as if they 
favor competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003), we consider them as distinct 
from individual competitiveness. 
2.2.1 Economic and psychological measurements of competitiveness 
Economic approaches to measuring individual competitiveness are based on the 
assumption that revealed behavior best approximates individuals’ unobservable 
preferences. Consequently, they rely on the revealed preference paradigm and measure 
participants’ competitiveness by observing their behavior in incentivized experiments 
(e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; for a 
review see Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Within these experiments participants typically 
have to perform a task and choose between a competitive tournament and a non-
competitive payment scheme (e.g., piece-rate or flat wage) (e.g., Niederle & Vesterlund, 
2007). Table 2.1 provides an illustrative overview of experimental designs used in this 
research.  
In the tournament participants face a competitive environment in the sense of 
Deutsch (1949), as their goals are interdependent and not simultaneously achievable. 
This is not the case under a piece-rate or flat wage scheme, where payments are 
independent of other participants’ actions.  
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Table 2.1: Behavioral measures of competitiveness 
Study Payment Choice Task Competitors Time limit 
Niederle and 
Vesterlund 2007 
  0.50$ PR vs. 
 2.00$ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
3 random 
identifyable 
5 min. 
Bartling, Fehr, 
Maréchal, and Schunk 
2009 
 2.00€ PR vs.  
6.00€ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
1 random 
anonymous 
90 sec. 
Gneezy, Leonard, and 
List 2009 
   X$ PR vs.  
3X$ WTA 
Ball tossing  
(tennis ball into bucket) 
1 random 
anonymous 
10 tries  
no time limit 
Große and Riener 
2010 
          0.50€ PR vs.  
1.40€/0.20€ RC vs. 
    0.50€ RS 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
Verbal  
(word order task) 
3 random 
identifyable 
5 min. 
4 min. 
Hoffman and Gneezy 
2010 
 20₹ PR vs.  
60₹ WTA 
Ball tossing  
(tennis ball into bucket) 
1 random 
anonymous 
10 tries  
no time limit 
Kamas and Preston 
2010 
 0.20$ PR vs. 
0.80$ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
Verbal  
(word in word puzzle) 
3 random 
identifyable 
2 min. 
Cárdenas, Dreber, von 
Essen, and Ranehill 
2012 
   X PR vs.  
2X WTA 
Math  
(solving exercises) 
Verbal  
(word search) 
1 random 
identifyable 
2 min. 
Shurchkov  
2012 
   X$ PR vs.  
4X$ WTA 
Math  
(number in number puzzle) 
Verbal  
(word in word puzzle) 
3 random 
identifyable 
2 min. & 
10 min.  
Leibbrandt, Gneezy, 
and List 2013 
   X$ PR vs.  
3X$ WTA 
Ball tossing  
(tennis ball into bucket) 
1 random 
anonymous 
10 tries  
no time limit 
Buser, Niederle, and 
Oosterbeek 2014 
 0.25$ PR vs.  
1.00$ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
3 random 
anonymous 
3 min. 
Masclet, Peterle, and 
Larribeau 2015 
Flatwages:  
      2.50€/2.50€ vs. 
4.50€/0.50€ 
Decoding 
(numbers into letters) 
1 random 
anonymous 
3 min. 
Wozniak, Harbaugh, 
and Mayr 2014 
 0.25$ PR vs.  
0.50$ WTA 
Math  
(checking simple equations) 
1 random 
anonymous 
30 sec. 
Reuben, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2015 
   4.00$ PR vs.  
16.00$ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
3 random 
identifyable 
150 sec. 
Buser, Peter, Wolter 
2017 
 0.25 CHF PR vs. 
1.00 CHF WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
Verbal  
(counting letters) 
3 random 
anonymous 
3 min. 
van Veldhuizen 2017 
 0.50$ PR vs.  
2.00$ WTA 
Math  
(adding two-digit numbers) 
3 random 
identifyable 
5 min. 
Notes: PR = piece-rate; WTA = winner-take-all tournament; RC = ranked compensation; RS = revenue 
sharing 
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Individuals preferring the competitive tournament over the non-competitive 
payment are considered as competitive individuals. Hence these economic measures 
reflect individuals’ behavioral competitiveness. The advantage of observed real 
behavior carries a less salient drawback when attempting to measure general 
characteristics, which should characterize individuals across larger sets of different 
contexts. By construction, revealed behavior is an individual’s response within a very 
concrete and often specific situation. Asking for the extent to which this observed 
behavior characterizes an individual more generally and across many contexts is, in 
fact, an instantiation of concerns of external validity. External validity, defined as “the 
ability to generalize from the research context to the settings that the research is 
intended to approximate” (Loewenstein, 1999, p. F26), is considered the largest thread 
to experimental research, both in psychology and economics (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 
1982; Loewenstein, 1999).  
Because several studies have already demonstrated that minor changes in the 
experimental setting can lead to substantially different outcomes regarding competitive 
behavior (e.g., Shurchkov, 2012; Wozniak et al., 2014), there is a threat of context-
specificity to the external validity of economic measurements of individuals’ general 
competitiveness. Despite these general concerns, existing experimental measures of 
individual competitiveness have been demonstrated to show predictive validity for real-
world economic choices, such as the choice of study programs (e.g., Buser et al., 2014), 
which nevertheless suggests a sufficient external validity.  
Psychological approaches to measuring individual competitiveness mostly build 
on self-reported psychometric scales (e.g., Smither & Houston, 1992; Newby & Klein, 
2014). These scales are composed of items like “I enjoy competing against others.” 
(Newby & Klein, 2014) or “I find competitive situations unpleasant” (Smither & 
Houston, 1992). Respondents usually rate their agreement or disagreement with each of 
these statements. Hence these psychometric measures reflect individuals’ self-reported 
competitiveness.  
These measures do not incentivize respondents to provide truthful answers and, 
hence, rely on what economists refer to as “epsilon truthfulness”, the assumption that 
individuals indifferent between lying and telling the truth, tell the truth (see Cummings, 
Elliott, Harrison, & Murphy, 1997).  
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Table 2.2: Psychometric measures of individual competitiveness 
Scale 
 
Authors Dimensions Items 
Competition-
Cooperation 
Attitude scale 
CCAS* 
Martin and Larsen 
1976 
aggression orientation 
fascist tendencies 
work ethic orientation 
power orientation 
independence orientation 
9  
10  
4  
9  
6  
Work and family 
orientation 
questionnaire 
WOFO 
Helmreich and Spence 
1978 
work 
mastery 
competitiveness 
personal unconcern 
6  
8  
5 
4  
Jenkins Activity 
Survey 
JAS 
Jenkins et al.  
1979 
Type A 
speed and impatience 
job involvement 
hard driving and competitive 
21 
21 
24 
20 
Sports Competition 
Trait Inventory 
SCTI 
Fabian and Ross  
1984 
competitiveness 17 
Sports Orientation 
Questionnaire 
SOQ 
Gill and Deter  
1988 
competitiveness 
win orientation 
goal orientation 
13 
6 
6  
Hypercompetitive 
Attitude Scale 
HAS 
Ryckman et al.  
1990 
hypercompetitiveness 26  
Competitiveness 
Questionnaire 
CQ 
Griffin-Pierson  
1990 
interpersonal competitiveness 
goal competitiveness 
8 
7 
Competitiveness 
Index 
CI 
Smither and Houston 
1992 
emotion 
argument 
games 
9 
6 
5 
Personal 
Development 
Competitive 
Attitude Scale 
PDCAS 
Ryckman et al.  
1996 
pers. dev. competitiveness 14 
Competitiveness 
Index - Revised 
CI-R 
Houston et al.  
2002b 
enjoyment of competition 
contentiousness 
9 
5 
Competitive 
Orientation 
Measure 
COM 
Newby and Klein  
2014 
general competitiveness 
dominance 
competitive affectivity 
personal enhancement 
12 
13 
8 
4 
Multidimensional 
Competitive 
Orientation 
Inventory 
MCOI 
Orosz et al.  
2018 
hypercompetitive orientation 
anxiety-driven comp. avoidance 
self-dev. comp. orientation 
lack of interest in competition 
3 
3 
3 
3 
* The CCAS contains a total 28 items. Several items were reported to load either on multiple dimensions 
or on no dimension at all (Martin and Larsen, 1976). 
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While violations of this assumption represent a threat to the validity of 
psychological competitiveness measurements, this disadvantage may be outweighed by 
the advantage of measuring competitiveness in less context-specific ways. It has been 
shown that these scales meaningfully predict, e.g., students’ vocational interests, such 
that competitive individuals are attracted to jobs involving competitive pressure (e.g., 
Houston et al., 2015). 
There is a large diversity of psychometric scales measuring individuals’ 
competitiveness (see discussion by Smither & Houston, 1992, and by Newby & Klein, 
2014). The Competitive-Cooperative Attitude Scale (Martin & Larsen, 1976), the 
Competitiveness Questionnaire (Griffin-Pierson, 1990), the Competitiveness Index 
(Smither & Houston, 1992) and the competition subscale of the Work and Family 
Orientation Scale (Helmreich & Spence, 1978) are examples of widely used 
psychometric scales. Table 2.2 provides an overview of psychometric competitiveness 
scales. While many psychological competitiveness scales discriminate between different 
motives for why people enter competitive environments (e.g. Ryckman et al., 1996; 
Newby & Klein, 2014), several competitiveness scales aim at measuring general 
competitiveness and are, thus, motive-independent (e.g. Newby & Klein, 2014; Smither 
& Houston, 1992).  
Our conceptualization of individual competitiveness is general with respect to 
the context and does not discriminate competitiveness with respect to the underlying 
motives. This conceptualization is consistent with Smither’s and Houston’s (1992, 
p. 412) operationalization of competitiveness, which builds on “items designed to
identify persons who prefer competitive situations over cooperative ones”. Consistent 
with economics approaches to competitiveness building on the revealed preference 
paradigm, we initially focus on psychological measures of competitiveness that do not 
discriminate with respect to deeper motives underlying individual tendencies to enter 
competitions. Supporting our approach, Newby and Klein (2014, p. 880) reported factor 
analyses of a multitude of existing psychological competitiveness scales revealing a 
strong factor that they refer to as general competitiveness and that they not only 
conceptually qualify as superordinate dimension but also “found to discriminate 
between individuals that choose to enter or refrain from entering competitive activities“.  
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Despite their substantial differences, economic and motive-independent 
psychological measurement approaches are consistent with our conceptualization of 
individual competitiveness as a tendency to self-select into competitive environments. 
Since economic and general psychological measures of competitiveness share such 
common conceptual ground, we expect them to be positively associated. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive relationship between the behavioral 
measure and the self-reported measure of individual competitiveness. 
2.2.2 Motives and contexts I: personal development 
Employing Ajzen’s and Fishbein’s (2005) principle of compatibility, we argue 
that differences in the relevance of individuals’ personal development motives in 
economic and psychological measures of competitiveness create a meaningful 
difference between these measures. The principle of compatibility suggests that 
different measures of individuals’ evaluation or appraisal of a behavior and the related 
observed behavior must be defined at the same level of generality or specificity to 
observe reasonable relationships between them (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Thus, if 
psychologists’ self-reported measures and economists’ behavioral measures of 
competitiveness involve different levels of specificity, we may observe a substantially 
weakened relationship between these two types of measures.  
In our case, individual competitiveness represents a general tendency to enter 
competitive environments, but the behavioral measure of competitiveness relates to a 
behavior in a specific experimental environment possibly not representative of other 
individually relevant competitive environments. Behavioral measures are therefore by 
design context-specific. While most psychometric competiveness scales do not refer to 
specific contexts, they often discriminate between different motives for why people 
enter or why they positively respond to competitive environments. Depending on their 
motives, individuals may react differently to different types of competitive 
environments. Individuals can be expected to favor a specific competitive environment 
to the extent that this competitive environment allows the satisfaction of motives that 
make competition attractive to them. If a specific motive for competing reflected in self-
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reported measures of individual competitiveness is not satisfied by the very specific 
context provided by the experimental environment in behavioral measures, we observe 
a violation of the compatibility principle, which implies a divergence of what is 
measured by psychological self-reported measures and economic behavioral measures. 
Individuals motivated for competition by opportunities for personal development 
seek competition because it helps them to improve their competence, be the best that 
they can be, and to judge their level of competence (Newby & Klein, 2014; Ryckman et 
al., 1996). As indicated by meta-analyses in psychological research, the personal 
development motive has emerged as one of the most important motives to enter 
competition in general (Houston et al., 2002a; Newby & Klein, 2014). Analyzing a 
multitude of measures of competitiveness, Houston and colleagues (2002a) identify two 
major factors underlying all these scales with one of them described as personal 
development, where competition is considered to improve oneself instead of being an 
instrument to winning over others. Moreover, pooling items from eleven 
competitiveness scales, Newby and Klein (2014) validate the distinction between 
general competitiveness and, among others, personal enhancement competitiveness, 
which reflects personal development motives. An estimated correlation of 0.67 between 
general competitiveness and competitiveness motivated by personal development 
indicates that despite being psychometrically distinct, a substantial amount of general 
competitiveness is explained by personal development motives. 
Personal development motives, however, are unlikely to play an important role 
for explaining selection into competitive environments within economic experiments. In 
typical economic measurements of competitive preferences, competition relates to trivia 
quizzes, mini games like ball tossing (Leibbrandt et al., 2013), or solving simple math 
tasks (Gneezy et al., 2003, Niederle & Vesterlund,  2007), often under time pressure 
against randomly assigned competitors (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). These 
simple tasks do not require training or specific qualifications and, thus, are hardly 
representative for competitive situations that offer opportunities for personal 
development, like competition at work, in sports, arts or academic environments.  
Thus, despite aiming at measuring the same underlying construct, linking 
psychological and economic measures of competitiveness reflects a potential violation 
of the compatibility principle. Individuals, whose self-reported competitiveness is 
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substantially driven by a personal development motive, will be less attracted by 
competitive environments in economic experiments than individuals, whose self-
reported competitiveness is driven by other motives. Thus, the compatibility principle 
suggests that personal development motives contributing to individuals’ 
competitiveness reduce the strength of the relationship between psychometric and 
experimental measures of competitiveness. Distinguishing between competitiveness 
motivated by personal development and competitiveness not related to such motives, we 
thus hypothesize that the former relates less strongly than the latter to economists’ 
behavioral measures of competitiveness.  
Hypothesis 2a: The behavioral measure of competitiveness is less strongly 
related to self-reported competitiveness motivated by personal development than to self-
reported competitiveness not motivated by personal development motives. 
By construction, general measures of competitiveness that do not discriminate 
between motives why individuals enter competitive environments comprise all motives 
for individual competitiveness. If, however, different motives lead to different 
relationships, then these measures are likely to display relationships that reflect the 
average of those relationships associated with the more specific ones. Therefore, we 
expect that the general self-reported measure of competitiveness correlates with the 
experimental measure less than competitiveness not motivated by personal development 
but more so than competitiveness motivated by personal development. 
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between the behavioral measure of 
competitiveness and the overall self-reported measure is larger than its relationship 
with the self-reported competitiveness motivated by personal development. 
Hypothesis 2c: The relationship between the behavioral measure of 
competitiveness and the overall self-reported measures is smaller than its relationship 
with the self-reported competitiveness not motivated by personal development. 
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We also hypothesize that this asymmetry extends to correlations with the Big 
Five personality dimensions, such that measures of competitiveness not motivated by 
personal development show correlations similar to behavioral measures but different 
from measures of competitiveness motivated by personal development. 
2.2.3 Motives and contexts II: competing and winning 
While the original analysis stopped at this point, subsequent work allows us to 
further analyze competitiveness not motivated by personal development. Recent 
psychological research examines three motives of individual competitiveness: (a) 
personal development; (b) hypercompetitiveness; and (c) enjoyment of competition (cf. 
Houston et al., 2012), where the concept of hypercompetitiveness refers to an 
individual’s indiscriminate need to compete, win, and to avoid losing at any cost 
(Horney, 1937; Ryckman et al., 1990). This suggests that competitiveness not motivated 
by personal development can be either motivated by enjoyment of competition or 
motivated by a desire to win. 
Individuals, who enjoy competing against others, gain non-monetary benefits 
related to the institution of competition itself, independent of the outcome of a 
competition. An environment allows satisfaction of the enjoyment of competition 
motive to the extent to which it is seen as competitive; i.e. individuals, who enjoy 
competing, are likely to gain more such enjoyment from more competitive 
environments1. Typical economic measurements of competitive preferences apply 
winner-take-all tournaments, which are considered as extremely competitive 
environments (Lazear, 1999). Hence, we argue that enjoyment of competition is likely 
to play an essential role for explaining selection into competitive environments within 
economic experiments. As argued in Section 2.2.2 personal development motives are 
less likely to play an important role for explaining self-selection into competitive 
environments within economic experiments, because typical experimental tasks are 
hardly representative for competitive situations that offer opportunities for personal 
development. Therefore, we expect that individuals, whose self-reported 
competitiveness is substantially driven by enjoyment of competition, are more attracted 
1 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. 
32 
by competitive environments in economic experiments than individuals, whose self-
reported competitiveness is driven by personal development motives.  
Hypothesis 3a: The behavioral measure of competitiveness is less strongly 
related to self-reported competitiveness motivated by personal development than to self-
reported competitiveness motivated by enjoyment of competition. 
As discussed above, if different motives lead to different relationships, then self-
reported general measures of individual competitiveness tend to reflect an average of 
the different motives for entering competitions. Therefore, we expect that the general 
self-reported measure of competitiveness correlates with the experimental measure less 
than competitiveness motivated by enjoyment of competition. 
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between the behavioral measure of 
competitiveness and the overall self-reported measures is smaller than its relationship 
with self-reported competitiveness motivated by enjoyment of competition. 
In our conceptualization of competitiveness as an individual’s tendency to select 
into competitive environments, we have distinguished competitiveness from 
individuals’ preferences over distributions of rewards, and from individuals’ 
preferences related to behavior within competitive environments. A desire to win can be 
expected to have a direct effect on behavior within competition. Within a competition 
individuals with a stronger desire to win might try harder, and spend more effort and 
resources in order to actually win the competition2. The expected effects of a desire to 
win on selection into competition are more ambiguous. On the one hand, individuals, 
who seek to win a competition, have to enter a competition first. On the other hand, 
individuals, who seek to win and avoid losing at any cost, may either not at all be 
willing to enter competitions with a low chance of winning, or anticipate spending 
excessive effort and resources, once they have entered such a competition, and prevent 
this by not entering it.  
2 This effect will be discussed more formally in Chapter III. 
33 
Therefore, we do not have ex-ante hypotheses for the relationship between 
competitiveness motivated by a desire to win and other measures of competitiveness, 
but tentatively explore this relationship in this study. 
 
2.3 METHOD 
2.3.1 Sample and study design 
To study the relationship between psychologists’ self-reported and economists’ 
behavioral measurements of competitiveness we employ a survey among undergraduate 
students with a directly following classroom experiment. Our sample includes 186 
students who are on average 23 years old and all achieved the education level required 
to access a university in Germany. Participants were enrolled in business and economics 
(70%) and related fields such as health economics (15%), a few were enrolled in a 
teacher program (9%), and 6% are majoring in other subjects. Table 2.6 summarizes 
descriptive statistics.  
At the beginning of the survey, students were informed that participation was 
voluntary and that their identities are not recorded to ensure confidentiality. Participants 
were not informed about the specific research question. The survey contained questions 
regarding competitiveness, risk-taking preferences, general self-efficacy, Big Five 
personality, and career anchors; demographic information were gathered at the end of 
the questionnaire. During the survey, participants were informed that at the end of the 
survey 30 participants would be randomly selected to participate in an experiment 
involving decisions and performing a task, where they could earn up to €20.00. After 
describing the experiment in detail, participants were asked to fix their decisions for the 
experiment; these decisions were binding and could not be changed afterwards.  
To reduce problems stemming from participants’ potential tendency to be self-
congruent with respect to their self-reported competitiveness and their plans for their 
behavior in the experiment, self-reported competitiveness scales were administered 
before participants knew the content of the incentivized experiment. Because the 
experiment is associated with real pay-offs, we believe that behavior in the experiment 
is less likely to be affected by earlier self-reported competitiveness than vice versa.  
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For the experiment, we adopt a design that is frequently used to measure 
individual competitiveness (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Shurchkov, 2012; see 
Table 2.1), wherein participants perform a real task and have a choice between a non-
competitive piece-rate compensation and a competitive winner-take-all tournament 
compensation for their task performance.  In the task participants were to answer up to 
20 trivia questions within 5 minutes (question taken from Eberlein, Ludwig, & 
Nafziger, 2011). For each question participants had to choose the one correct answer out 
of four given options. Questions were presented on a quiz sheet and could be answered 
in any order. No feedback was provided during the quiz. The experiment took about 20 
minutes including the payment. During the survey, participants got four example 
questions, which they could solve (without any incentives) to familiarize with the task.  
Then, participants had to choose the payment for their task performance. With 
piece-rate payment, participants got their payoffs according only to their own 
performance and received €0.50 for every correctly answered question in the quiz. With 
the tournament payment, each participant’s score was compared to the score of a 
randomly matched competitor. If participants had more correct answers than their 
respective competitor they received €1.00 per correct answer; otherwise they received 
€0.00. Ties were broken randomly. After the survey questionnaires were collected, the 
randomly selected participants performed the task, and participants were paid 
accordingly3.  
To further validate the hypothesized relations among different competitiveness 
measures we attempt to embed the competitiveness measures into their nomological 
network and test their differential relationships to broad personality dimensions as well 
as to career orientation. We follow psychological research, which has employed the Big 
Five model to relate competitiveness to broad-bandwidth personality inventory 
(Fletcher & Nusbaum, 2008; Müller & Schwieren, 2012; Ross, Rausch, & Canada, 
2003; Ryckman, Thornton, Gold, & Collier, 2011). Specifically, Ross et al. (2003) 
reported that different measures of competitiveness differently relate to the five-factor 
model of personality. Furthermore, since both behavioral and psychometric measures of 
competitiveness have been related to choosing more competitive careers (e.g., Bönte & 
3 The random selection of participants was performed via code numbers. The experimenters 
could verify the code, only if the selected participants showed-up for the task. From the 30 randomly 
selected participants, 23 showed up and actually performed the task. 
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Piegeler, 2013; Buser et al., 2014; Houston et al., 2015), we assess the practical 
relevance of potential differences between behavioral and psychometric measures by 
investigating their respective relations to a measure of a competitive career orientation. 
2.3.2 Measures of competitiveness 
The behavioral measure of competitiveness (BC) is reflected by participants’ 
choices of the competitive payment scheme; a dummy variable is generated, that takes 
the value zero for participants choosing the non-competitive piece-rate payment and the 
value one for participants choosing the competitive tournament payment. Out of our 
sample, 56 participants (30%) chose the competitive payment in our experiment, while 
130 preferred the piece-rate payment (70%). 
General self-reported competitiveness (SC) is operationalized through a short-
scale that seeks to straightforwardly cover our definition of competitiveness. We select 
four items from different sources that we consider most suitable to distinguish between 
more and less competitive individuals, and which do not explicitly include reasons why 
individuals prefer competitive environments. We include the highest-loading item from 
Newby’s and Klein’s (2014) ‘general competitiveness’ subscale (“I enjoy competing 
against others.”), the highest-loading reverse-coded item from Smither’s and Houston’s 
(1992) subscale related to general affective responses to competition (“I find 
competitive situations unpleasant.”), an adaptation of an item from Helmreich’s and 
Spence’s (1978) WOFO competitiveness subscale as employed within a large European 
survey (“I like situations in which I compete with others.”, Bönte & Piegeler, 2013), and 
a newly created item that at a general level focuses on settings where one’s goal could 
also be pursued outside a competitive environment (“I prefer competing with others 
when pursuing a goal over pursuing the goal alone.”)4. Participants responded to each 
item on a scale from “does not apply at all” (1) to “fully applies” (7). The average score 
of responses to these items reflects our self-reported measure of competitiveness 
(α=0.78).  
4 Note that our items focus on self-reports and avoid normative statements (e.g., “Outside the 
world of sports, people should compete as little as possible”, Kleinjans, 2009, p. 705), which may but do 
not need to relate to one’s own behavior. 
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Table 2.3: Three dimensions of self-reported competitiveness 
Dimension Items 
General 
self-reported 
Competitiveness (SC) 
I find competitive situations unpleasant. 
I enjoy competing against others 
I like situations in which I compete with others 
I prefer competing with others when pursuing a goal 
over pursuing the goal alone 
Personal 
development 
motive (PD) 
I can improve my competence by competing 
Competition allows me to judge my level of competence 
I use competition as a way to prove something to myself 
Competition allows me to measure my own success 
Desire to win (DW) 
It annoys me when other people perform better than I do 
I try to be the best person in the room at almost anything 
It is important to me to perform better than others on a task 
I like to be better than others at almost everything 
We measure individuals’ personal development motives (PD) with the 4-item 
personal enhancement subscale from Newby’s and Klein’s (2014) Competitiveness 
Orientation Measure, e.g. “I can improve my competence by competing.” Participants 
responded on a scale from “does not apply at all” (1) to “fully applies” (7). 
Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrate that PD is distinct from SC; the two-factorial 
model (χ²(19)=47.68, CFI=0.955, SRMR=0.047, AIC=4884.25, BIC=4964.90) fits 
better than the unidimensional model (χ²(20)=90.52, CFI=0.889, SRMR=0.060, 
AIC=4925.10, BIC=5002.52). The average response to these four items scaled with a 
constant factor β1, which is explained below, forms our score for competitiveness 
motivated by personal development (SCPD, α=0.83). 
The desire to win is measured by two items from the Newby’s & Klein’s (2014) 
dominant competitiveness subscale (“I try to be the best person in the room at almost 
anything.” and “I like to be better than others at almost everything.”) and two related 
items from the competitiveness subscale of Helmreich’s & Spence’s (1978) WOFO 
scale (“It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.” and “It is important 
to me to perform better than others on a task”). Participants responded to each item on a 
7-point scale from “does not apply at all” (1) to “fully applies” (7). The average 
response to these four items scaled with a constant factor β2, which is explained below, 
forms our score for competitiveness motivated by a desire to win (SCDW, α=0.84).  
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Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrate that these four items form a factor that 
is distinct from both our 4-item measurement of general competitiveness and the 4-item 
personal development scale. The fit of the three-factorial model (χ²(51)=98.17, 
CFI=0.947, SRMR=0.055, AIC=6167.22, BIC=6285.91) is much better than both two-
factorial models assuming that the desire to win is either the same factor as SC (χ²(53)= 
252.69, CFI=0.775, SRMR=0.097, AIC=6317.73, BIC=6430.34) or the same factor as 
SCPD (χ²(53)= 209.83, CFI=0.823, SRMR=0.089, AIC=6274.88, BIC=6387.49). 
2.3.3 Personality: The Big Five 
To measure personality we employ the German translation (Gerlitz & Schupp, 
2005) of the 25-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) with 
five items for each dimension. Participants responded to each item on a scale from 
“does not apply at all” (1) to “fully applies” (7). Average responses to the respective 
five items form scores for Openness to experience (α=0.76), Conscientiousness 
(α=0.76), Extraversion (α=0.89), Agreeableness (α=0.68), and Neuroticism (α=0.66)5. 
2.3.4 Career Orientation 
We measure participants’ intent to work in competitive management positions 
by the five-item subscale general management career anchor (GM) from the German 
translation (Schein, 2005) of Schein’s Career Anchors Orientation Inventory (Schein, 
1990). Due to its frequent application in industrial trainings (e.g., Kniveton, 2004) and 
its consideration in research on vocational behavior (e.g. Rodrigues, Guest, & 
Budjanovcanin, 2013), we believe this scale to be appropriate for the exploratory part of 
our study. A career orientation is a meaningful measure within our sample, because 
despite being in a very early stage of their professional career, students have typically 
developed a general idea about their career goals (Scherer, Adams, Carley, & Wiebe, 
1989). Participants rated the importance of management-related job aspects on a scale 
5 The relatively low Cronbach’s alphas found in our sample match with those found in the study 
developing and validating the German items (see Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005, p.12) and are comparable with 
observations for other short versions of the Big Five (e.g., Rammstedt & John, 2005). These low values 
can be explained by the fact that a few items per personality dimension are aimed to cover a broad range 
of facets within each dimension (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005). 
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from “completely unimportant” (1) to “extremely important” (9). The average response 
forms the score for the orientation towards a general management career (α=0.76).  
2.3.5 Control variables 
Because competitiveness is defined independent of risk preferences and 
expectations of winning (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) and task stereotypes may 
differently influence the willingness to enter competition of women and men 
(Shurchkov, 2012), we include related variables as statistical controls. As personality 
and career anchors are rather context-independent, we also control for general risk 
preferences and performance expectations. For completeness and consistency, all our 
analyses include the same set of control variables reported in Table 2.6. 
We adapt an experimentally validated measure of risk preferences from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (Dohmen et al., 2011). On a scale from “unwilling to 
take risks” (1) to “very prone to take risks” (7), respondents indicate their willingness to 
take risk related to four domains relevant in our study: games, and financial investments 
(both because of the experiment’s nature), professional career (because of addressing 
participants’ intentions to take management jobs), and general (to cover additional 
aspects not reflected by the domain-specific measures).  
To measure confidence, we ask participants to forecast their own score (number 
of correctly answered questions) and the average score of all other participants. 
Respondents also estimate the percentage of other respondents who correctly answered 
more questions than they themselves do. Due to the potentially complex interplay 
between judgments of individual and others’ performances, e.g. anchoring effects, we 
included all three measures of expectations as separate controls. To capture more 
general aspects of confidence we included general self-efficacy (GSE) measured by 
Chen, Gully, and Eden’s (2001) New General Self-Efficacy scale. Participants rate each 
item on a scale from “does not apply at all” (1) to “fully applies” (7); responses to all 
items were averaged (α=0.86).  
We included a dummy variable indicating respondents’ gender (female) and a 
variable indicating their age. 
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2.3.6 Response Style markers 
When multiple constructs are measured with the same method an observed 
correlation between these constructs can be inflated by a common method variance 
(Lindell & Whitney, 2001), which has been particularly highlighted for behavioral self-
reports (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). While common method 
variance may stem from a variety of sources (Podsakoff et al., 2003), response styles 
have been emphasized as a particularly problematic source in questionnaires using 
Likert-type rating scales (Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert, 2010). For a subsample of 
our respondents we can control for related biases and, thereby, test the robustness of our 
findings. 
At the end of our survey 30 randomly selected participants were to perform the 
experimental task. During that time the other participants were provided an additional 
survey including marker questions measured in the same way as the self-reported 
competitiveness measures but not related to the content of our survey, which could be 
used to identify participants’ response styles (Weijters et al., 2010). For this subsample 
of participants we perform additional robustness checks including these variables as 
additional controls. Table 2.4 reports all marker questions. 
2.3.7 Measurement of Response Styles 
To measure response styles, we follow recommendations by Weijters, 
Schillewaert, and Geuens (2008) for studies in which response styles are of secondary 
interest. We use responses to 15 items about economic policy shown in Table 2.4, 
which do not relate to variables of interest in our study, to generate indicators for 
acquiescent response style (ARS), disacquiescent response style (DRS), extreme 
response style (ERS) and midpoint response style (MRS).  
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Table 2.4: Questions for response style markers 
Original Item English Item Text 
Response 
Style 
Marker 
Bisher habe ich mein VWL-Wissen noch 
nicht mit der Realität in Verbindung bringen 
können. 
So far I have not been able to relate my 
knowledge of economics to reality. 
1 
Der Staat sollte die Marktmacht großer 
Unternehmen, wie Amazon, Google oder 
Facebook, beschränken. 
The state should restrict market power of 
large companies, such as Amazon, 
Google or Facebook. 
1 
Für den Klimaschutz muss die Wind- und 
Solarenergie finanziell gefördert werden. 
For the purpose of climate protection 
wind energy and solar energy have to be 
financially subsidized. 
1 
Jede CO2 Einsparung ist gut. Every CO2 saving is good. 
1 
Steuern auf die Emission von Schadstoffen 
bieten einen besseren Anreiz für die 
Beschränkung von Emissionen als die 
Festlegung von Schadstoffobergrenzen. 
Taxes on the emission of pollutants offer 
better incentives to reduce emission than 
the regulation of maximum pollution 
levels. 
1 
Wir müssen überall CO2-Emissionen 
verringern. 
We need to reduce CO2 emission 
everywhere. 
2 
Ökonomische Modelle sollten ein möglichst 
exaktes Abbild der Realität liefern. 
Economic models should display reality 
as exactly as possible. 
2 
Hohe Staatsschulden haben negative Effekte 
auf das gesamtwirtschaftliche Wachstum. 
High public debt has negative effects on 
economic growth. 
2 
Der Staat sollte die F&E Aktivitäten privater 
Unternehmen subventionieren. 
The state should subsidize R&D 
activities of private firms. 
2 
Inflation ist generell schlecht für die 
Wirtschaft. 
Inflation is generally bad for the 
economy. 
2 
Mir ist bislang unklar, was 
volkswirtschaftliche Forschung eigentlich ist. 
So far I do not clearly understand what 
economic research actually is. 
3 
Es ist gut, dass der Taxidienst „Uber“ den 
Markt aufmischt. 
It is good that the taxi service “Uber” 
roughs up the market. 
3 
Unternehmen investieren aus 
gesamtwirtschaftlicher Sicht zu wenig in 
Forschung und Entwicklung. 
From an economic perspective firms do 
not invest enough in R&D. 
3 
Wir müssen dort CO2-Emissionen verringern, 
wo viel emittiert wird. 
We should reduce CO2 emission there, 
where most is emitted.  
3 
Alle Länder der EURO-Zone sollten ihre 
Staatsverschuldung senken. 
All countries of the EURO-zone should 
reduce public debt. 
3 
Notes: Items used to calculate response style markers. 
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Participants responded to these items on a 7-point Likert scale. We randomly 
split the 15 items into three sets of 5 items as reported in Table 2.4, each of which we 
use to calculate an indicator for each response style using the prescriptions by 
Baumgartner and Steenkamp (2001). Table 2.5 reports summary statistics of the 
calculated markers for each item group. 
Table 2.5: Summary statistics of response style markers 
correlation 
mean s.d. ARS1 ARS2 ARS3 DRS1 DRS2 DRS3 ERS1 ERS2 ERS3 MRS1 MRS2 
ARS 1 1.03 0.60 1.00 
ARS 2 0.74 0.49 0.50 1.00 
ARS 3 0.93 0.52 0.50 0.54 1.00 
DRS 1 0.42 0.43 -0.46 -0.14 -0.03 1.00 
DRS 2 0.48 0.46 -0.21 -0.39 -0.05 0.44 1.00 
DRS 3 0.47 0.35 -0.16 -0.03 -0.24 0.40 0.34 1.00 
ERS 1 0.17 0.24 0.58 0.40 0.38 0.26 0.10 0.16 1.00 
ERS 2 0.13 0.16 0.30 0.53 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.58 1.00 
ERS 3 0.17 0.20 0.38 0.48 0.62 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.57 0.55 1.00 
MRS 1 0.17 0.17 -0.45 -0.23 -0.36 -0.18 -0.07 -0.04 -0.25 -0.19 -0.26 1.00 
MRS 2 0.28 0.22 -0.08 -0.38 -0.31 -0.23 -0.47 -0.23 -0.20 -0.29 -0.28 0.24 1.00 
MRS 3 0.23 0.21 -0.15 -0.30 -0.55 -0.17 -0.15 -0.37 -0.17 -0.20 -0.29 0.33 0.42 
Notes: N=163 
We conduct confirmatory factor analysis to identify the latent response style 
factors ARS, DRS, ERS, and MRS using the “RIRSMACS model for cross-mode style 
comparison” of Weijters et al. (2008, p. 415). Results of the four-factor model are 
reported in Figure 2.1. The model shows sufficient fit (χ2(30) = 37.83, CFI = 0.994, 
SRMR = 0.051, AIC = -433.11, BIC = -247.48). Predicted scores for these four latent 
variables (ARS, DRS, ERS, and MRS) are included as controls in a robustness check.  
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Figure 2.1: Results of the RIRSMACS model 
Notes: N=163. Figure reports results of maximum likelihood estimation of four factor model. For 
observed items and latent factors δ indicates error variance, ρ indicates covariance, and λ indicates 
factor loading.  
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2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Personal development motives vs. other motives of competitiveness 
We measure competitiveness not motivated by personal development (SCnoPD) 
through residualizing SCPD from SC
6. We regress PD on SC using a simple ordinary 
least squares estimation: 
SCi = β1 ∙ PDi + α +εi (2.4.1) 
with β1 as the estimated coefficient for PD, α being the constant, and εi the error term. 
Variation in competitiveness not motivated by personal development is given by 
SCnoPD = α + εi. Scaling PD with β1, such that SCPD = β1 ∙ PDi, ensures that SC equals 
the sum of the perfectly uncorrelated components SCPD and SCnoPD, which permits a 
meaningful interpretation and comparison of both coefficients. Table 2.9 reports results 
of the residualization. 
Table 2.9: Residualization of self-reported competitiveness I 
Dep-Var.: Self-reported Competitiveness (SC) Coef. (s.e.) 
Personal development Motive (PD) β1 = 0.5964 (0.0536)*** 
Constant α = 1.5498 (0.2483)*** 
R2 0.4022 
Notes: N=186. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Figure 2.2 reports shares of participants choosing the competitive payment in the 
experiment, i.e. the behavioral competitiveness (BC), sorted by scores of self-reported 
competitiveness; as expected, this share is higher among individuals with higher self-
reported competitiveness scores (SC). In contrast, there is almost no increase in shares 
of participants choosing the competitive payment with higher SCPD. As expected, 
however, the share of participants choosing the competitive payment continuously 
increases with SCnoPD.  
6 Including both SC and its antecedent PD as explanatory variables would create a bad control 
problem (Angrist & Pischke, 2008), which complicates a meaningful interpretation of estimated 
coefficients. To avoid this, we partition variation in SC into uncorrelated parts, SCPD driven by variations 
in personal enhancement motives and SCnoPD not driven by them.  
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Figure 2.2: Behavioral and self-reported competitiveness 
Notes: Relative frequency of participants selecting tournament in the experiment (BC) conditional on 
scores of (A) self-reported competitiveness (SC), (B) self-reported competitiveness due to personal 
development motives (SCPD), and (C) self-reported competitiveness due to other motives (SCnoPD). Scores 
categorized in classes (n-0.5, n+0.5]. Number of Observations within each category provided within or 
above bars. 
To get a first impression of the relationship between the competitiveness 
experiment and the self-reported measures, we look at the plain binary correlations 
reported in Table 2.7. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the behavioral measure of 
competitiveness displays a positive correlation with self-reported competitiveness 
(SC = 0.32, p<0.001). The behavioral measure, however, is not and, thus, less correlated 
with competitiveness that is due to personal development motives (SCPD = 0.10, 
p=0.170), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2b. In contrast and consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, the behavioral measure is more strongly correlated with competitiveness 
that is not due to personal development motives (SCnoPD = 0.33, p<0.001). Because the 
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correlations of the behavioral measure with both SC and SCnoPD are almost identical, 
this first inspection of our data does not seem to support our Hypothesis 2c.  
Figure 2.3: Replicating gender differences in competitiveness 
Notes:  N=186. Figure 2.3a (left) shows averages of competitiveness measures for females (dark grey) 
and males (light grey). Self-reported competitiveness (SC) is scaled to the interval [0, 1]. Figure 2.3b 
(right) shows cumulative distribution of SCnoPD for females (dark grey) and males (light grey). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Moreover, we replicate the finding of previous studies that men are more likely 
than women to choose competitive pay (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Both experimental 
and self-reported measures of competitiveness display substantial negative correlations 
with being female. While 56 percent of the male students chose competitive pay, only 
14 percent of the female students chose competitive payment (Two-sample test of 
proportions: diff=0.56-0.14=0.42>0, z=6.13, p<0.001). For self-reported 
competitiveness we observe a score of 4.62 for male students and of 3.96 for female 
students (Two-sample t test: diff=4.62-3.96=0.66>0, t=3.83, p<0.001). Regarding the 
components of self-reported competitiveness SCPD and SCnoPD, we find a negative 
correlation of SCnoPD with being female, but no substantial correlation between gender 
and SCPD. While male students show higher average scores in both measures, these 
gender differences are only significant for SCnoPD (Two-sample t test: diff=1.87-
1.35=0.52>0, t=3.90, p<0.001), but insignificant for SCPD (Two-sample t test: 
diff=2.75-2.61=0.14>0, t=1.25, p=0.213). Figure 2.3a illustrates those gender 
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differences. Figure 2.3b shows the cumulative distribution of SCnoPD by gender 
indicating a first-order stochastic dominance of the male distribution. 
Regression analyses provide further insights by statistically controlling for 
confounding variables, such as risk preferences, competence perceptions, and gender 
effects (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Shurchkov, 2012). All hypotheses involve a 
relationship of the behavioral measure of competitiveness (BC) with self-reported 
competitiveness (SC) or a component of it (SCPD and SCnoPD). Therefore, we employ 
logistic regression analyses with BC as dependent variable. The baseline estimation 
(Model 1) includes all controls, but no measure of self-reported competitiveness. While 
male students and more confident individuals are more likely to self-select into 
competition, the estimated effects of risk preferences are statistically insignificant 
(individually and jointly tested). Estimating the relationship between the behavioral and 
self-reported measures of competitiveness (Model 2), we observe that also with control 
variables included, there is still a significant relationship between BC and SC, which 
provides support for Hypothesis 1. 
To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c we employ the two variables resulting from the 
residualization presented in Table 2.9, that is, competitiveness motivated by personal 
development (SCPD) and competitiveness not motivated by such motives (SCnoPD). In a 
first step we use constrained regression analysis to enforce that both components have 
the same effect (Model 3). Model 3 illustrates that (by design) SC equals the sum of the 
perfectly uncorrelated components SCPD and SCnoPD, therefore Model 3 equals Model 2.  
As a next step, we relax the constraint (Model 4). The two components of self-
reported competitiveness SCPD and SCnoPD relate differently to BC: SCPD does not relate 
to BC, but SCnoPD relates to BC
7. Within Model 4 the coefficient of SCnoPD is 
significantly larger than the coefficient of SCPD (βSCnoPD – βSCPD=0.829>0, SE=0.446, 
p=0.0315).  This finding provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2a. In support of 
Hypothesis 2b, we find a significant positive difference between the coefficient of SC in 
Model 2 and the coefficient of SCPD in Model 4 (βSC – βSCPD=0.503>0, SE=0.262, 
p=0.027).  
7 Separately including each of the two components SCPD or SCnoPD does not change the result. 
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Table 2.10: Logistic regressions  
of behavioral competitiveness on self-reported competitiveness I 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Odds 
Ratios 
Marginal 
Effects 
Self-reported competitiveness (SC)  0.43* 
(0.20) 
SC: Personal development (SCPD)  0.43* -0.08  0.93 -0.01 
(0.20) (0.31) (0.29) (0.05) 
SC: Not personal development (SCnoPD)  0.43*  0.75**  2.12**  0.13** 
(0.20) (0.27) (0.57) (0.04) 
Control variables
   Risk: General -0.06 -0.03 -0.03  0.01  1.01  0.00 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.03) 
   Risk: Job  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.23  1.26  0.04 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.03) 
   Risk: Financial investments  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  1.11  0.02 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.03) 
   Risk: Games  0.18  0.10  0.10  0.18  1.19  0.03 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.02) 
   Confidence: General self-efficacy  0.43  0.21  0.21  0.17  1.18  0.03 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.40) (0.06) 
   Confidence: Own expected Score  0.20*  0.20*  0.20*  0.21**  1.23**  0.03** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01) 
   Confidence: Expected average score -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04  0.96 -0.01 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) 
   Confidence: Probability to win -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  1.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
   Age  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.04  1.05  0.01 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) 
   Female -1.58*** -1.43** -1.43** -1.38**  0.25** -0.25** 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.12) (0.09) 
Constant -6.69** -7.65*** -7.65*** -7.27** 
(2.15) (2.21) (2.21) (2.31) 
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.294 0.294 0.314 
Log Likelihood -82.67*** -80.33*** -80.33*** -78.09*** 
(LR χ2) (62.24) (66.91) (66.91) (71.41) 
Notes:  N=186. Model 3 is constrained to equalize coefficients of SCPD  and SCnoPD. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
In support of Hypothesis 2c, we also find that the coefficient of SC in Model 2 is 
smaller than the coefficient of SCnoPD in Model 4 (βSCnoPD – βSC=0.326>0, SE=0.189, 
p=0.0425). For a better interpretation of effect sizes we calculate odds ratios and 
marginal effects for Model 4. Increasing SCnoPD by one point on a seven-point scale 
doubles the odds of choosing competitive payments; the probability of such selection 
increases by about 13 percentage points (Table 2.10, last two columns). 
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Analyses of multiple self-reported rating-scale based measures might biased by 
common method variance (CMV), e.g. resulting from individuals varying in their 
response styles (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Weijters et al., 2010). We conduct a robustness 
check with respect to response styles using the subsample of participants, who provided 
this information. Table 2.11 shows results for Model 4 of the previous analysis when 
additionally controlling for response styles. The coefficient, odds ratios, and marginal 
effects of ARS, DRS, MRS, and ERS are all insignificant, which indicates no effect of 
response styles on behavioral competitiveness. More importantly, we still observe the 
same relation between competitiveness measures as in the main analysis. The model 
indicates a positive relation between SCnoPD and BC, but no significant relation between 
SCPD and BC. A generalized Hausmann test indicates no significant changes in the 
coefficients of SCPD and SCnoPD when controls for response styles are included 
(χ²(2)=2.27, p=0.321). Therefore, we consider our findings to be robust against potential 
biases stemming from response styles. 
Table 2.11: Logistic regressions including controls for response styles 
Dep. Var.: Behavioral Competitiveness Coef. Odds Ratios Marginal Effects 
SC: Personal development (SCPD) -0.23 (0.34) 0.79 (0.27) -0.04 (0.06) 
SC: Not personal development (SCnoPD) 0.62 (0.29)* 1.85 (0.54)* 0.11 (0.05)* 
Control variables
   Risk: General -0.06 (0.23) 0.94 (0.22) -0.01 (0.04) 
   Risk: Job 0.42 (0.20)* 1.52 (0.31)* 0.08 (0.04)* 
   Risk: Financial investments 0.16 (0.17) 1.17 (0.20) 0.03 (0.03) 
   Risk: Games 0.21 (0.15) 1.23 (0.19) 0.04 (0.03) 
   Confidence: General self-efficacy 0.38 (0.40) 1.46 (0.58) 0.07 (0.07) 
   Confidence: Own expected Score 0.20 (0.09)* 1.22 (0.12)* 0.04 (0.02)* 
   Confidence: Expected average score 0.02 (0.10) 1.02 (0.10) 0.00 (0.02) 
   Confidence: Probability to win 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 
   Age 0.00 (0.07) 1.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.01) 
   Female -1.49 (0.54)** 0.23 (0.12)** -0.28 (0.10)** 
Acquiescent response style (ARS) -2.50 (3.57) 0.08 (0.29) -0.45 (0.64) 
Disacquiescent response style (DRS) -2.81 (3.92) 0.06 (0.24) -0.50 (0.70) 
Midpoint response style (MRS) 1.57 (8.46) 4.82 (40.77) 0.28 (1.52) 
Extreme response style (ERS) 6.24 (6.10) 513.13 (3,129.83) 1.12 (1.09) 
Constant -8.47 (2.67)** 
Pseudo R2 0.356  
Log Likelihood (χ2) -66.25 (73.11)***  
Notes:  N=163. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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The previous analysis suggests that competitiveness motivated by personal 
development (SCPD) and competitiveness not motivated by personal development 
(SCnoPD) differently relate to the behavioral measure of competitiveness (BC). The 
divergence between SCnoPD and SCPD extends to their respective relationships with 
personality. Table 2.12 reports partial correlations of competitiveness measures with the 
Big Five personality dimensions when controlling for risk-preferences, confidence, 
gender, and age. In contrast to suggestions relating conscientiousness to 
competitiveness (e.g., Caliendo, Fossen, Kritikos, & Wetter, 2015), conscientiousness 
and openness to experience, do not relate to any type of competitiveness.  
Table 2.12: Partial correlations of competitiveness with 
personality and managerial career anchor I 
Behavioral 
competitiveness 
Self-reported competitiveness 
BC   SCnoPD    SCPD SC=SCnoPD+SCPD 
Openness to experience  .10  .05  .02  .06 
Conscientiousness -.03  .06  .02  .07 
Extraversion  .17*  .32*** -.12  .18* 
Agreeableness   .07  .11 -.20** -.04 
Neuroticism -.16* -.23**  .17* -.08 
General Management  .03  -.00  .18*  .12 
Notes: N=186. Partial correlations controlling for risk preferences, confidence, gender, and age. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Extraversion, reflecting individuals being sociable, gregarious, and assertive, 
positively correlates with SCnoPD, which is rather consistent with results from various 
psychometric scales (e.g., Ross et al., 2003; Ryckman et al., 2011), but does not 
correlate with SCPD. In contrast, agreeableness, reflecting people being warm, generous, 
trusting, and altruistic, negatively correlates with SCPD, but not with SCnoPD. BC and 
SCnoPD exhibit striking similarities in their correlations patterns as they are positively 
associated with extraversion but not associated with agreeableness.  
Neuroticism, which is low when people are emotionally stable, even-tempered, 
and self-reliant, displays an interesting correlational pattern. It positively correlates with 
SCPD and thereby mirrors results on hypercompetitive attitudes (Ross et al., 2003) but 
negatively with SCnoPD. Again, BC behaves like SCnoPD and is — consistent with 
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Müller’s and Schwieren’s (2012) findings — negatively associated with neuroticism. 
Thus, depending on the specific competition neuroticism can display both positive and 
negative relationships with competitiveness. Neurotic individuals might shy away from 
competition if they associate it with negative experiences, like stress and pressure, but 
may embrace competition if they associate it with positive experiences like personal 
development.  
Finally, an interest in a managerial career is more strongly associated with SCPD 
than with SCnoPD. Again, BC and SCnoPD exhibit remarkable similarities as both do not 
display a relationship with participants’ interest in a managerial career.  
2.4.2 Desire to Win & Enjoyment of Competition 
We measure enjoyment of competition through residualizing SCPD as well as 
SCDW from SC. We regress PD and DW on SC using a simple ordinary least squares 
estimation: 
SCi = β1 ∙ PDi + β2 ∙ DWi + α +εi (2.4.2) 
with β1 as the estimated coefficient for PD, β2 as the estimated coefficient for DW, 
α being the constant, and εi the error term. Variation in enjoyment of competition is 
given by SCEC = α + εi. We scale PD with β1, such that SCPD = β1 ∙ PDi, and we scale 
DW with β2, such that SCDW = β2 ∙ DWi. As introduced in Section 2.4.1, this ensures 
that SC equals the sum of its components SCPD, SCDW, and SCEC. SCEC is perfectly 
uncorrelated with both SCPD and SCDW, which permits a meaningful interpretation and 
comparison of all three coefficients.  
Table 2.13 reports results of the residualization. The residualization coefficient 
of the desire to win (β2) is insignificant, which indicates that in our sample the self-
reported measure of the desire to win and the general self-reported competitiveness 
measure are only weakly related. This is noteworthy, since we observe a substantial 
positive correlation (r=0.36, p<0.001) between SC and SCDW. The residualization shows 
that once controlling for SCPD this relation is substantially reduced. 
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Table 2.13: Residualization of self-reported competitiveness II 
Dep-Var.: Self-reported Competitiveness (SC) Coef. (s.e.) 
Personal development Motive (PD) β1 = 0.5812 (0.0636)*** 
Desire to win (DW) β2 = 0.0274 (0.0611) 
Constant α = 1.5175 (0.2590)*** 
R2 0.4028 
Notes: N=186. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Moreover, the resulting measure for the enjoyment of competition SCEC is 
almost perfectly correlated with SCnoPD (r=0.9995, p<0.001), while SCDW has no 
significant correlation with SCnoPD. These first results already strongly suggest that 
self-reported competitiveness not driven by personal development motives is primarily 
driven by enjoyment of competition rather than by a desire to win. We observe 
significant gender differences, such that average male students score higher than 
average female students in both the desire to win (Two-sample t test: 
diff=0.109-0.095=0.014>0, t=2.60, p=0.010) and the enjoyment of competition 
(Two-sample t test: diff=1.83-1.32=0.51>0, t=3.82, p<0.001). 
Table 2.14 shows results of logistic regression estimations with three motives of 
self-reported competitiveness. Again we first use constrained regression analysis to 
enforce that all three components have the same effect (Model 5) showing that now (by 
design) SC equals the sum of the three motives SCPD, SCDW and SCEC. Hence, Model 5 
equals Model 2 and Model 3. When relaxing the constraint (Model 6) we find a positive 
effect of SCEC on BC, but no effect of SCPD, or SCDW.  
The difference between the coefficient of enjoyment of competition SCEC and 
the coefficient of SCPD is weakly significant (βEC – βPD=0.767>0, SE=0.506, p=0.0643), 
which provides weak support for Hypothesis 3a. We also observe weakly significant 
differences between the coefficients for enjoyment of competition (SCEC) and general 
SC (βEC – βGC=0.313>0, SE=0.192, p=0.0516), which supports Hypothesis 3b. 
Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the difference between the coefficients of 
SC and of SCPD is still weakly significant (βGC – βPD=0.454>0, SE=0.327, p=0.0823). 
Odds ratios and marginal effects of Model 6 indicate that the effect size for enjoyment 
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of competition is almost identical to the effect size of SCnoPD discussed in the previous 
section. 
Table 2.14: Logistic regressions 
of behavioral competitiveness on self-reported competiveness II 
Model 5 6 7 
Dep. Var.: Behavioral competitiveness Coef. Coef. 
Odds 
Ratios 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coef. 
SC: Personal development motive   0.43* -0.03 0.97 -0.00 -0.11 
(0.20) (0.36) (0.35) (0.06) (0.40) 
SC: Enjoyment of competition   0.43*     0.74**     2.09**     0.12** 0.60* 
(0.20) (0.27) (0.56) (0.04) (0.29) 
SC: Desire to win   0.43* -2.14 0.12 -0.36 -5.54 
(0.20) (6.98) (0.82) (1.17) (7.80) 
Control variables 
   Risk: General -0.03 0.01 1.01 0.00 -0.08 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.03) (0.23) 
   Risk: Job 0.20 0.24 1.27 0.04 0.43* 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.03) (0.20) 
   Risk: Financial investments 0.11 0.11 1.11 0.02 0.17 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.03) (0.17) 
   Risk: Games 0.10 0.18 1.20 0.03 0.22 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.02) (0.16) 
   Confidence: General self-efficacy 0.21 0.17 1.18 0.03 0.39 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.40) (0.06) (0.40) 
   Confidence: Own expected score   0.20*   0.20*   1.23*     0.03** 0.19* 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) 
   Confidence: Expected average score -0.05 -0.04 0.96 -0.01 0.02 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) 
   Confidence: Probability to win -0.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.00 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
   Acquiescent response style (ARS) -2.23 
(3.59) 
   Disacquiescent response style (DRS) -2.70 
(3.90) 
   Midpoint response style (MRS) 1.70 
(8.48) 
   Extreme response style (ERS) 5.91 
(6.08) 
   Age 0.06 0.04 1.04 0.01 -0.00 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) 
   Female   -1.43**   -1.41**     0.24**    -0.26** -1.57** 
(0.45) (0.47) (0.11) (0.09) (0.56) 
Constant   -7.65***   -7.03** -8.00** 
(2.21) (2.38) (2.73) 
Obs. 186 186 163 
Pseudo R2    0.294    0.315    0.359 
Log Likelihood -80.33*** -78.00*** -65.93*** 
(LR χ2) (66.91) (71.58) (73.74) 
Notes:  N=186. Model 1 is constrained to equalize coefficients of SCPD, SCEC, and SCDW. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. 
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Model 7 additionally controls for response styles. Again the coefficients of ARS, 
DRS, MRS, and ERS are all insignificant, which indicates no effect of response styles 
on behavioral competitiveness. We still observe a positive relation between SCEC and 
BC, but no significant relation of BC with SCPD and SCDW. A generalized Hausmann 
test indicates no significant changes in the coefficients of SCPD, SCDW, and SCEC when 
controls for response styles are included (χ²(3)=2.52, p=0.472). Therefore, we consider 
our findings to be robust against potential biases stemming from response styles. 
Table 2.15: Partial correlations of competitiveness with personality 
and managerial career anchor II 
Behavioral 
competitiveness 
Self-reported competitiveness 
BC SCEC SCDW SCPD  SC 
Openness to experience  .10  .05  .11  .02  .06 
Conscientiousness -.03  .06  .11  .02  .07 
Extraversion  .17*  .32*** -.17* -.12  .18*   
Agreeableness   .07  .11   -.32*** -.20** -.04 
Neuroticism -.16* -.24**  .29***  .17* -.08 
General Management  .03  -.01  .37***  .18*  .12 
Notes: N=186. Partial correlations controlling for risk preferences, confidence, gender, and age. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Table 2.15 reports partial correlations of competitiveness measures with the Big 
Five personality dimensions when controlling for risk-preferences, confidence, gender, 
and age. Conscientiousness and openness to experience, do neither relate to SCDW, nor 
to SCEC. The enjoyment of competition (SCEC) is positively related to Extraversion and 
negatively related to Neuroticism. Hence, SCEC shows the same correlation pattern as 
BC and SCnoPD. The desire to win (SCDW) is negatively related to Extraversion and 
Agreeableness, but positively related to Neuroticism. The correlation pattern of SCDW 
with the Big Five is clearly distinct from the correlations patterns of BC and SCEC, as 
the respective correlations have opposite signs for Extraversion and Neuroticism. On 
the contrary, the correlation pattern of SCDW is rather similar to the correlation pattern 
of SCPD, as both measures have negative relations with Agreeableness, but positive 
relations with Neuroticism. Furthermore, both SCDW and SCPD are positively associated 
with an interest in a managerial career, while BC and SCEC are not. 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
2.5.1 Summary of findings 
Following a long tradition of a mutually fruitful exchange between economic 
and psychological research (e.g., Fetchenhauer et al., 2012; Simon, 1959; Van Praag, 
1985), the study presented in this chapter aims at improving our understanding of 
commonalities and differences between experimental-economic and psychological 
measurements of individual competitiveness. We discuss how incentivized behavioral 
experiments as experimental economists’ preferred measurement of competitiveness 
relate to self-reported psychometric scales, which are the dominant measurement of 
individual competitiveness within psychological research. While the experimental 
measurement builds on the revealed preference paradigm and thereby is rather context-
specific, the self-reported scales often explicitly aim at a more general characteristic and 
build on the assumption of epsilon-truthfulness.  
In support of Hypothesis 1 we find a robust positive correlation between 
individuals’ payment choices within a behavioral measure of competitive preferences 
and a general self-reported measure of individual competitiveness based on 
psychometric scales. These findings suggest that both measures are indicators of the 
same underlying latent variable, which might be interpreted as a general preference to 
enter competitive situations. 
We argued that the specific contexts of economic experiments measuring 
individual competitive preferences are likely to provide extremely competitive 
environments, but offer little opportunities for personal development. Consistent with 
the compatibility principle (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005) and with our hypotheses our 
findings suggest, that competitiveness motivated by an enjoyment of competition is 
strongly related to economists’ behavioral measures of competitiveness, while personal 
development motives are less reflected by individuals’ choices to enter a tournament in 
these behavioral experiments. 
In support of Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c choices of competitive payments in the 
experiment more strongly relate to self-reported competitiveness not motivated by 
personal development motives. In contrast, we could not identify a relationship between 
the choice of competitive payment in our experiment and self-reported competitiveness 
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motivated by personal development. These findings support our conjecture that in our 
experiment, which is similar to setups typically used in economic experiments 
measuring competitiveness (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009), participants do not perceive 
competition as an opportunity for personal development. 
Furthermore, we find that self-reported competitiveness not motivated by 
personal development is motivated by enjoyment of competition, rather than by a desire 
to win in competition. In support of Hypotheses 3a and 3b choices of competitive 
payments in the experiment more strongly relate to self-reported competitiveness 
motivated by enjoyment of competition, than to self-reported competitiveness motivated 
by personal development, or to general self-reported competitiveness. This finding is 
consistent with the claim that our participants perceive the winner-take-all tournament, 
but not the piece-rate condition, as a highly competitive environment8. 
Moreover, we find no relation between an individual’s desire to win in a 
competition and self-selection into competitive tournaments within behavioral 
experiments. Consistent with previous psychological studies (e.g., Newby & Klein, 
2014; Smither & Houston, 1992), the general self-reported measure of competitiveness 
is highly correlated with all motives. It captures competitiveness motivated by personal 
development and by enjoyment of competition to large extents. However, when 
controlling for personal development motives, we do not observe a substantial relation 
between the general measure and the desire to win.  
Our results confirm that personal development motives, which are captured by 
self-reported, but not by economists’ behavioral measures of competitiveness, constitute 
a violation of the compatibility principle. Yet, the enjoyment of competition and the 
desire to win do not.  
While we believe this study to make worthwhile contributions to our 
understanding of measurements of individuals’ competitiveness, we acknowledge 
limitations implied by our specific conceptualizations. By defining competitiveness as 
an individual’s general tendency to self-select into competitive environments, we 
neglected any preferences for specific behaviors within competitive environments.  
8 Further empirical evidence for this claim is provided in Chapter V. 
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2.5.2 Implications 
1. Revised experimental designs
Our findings indicate that prior experimental studies measuring individual com-
petitiveness presumably have measured competitiveness that just weakly relates to 
personal development motives, but is driven by enjoyment of competition. Such a clear 
focus has advantages. Current behavioral measures of competitiveness are rather 
capable of separating the effect of enjoyment of competition from the effects of other 
motives of individual competitiveness9. However, if personal development motives are 
not considered as confounds but rather as essential antecedents (see discussion by 
Brocklebank Lewis, & Bates, 2011), then economic studies addressing such 
competitiveness may need adjustments. Related psychometric measures (e.g. Newby & 
Klein, 2014) include items referring to feedback (e.g. “Competition allows me to judge 
my level of competence”) and learning (e.g. “I can improve my competence by 
competing.”). We expect experiments that include more feedback and learning 
opportunities to be more likely to capture competitiveness motivated by personal 
development motives than experiments without such opportunities (e.g., Azmat & 
Iriberri, 2016; Wozniak et al., 2014).  
2. Approximating experimental measures by self-reported measures
Our results suggest that both behavioral competitiveness measures and self-
reported competitiveness scales are indicators of the same underlying latent variable, 
which might be interpreted as a general preference to enter competitive situations. 
Hence, scale-based measures of individual competitiveness, especially when these 
scales focus on the enjoyment of competition (e.g., Houston et al. 2002b), may be able 
to approximate behavioral measures, where behavioral measures cannot be reasonably 
employed. Since incentivized economic experiments are difficult to implement and very 
costly, they are sometimes not feasible, and short psychometric scales might be 
employed instead. This might particularly hold for large-scale surveys (see Bönte & 
Piegeler, 2013), or for representation in socio-economic panels, which also address 
9 The experimental designs presented in Chapter III and Chapter IV show different approaches to 
implement such a separation.    
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individuals’ psychological backgrounds such as risk attitudes (e.g., Dohmen et al., 
2011). Research on individual competitiveness might benefit from the analysis of such 
representative and large-scale surveys in order to get a more comprehensive 
understanding of how individual competitiveness is distributed across populations and 
how it relates to real world behavior. In extreme cases and similar to recent 
developments in measuring risk preferences (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2011), one might even 
need to rely on single items to measure individual competitiveness (e.g. Bönte & 
Piegeler, 2013). 
3. Competitive Preferences and career choices
We find that personal development motives as well as the desire to win might be 
relevant for selection into competitive management positions, whereas the enjoyment of 
competition is not related to such managerial intentions. These findings are very 
important when interpreting recent research linking experimental measures of individual 
competitiveness to career choices (e.g., Buser et al., 2014; Reuben et al., 2015) in 
conjunction with studies linking self-reported psychometric scales to career choices 
(e.g., Bönte & Piegeler, 2013; Kleinjans, 2009). These two types of studies are likely to 
capture slightly different notions of competitiveness. 
This difference between these notions might be particularly interesting, when 
gender differences are emphasized. We are able to replicate the finding of previous 
studies that men are more competitively inclined than women (Croson & Gneezy, 
2009). Both the experiment-based and the scale-based measure of competitiveness point 
to substantial gender differences. However, while we find gender differences for 
competitiveness that is motivated by enjoyment of competition and the desire to win, 
we do not find a gender difference for competitiveness motivated by personal 
development. Hence, none of the three motives of competitiveness indicates gender 
differences and is related to the behavioral measure and is related to managerial 
intentions. While prior research suggests that gender difference in competitiveness 
might partly explain gender differences in labor market outcomes (Buser et al., 2014; 
Flory et al., 2015; Reuben et al., 2015), it remains an open and relevant question, 
whether and to what extent occupational choice is driven by different motives of 
competitiveness. 
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4. Competitive Preferences and personality
We observe striking similarities between behavioral competitiveness and self-
reported competitiveness not motivated by personal development with regard to their 
correlations with the Big Five personality dimensions, whereas the correlation pattern of 
competitiveness motivated by personal development is very dissimilar. This finding 
further validates our distinction of types of competitiveness. It furthermore 
demonstrates that not only economic experiments offer well-defined environments to 
investigate personality (Ferguson, Heckman, & Corr, 2011), but also personality 
frameworks can be employed to better understand economic behavior (Borghans et al., 
2008; Müller & Schwieren, 2012). Our findings are particularly important for recent 
studies investigating the relationship between economic measures of competitiveness 
and personality dimensions such as the Big Five. Müller and Schwieren (2012), for 
instance, report a negative association of neuroticism with competitiveness. While we 
replicate this finding for the experiment-based measure of competitiveness, our study 
highlights that this does not imply that neurotic people will generally avoid competitive 
environments. If competition provides opportunities for personal development, neurotic 
individuals may exploit competitions for exactly that reason and have higher tendency 
to enter such competitions. Thus, the relationship between competitiveness and 
personality might be highly sensitive to the specific context of a competition. 
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Chapter III 
Exploring the Utility 
of Competing and Winning 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Institutions can differ in the importance they place on competitiveness (Niederle, 
2017) and the deliberate design of competition within and between organizations, such 
as promotion contests or innovation contests, has been intensively studied for more than 
30 years (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Connelly et al., 2014). In addition to standard 
economic explanations, the role of individual preferences to enter competitive 
environments has recently gained prominence (Niederle, 2017). Investigating the self-
selection of men and women into a competitive tournament Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) conclude that there is heterogeneity in preferences for entering competition. 
Recent studies have questioned the identification of competitive preferences by Niederle 
and Vesterlund (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016a; 2016b; Van Veldhuizen, 2017) and argued 
that gender differences in self-selection into competition might be fully explained by 
(over-)confidence and risk preferences (Van Veldhuizen, 2017). 
Competitiveness research is creating valuable insights and exploring institutional 
differences in competitiveness and their effects on decision makers with heterogeneous 
preferences for competition remains an open area of behavioral market design 
(Niederle, 2017). However, it faces a severe lack of theoretical foundations and the 
economic interpretation of self-selection into competition remains unclear. In order to 
provide solid foundations for effective market design, research on competitive 
preferences needs to inform the utility function (see Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016b), yet 
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this link between an individual’s self-selection into competition and the individual’s 
utility maximizing behavior is still missing. Currently, it is unclear, whether genuine 
preferences for competition exist; and if they exist, it is unclear, how individual 
heterogeneity in self-selection into competition translates into individual heterogeneity 
in competitive preferences. 
Chapter II has investigated different motives to self-select into competition and 
provided evidence that self-selection into competitive environments is driven by an 
individual’s enjoyment of competition. This finding is consistent with a conjecture that 
men more than women enjoy competing (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Furthermore, 
with the results from Chapter II I cannot rule out the desire to win as an additional 
motive to self-select into competition. Such a desire to win is consistent with another 
stream of experimental research investigating the performance within competition using 
experiments, where competition is exogenously imposed (e.g. Falk, Fehr, and Huffman, 
2008; Blanes i Vidal & Nossol, 2011; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011). In some recent 
studies competitions are designed as tournaments without prizes, where relative 
performance feedback is provided to participants (Azmat & Iriberri 2010; Blanes i Vidal 
& Nossol, 2011), if any rewards are provided to participants, these rewards are purely 
symbolic – such as e.g. a congratulatory card – ensuring that any behavioral effect is 
driven by non- material benefit (Blanes i Vidal & Nossol, 2011; Kosfeld & 
Neckermann, 2011). Results of these studies suggest a high symbolic value of winning a 
tournament (Delfgaauw et al., 2013). While both an enjoyment of competition and a 
desire to win may drive self-selection into competition, it needs to be tested, whether 
such personality characteristics reflect well-known economic preferences, or whether 
economic theory can benefit from the inclusion of these personality characteristics as 
model parameters (see Borghans et al., 2008). 
In Chapter III I link self-selection into competition to an individual’s utility 
maximizing behavior by providing a utility-based model that includes both an 
enjoyment of competition and a desire to win in the individual’s utility function. 
Thereby, I provide a theory driven attempt to disentangle a genuine competitive 
preference from utility maximizing behavior that can be explained by well-known 
economic preferences. I distinguish environments, where individuals provide their 
maximum feasible performance, from environments, where individuals optimize their 
performance by providing a lower performance level. For both types of environments I 
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examine the interplay of an individual’s expected performance and self-selection into 
competition. Under the assumption of maximum performance provision I subsequently 
derive the effects of a value of competing reflecting the phenomenon that individuals 
enjoy competing and of a value of winning reflecting an individual’s desire to win on 
the individual’s self-selection into competitive versus non-competitive environments. 
To examine the usefulness of my model empirically I utilize recent refinements 
in measures of competitiveness (Gneezy & Pietrasz, 2013; Petrie & Segal, 2015; Ifcher 
& Zarghamee, 2016a; 2016b) and identify piece-rate equivalents for multiple 
competitive environments. Furthermore, I introduce an experimental treatment that 
allows manipulating the probability of winning the competition exogenously and 
calculating a non-monetary value of competing as well as a non-monetary value of 
winning. This study deepens the understanding of competitive preferences by 
quantifying the behavioral distortion created by such preferences as compared to the 
benchmark model. Furthermore, it contributes to the integration of competitiveness 
research by elaborating the link between self-selection into competition and behavior 
within competition.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a 
utility-based model of individuals’ self-selection into competition depending on a non-
monetary value of competing and a non-monetary value of winning. Section 3.3 
describes the experimental design and subject pool. Section 3.4 presents the results 
including replications of related previous studies and robustness checks. Section 3.5 
provides a discussion of the findings including implications and limitations.  
3.2 A SIMPLE UTILITY MODEL 
This section introduces a utility-based model of the effects of individual 
competitive preferences on individuals’ self-selection into competitive environments. 
First, I model individual utility maximization in non-competitive environments and 
introduce a distinction between maximum performance environments and optimal 
performance environments. Second, I operationalize competitive environments and 
analyze individual utility maximization in competitive environments. Next, I compare 
optimal performance provided in competitive versus non-competitive environments and 
65 
show that individuals’ decision to enter competitive environments can be expected to be 
entangled with effects of competition on optimal performance. Moreover, I show how 
maximum performance environments can help to disentangle these effects.  
Subsequently, I introduce competitive preferences in the form of a non-monetary 
value of winning and a non-monetary value of competing. For maximum performance 
environments I model the effect of both values on the individual’s self-selection into 
competitive versus non-competitive environments and show how to quantify both 
values by observing multiple decisions of the same individual. Finally, I include risk 
preferences and provide the full model. 
3.2.1 Non-competitive environments 
I consider a non-competitive environment A in which each individual i performs 
in a task and receives a payment 𝜋𝐴𝑖 that depends only on the individual’s own 
performance 𝑝𝐴𝑖. Individual i receives a constant piece-rate of 𝛿𝐴 such that the 
individual payment 𝜋𝐴𝑖 is given by equation 3.1.1:  
𝜋𝐴𝑖 = 𝛿𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖 (3.1.1) 
I assume convex cost of performance 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝑖) (s.t. 𝑐𝑖′(𝑝𝑖) > 0; 𝑐𝑖′′(𝑝𝑖) > 0)
10.
Moreover, I assume that the cost function has a discontinuity at an exogenous 
performance level 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖, which can differ between individuals. For any performance 
level higher than 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 individual i faces infinitely high performance cost, such that 
𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 is the maximum feasible performance level of this individual
11. The utility 𝑈𝐴𝑖 of
individual i in environment A is assumed to be determined by the payment and the cost: 
10 This assumption of performance cost can, for instance, be interpreted in a way that individual i 
provides some kind of costly effort 𝑒𝐴𝑖 and performance 𝑝𝐴𝑖  is a deterministic function of individual i’s
effort 𝑒𝐴𝑖, where more effort leads to a higher performance. Convexity of performance cost can be
realized by convex effort cost 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖) (s.t. 𝑐𝑖′(𝑒𝑖) > 0; 𝑐𝑖 ′′(𝑒𝑖) ≥ 0), or by decreasing returns of effort with
respect to performance (i.e. 𝑝𝐴𝑖′(𝑒𝐴𝑖) > 0; 𝑝𝐴𝑖 ′′(𝑒𝐴𝑖) < 0).
11 While this assumption can represent a broad variety of environments, it typically reflects some 
kind of restriction to the provision of effort or a limited ability of individual i. In sports or work 
environments only performance up to a certain level may be accounted for. In an economic experiment 
only a limited number of tasks might be provided (cf. Leibbrandt et al., 2013). Experimental tasks with 
time constrains (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Shurchkov, 2012) can be considered in a similar way. 
If an individual is only able to solve tasks at a given rate, the time limit implies the individual’s maximum 
feasible performance. 
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𝑈𝐴𝑖 = 𝛿𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖) (3.1.2) 
A utility maximizing individual can be expected to perform up to the point, 
where the marginal value of the performance equals marginal performance cost.  
𝜕𝑈𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝐴𝑖
= 𝛿𝐴 −
𝜕𝑐𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝐴𝑖
= 0 (3.1.3) 
Hence, in environment A individual i provides an optimal performance: 
𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ = argmax(𝛿𝐴 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖)) (3.1.4) 
Particularly, individual i provides the maximum performance 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 if the 
exogenous piece-rate 𝛿𝐴 is sufficiently high: 
𝛿𝐴 ≥ 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖) (3.1.5) 
In the following I refer to environment A as a maximum performance 
environment, if the optimal performance 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗  equals the maximum feasible performance
𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 and as an optimal performance environment otherwise. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
individual i’s choice of performance for both cases. 
Figure 3.1: Performance in non-competitive environments 
𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 𝑝𝑖 
𝑐𝑖 
𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗
Maximum performance 
environment 
Optimal performance 
environment 
𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ = 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 𝑝𝑖 
𝑐𝑖 
𝜋𝐴𝑖  
𝜋𝐴𝑖  
𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝑖) 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝑖)
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3.2.2 Competitive environments 
 Deutsch (1949) proposed that a competitive environment is characterized by 
institutions where individuals’ goals are not simultaneously achievable given the sets of 
possible strategies. Zero-sum games and winner-take-all situations represent examples 
of extremely competitive environments (Lazear, 1999). In competitive environments 
every attempt of individuals to get closer to their own goals makes it less likely for 
other individuals to achieve their goals (Deutsch, 1949; Lazear, 1999). That is, 
competition is part of the economic institutions that link performance to relevant 
outcomes. Following this definition I distinguish between competitive environments 
and non-competitive environments depending on how the performance of other 
individuals j (with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) influences individual i’s payoff. In competitive environments 
individual i’s payment 𝜋𝑖 depends negatively on a competitor j’s performance 𝑝𝑗12.  
Competitive Environment: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
< 0 
Non-competitive Environment: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
≥ 0 
Please note that this definition of competitive environments does not require a 
negative effect of the individual’s own performance 𝑝𝑖 on the payoff 𝜋𝑗 of others. 
Hence, competitive environments can be asymmetric in the sense that individual j 
creates a competitive environment for individual i (
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
< 0), but individual i does not 
necessarily create a competitive environment for individual j (
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑖
≥ 0). 
As a first step I analyze a simple winner-take-all tournament as competitive 
environment. Winner-take-all tournaments are considered as extremely competitive 
environments (Lazear, 1999) and are frequently used as competitive payment schemes 
in experimental research on competitive preferences (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; 
Cárdenas et al., 2012; Shurchkov, 2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Buser et al., 2014; 
2017). In environment B, the winner-take-all tournament, individual i receives a pay-
12 I continue to assume that the individual’s payment 𝜋𝑖 depends positively on the individuals
own performance 𝑝𝑖 , such that 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
> 0 for both competitive and non-competitive environments.
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rate of 𝛿𝐵 only if individual i wins the tournament, i.e. if the performance of individual i 
is higher than the performance of all competitors j: 
𝑝𝐵𝑖 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝𝑗) (3.2.1) 
Thus, the expected payment in environment B is given by equation 3.2.2: 
𝐸(𝜋𝐵) = 𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 + 0 ∙ (1 − 𝜌𝑖) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 (3.2.2) 
where 𝜌𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅 (𝑝𝐵𝑖 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝𝑗)) denotes the probability that individual i wins the 
tournament13. Individual i’s probability to win increases with the individual’s own 
performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖, but depends negatively on the competitors performances 𝑝𝑗. I assume 
the same performance cost function as in the non-competitive environment A discussed 
in Section 3.2.1. The utility 𝑈𝐵𝑖 of individual i in environment B is assumed to be 
determined by the payment and the cost (equation 3.2.3) and a utility maximizing 
individual can be expected to perform up to the point, where the marginal value of the 
performance equals marginal performance cost (equation 3.2.4): 
𝑈𝐵𝑖 = 𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖) (3.2.3) 
𝜕𝑈𝐵𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝐵𝑖
= 𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛿𝐵 ∙
𝜕𝜌𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝐵𝑖
∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 −
𝜕𝑐𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝐵𝑖
= 0 (3.2.4) 
Hence, in the winner-take-all tournament B this yields the optimal performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ : 
𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ = argmax (𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖,  𝑝𝑗) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖)) (3.2.5) 
If competitors choose their performances 𝑝𝑗 irrespective of 𝑝𝐵𝑖, then their performances 
can be taken as given. In previous studies on competitive preferences individuals 
typically compete against past performances of their competitors (e.g. Niederle & 
13 I refer to 𝜌𝑖 as the probability of winning. This denotes the subjective beliefs of individual i
regarding the chance to win the tournament, which can be expected to shape the individual’s decision 
making. This implies that individual i has to be able to form beliefs about chances of winning. I also 
assume that individual i forms beliefs about the effect of the own performance on the probability of 
winning. An individual i may not know the performances 𝑝𝑗 of competing individuals, but assume that
these performances are randomly drawn from a given distribution. In an economic experiment an 
individual might, for instance, compete against anonymous, randomly drawn competitors (e.g. Leibbrandt 
et al., 2013; Buser et al., 2014). How all these beliefs correspond to objective environmental conditions is 
irrelevant for my discussion. 
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Vesterlund, 2007), or against anonymous competitors (e.g. Leibbrandt et al., 2013). In 
both of these cases competitors cannot adjust their performances 𝑝𝑗 depending on 𝑝𝐵𝑖. 
In this chapter I focus on these simplified cases, because they are commonly used in 
competitiveness research and provide a clear context to identify values of competing 
and winning. Thus, individual i’s probability to win can be considered a function of 𝑝𝐵𝑖 
for a given 𝑝𝑗 and the individual’s optimal performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗  can be reduced to equation
3.2.6:   
𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ = argmax(𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖)) (3.2.6) 
Particularly, individual i provides maximum feasible performance 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 if the 
pay-rate 𝛿𝐵 and the probability of winning 𝜌𝑖 are sufficiently high. Moreover, the 
increasing chance of winning provides an additional performance incentive as shown in 
equation 3.2.7: 
𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖) + 𝛿𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖) ∙ 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖) (3.2.7) 
3.2.3 Performance in competitive vs non-competitive environment 
Following an experimental design introduced by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
economic studies examining individual competitive preferences measure an individuals’ 
revealed choices to self-select into either a competitive winner-take-all tournament or a 
non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme (e.g. Cárdenas et al., 2012; Shurchkov, 
2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Buser et al., 2014; 2017). To represent this kind of choice 
let individual i choose between the non-competitive piece-rate environment A and the 
competitive winner-take-all tournament B. For this purpose I first compare the 
performance provided in the tournament and the piece-rate. Without loss of generality I 
set 𝛿𝐵 equal to 1 and define the relative piece-rate: 
𝛿 =
𝛿𝐴
𝛿𝐵
(3.3.1) 
This allows rewriting the utility for both environments: 
𝑈𝐴 = 𝛿 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖) (3.3.2) 
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𝑈𝐵 = 1 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖) (3.3.3) 
I assume 𝛿𝐵 > 𝛿𝐴 such that 1 > 𝛿 > 0 holds. In the tournament the optimal 
performance increases with the probability of winning 𝜌𝑖. Hence, the optimal 
tournament performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗  is higher than the optimal piece-rate performance 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗  for
sufficiently high winning probabilities. 
𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ≥ 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗  ⇔ 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) + 𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ≥ 𝛿 (3.3.4) 
As far as the probability of winning increases with an individual’s ability, 
condition 3.3.4 is consistent with predictions from Moldovanu’s and Sela’s (2001) more 
sophisticated model of performance in competition. As shown by Boudreau, Lakhani, 
and Menietti (2016) the model predicts, that the highest-skilled contestants respond 
positively to additional competitors, whereas participants with lower ability respond 
negatively. 
To better analyze the performance differences relevant for individuals’ choices 
between competitive and non-competitive environments I apply the concept of a “piece-
rate equivalent” introduced by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a). In my model the piece-
rate equivalent of a competitive environment can be defined as the relative piece-rate 
for which individual i is indifferent between that relative piece-rate and the competitive 
environment. Let 𝛿∗ denote the piece-rate equivalent of environment B, so that 𝑈𝐴 = 𝑈𝐵
if 𝛿 = 𝛿∗ holds:
𝛿∗ ≡ 𝜌𝑖 ∙
𝑝𝐵𝑖
𝑝𝐴𝑖
+
𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖)
𝑝𝐴𝑖
(3.3.5) 
In this benchmark model the piece-rate equivalent 𝛿∗ of environment B is
determined by the individual’s subjective winning probability 𝜌𝑖. This is consistent with 
the notion that self-selection into competition is driven by (over-)confidence in winning 
the tournament (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Moreover, expected differences between 
piece-rate performance 𝑝𝐴𝑖 and tournament performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖 affect an individual’s self-
selection into either the piece-rate or tournament.  
These expected performance differences are systematically linked with the 
payment schemes in both environments. More specifically, I proceed to show that when 
a positive relative piece-rate in an optimal performance environment A equals the piece-
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rate equivalent then the optimal performance in environment B is larger than the 
optimal performance in environment A as long as the probability 𝜌𝑖 of winning the 
tournament increases with a further increase in performance 𝑝𝐵𝑖 in environment B. 
Proposition 1: 𝝆𝒊
′(𝒑𝑩𝒊) > 𝟎     ⇔     𝒑𝑩𝒊
∗ > 𝒑𝑨𝒊
∗  𝒊𝒇     𝜹 = 𝜹∗ 
Proof: 
Performance cost is increasing (𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝑖) > 0) and convex (𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑝𝑖) > 0):
(I) 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ > 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗   ⇔  𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) > 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )    ⇔   𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) > 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
A convex function lies above all of its tangents: 
(II) 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ ) ≥ 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) + 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ (𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ )    ⇔
𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ≥ 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
I and II imply: 
(III) 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ > 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗   ⇔  𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) > 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
The conditions for optimal performance in both environments imply: 
(IVA) 𝛿 = 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
(IVB) 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) + 𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ )
III and IV imply: 
(V) 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ > 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗   ⇔  𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ + 𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ (𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ )2 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) > 𝛿 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
Individual i is indifferent between both environments, if piece-rate equivalent is paid: 
(VI) 𝛿 = 𝛿∗   ⇔   𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) = 𝛿 ∙ 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ )
V and VI imply: 
(VII) 𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ > 𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗   ⇔  𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) ∙ (𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ )2 > 0 ■
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Proposition 1 shows that the optimal performance of an indifferent individual 
can be expected to be higher in competitive environments, if the chance of winning in 
the competitive environment increases with the individual’s performance14. The 
performance effects of competition have been intensely studied from the perspective of 
tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; see Connelly et al., 2014; Lazear, 2018 for 
reviews). The notion that competing with others for monetary rewards can have 
motivation effects has received empirical support in various economic settings (e.g., 
Bull, Schotter, & Weigelt, 1987; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994, Eriksson 1999, Falk et al., 
2008; Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez 2009).  
As shown by Proposition 1, individual i's choice to enter the competitive 
environment is linked to performance effects of the competitive relative to the non-
competitive environment as long as individual i can provide an optimal performance. As 
discussed in Chapter II an individual’s tendency to select into competitive environments 
is conceptually distinct from the individual’s behavior within competitive environments. 
However, Proposition 1 indicates that both phenomena are entangled as an individual’s 
anticipated performance resulting from behavior within a competition, affects the 
individual’s choice to enter that competition. This is not the case, if environment A is a 
maximum performance environment and, hence, individual i provides the maximum 
feasible performance in both the competitive and the non-competitive environment. 
This assumption of maximum performance allows disentangling the individual’s 
selection into competitive environments from potential performance effects of these 
environments.  
Systematic performance differences as indicated by proposition 1 require 
optimal performance environments, but do not occur in maximum performance 
environments, since the individual’s maximum performance is independent of the 
payment scheme. If the individual provides maximum performance, the indifference 
condition from equation 3.3.5 can be simplified and individual i chooses environment A 
over environment B if and only if  𝛿 ≥ 𝜌𝑖 holds. Therefore, in maximum performance 
environments the piece-rate equivalent 𝛿𝑀𝐴𝑋 equals the winning probability:
14 If the individual’s chance of winning the tournament does not increase with a further increase 
in the individual’s performance (𝜌𝑖
′(𝑝𝐵𝑖
∗ ) = 0), we can expect the optimal performance to be equal in
environment A and environment B. This can be the case, for instance, if 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ ) = 1, i.e. if an individual
expects that the optimal performance of the non-competitive environment is sufficient to win the 
tournament. 
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    𝛿𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 𝜌𝑖(𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖)       𝑖𝑓      𝑝𝐴𝑖 = 𝑝𝐵𝑖 = 𝑝𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖  (3.3.6) 
In previous research on individual competitiveness most studies employ a math 
task with time limits between 30 sec. and 10 min. (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007)15. 
While it is plausible that participants have low cost of performance within these 
designs, it is unclear, whether the maximum performance assumption holds. Moreover, 
it has been shown that task performance in these math tasks tends to increase in 
tournaments as compared to piece-rate payments (Gneezy et al., 2003). 
In contrast, in a recent study on competitiveness Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016b), 
apply a non-agency task where performance is determined by rolling (virtual) dice, the 
individual cannot provide any effort, but the performance is determined randomly. In 
these tasks the realized performance is, by design, the maximum feasible performance, 
i.e. the maximum performance assumption holds. Hence, these non-agency tasks allow 
studying self-selection into competitive environments irrespective of expected 
performance differences, and thereby disentangle performance effects from effects of 
competitive preferences. In the following I use the maximum performance assumption 
to provide a quantification of competitive preferences that does not require the 
elicitation of expected performance. 
 
3.2.4 Competitive preferences and self-selection into competition 
Now assume that individual i holds competitive preferences, i.e. individual i 
values competing as well as winning. While competitive preferences have only recently 
gained attention in economics, research on individual competitiveness has a tradition of 
more than 100 years in psychology (e.g., Deutsch, 1949; Triplett, 1898), where it is 
generally recognized as playing a significant role in interpersonal processes (Houston et 
al., 2002a). In previous research individual competitiveness denotes an individual’s 
general tendency to select into competitive environments. In other words, competitive 
individuals are those individuals who favor competitive over non-competitive 
environments (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Smither & Houston, 1992). Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) have argued that some individuals enjoy competing more than others. 
This is consistent with the “enjoyment of competition” measured as an individual 
                                                          
15 An overview of experimental designs in this research is provided in Table 2.1 of Chapter II 
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characteristic in psychological research (Houston et al. 2002b). To formalize this notion 
let ?̃?𝑐 denote the value of competing that is 0 for any non-competitive environment
16. In
a competitive environment ?̃?𝑐 takes a positive value, if an individual likes competition, 
and a negative value, if an individual dislikes competition.  
Furthermore, Delfgaauw and colleagues (2013) argue that previous economic 
experiments suggest a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Such a value of 
winning is in line with psychological concepts describing competitiveness as a form of 
dominance (Newby & Klein, 2014), such as interpersonal competitiveness (Griffin-
Pierson, 1990), hypercompetitiveness (Ryckman et al., 1990), and self-aggrandizement 
(Houston et al. 2002a), which refer to an individual’s need to compete and win at any 
cost (Horney, 1937). Hence, let ?̃?𝑤 denote the non-monetary value of winning that is 
realized if individual i outperforms all other individuals (𝑝 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝𝑗)) in a 
competitive setting17.  Since ?̃?𝑤 is only realized, if individual i wins in the competitive
environment, it describes the difference in utility between winning and losing.  If an 
individual does not value winning, but realizes a utility loss in case of losing, the 
16 In order to simplify the notation, I drop the index i from all variables. 
17 While I focus on the identification of an individual’s competitive preference in maximum
performance environments, where all individuals provide their maximum feasible performance, in an 
optimal performance environment the value of winning might also have effects on an individual’s optimal 
performance. Winning a competition requires an individual to do both: (1) to enter the competition, and 
(2) to provide high performance within the competition. Previous research has argued that higher 
performance in competitive environments is driven by a symbolic value of winning a tournament 
(Delfgaauw et al., 2013) and suggests heterogeneity in individuals’ responses competition (Gneezy et al., 
2003; Boudreau et al., 2016). Coffey and Maloney (2010) show that the thrill of victory has a positive 
effect on the speed of horse races as well as of dogs races. They argue that the thrill of victory is driven 
by the closeness of a competition, which is increasing with the probability of a rank change “the heat of 
competition itself will draw forth extra effort. When competition is intense, participants will work harder 
than when the outcome is obvious.” (Coffey and Maloney, 2010, p.8) 
When I include competitive preferences in my model the optimal performance in the non-competitive 
environment A and the competitive environment B are given by:  
𝑝𝐴𝑖
∗ = argmax(𝛿 ∙ 𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑝𝐴)) 𝑝𝐵
∗ = argmax(𝜌(𝑝𝐵) ∙ 𝑝𝐵 + ?̃?𝑐 + 𝜌(𝑝𝐵) ∙ ?̃?𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑝𝐵)). T
The optimal performance in the non-competitive environment 𝑝𝐴
∗  does not depend on competitive 
preferences. Moreover, the optimal performance in the tournament 𝑝𝐵
∗  is independent from the value of 
competing ?̃?𝑐. In contrast, the optimal performance increases with the value of winning ?̃?𝑤 as long as the
probability of winning increases with performance. More specifically, the effect of the value of winning 
?̃?𝑤 on the optimal tournament performance 𝑝𝐵
∗  is multiplied by the increase of the winning probability
𝜌′(𝑝𝐵) with respect to performance. Hence, if 𝜌
′(𝑝𝐵) > 0  the individual’s optimal tournament
performance 𝑝𝐵
∗  relative to the individual’s piece-rate performance 𝑝𝐴
∗  is also increasing with the 
individual’s value of winning ?̃?𝑤:
𝜕(𝑝𝐵
∗ )
𝜕?̃?𝑤
> 0 ⋏ 
𝜕(𝑝𝐴
∗ )
𝜕?̃?𝑤
= 0  
 
⇒ 
𝜕(𝑝𝐵
∗ −𝑝𝐴
∗ )
𝜕?̃?𝑤
> 0 T
The more intense a competition is – i.e. a small change in performance leads to a large change in the 
probability of winning – the more does the non-monetary value of winning increase the individual’s 
optimal performance in that competition. Hence, in terms of effects on optimal performance my model 
yields the same conclusion as the model by Coffey and Maloney (2010). 
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positive difference between both cases is still reflected by ?̃?𝑤, while the lower utility 
base level in competitive environments would be accounted as a lower value of 
competing. In case an individual values winning and fears losing ?̃?𝑤 can be interpreted 
as the sum of both effects, while ?̃?𝑐 still describes the utility gained from competition in 
the case of losing.   
Under the maximum performance assumption the performance is equal across 
all environments. Hence, I can define 𝑣𝑐 = ?̃?𝑐/𝑝 and 𝑣𝑤 = ?̃?𝑤/𝑝 for any given 
performance 𝑝. Including these preference terms yields the utility 𝑈𝐵 for the 
competitive environment (equation 3.4.2), whereas the utility 𝑈𝐴 is realized in the non-
competitive environment (equation 3.4.1): 
𝑈𝐴 = 𝛿 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑐(𝑝) (3.4.1) 
𝑈𝐵 = (𝜌 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤) ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑐(𝑝) (3.4.2) 
Under the maximum performance assumption the performance costs are equal 
across all environments in the choice set and, hence, the cost term 𝑐(𝑝) can be 
considered irrelevant for the individual’s choice between the competitive and the non-
competitive environment independent of the performance level. Current decision 
theories usually assume that individuals discard components that are shared in all 
prospects during an editing phase, before evaluating their decision (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2013). Following this approach I further simplify the utility functions: 
𝑈𝐴 = 𝛿 ∙ 𝑝 (3.4.3) 
𝑈𝐵 = (𝜌 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤) ∙ 𝑝 (3.4.4) 
A utility maximizing individual is expected to choose environment A over 
environment B if and only if 𝛿 ≥ 𝜌 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 holds
18. Hence, the piece-rate
equivalent of environment B is given by equation 3.4.5: 
𝛿𝐸𝑄 ≡ 𝜌 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 (3.4.5) 
18 Note that in the utility functions 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐵 I imply risk neutrality of individual i. While the
assumption of risk neutrality helps to clarify the line of argumentation, I relax this assumption in the next 
section and provide a discussion of risk preferences. 
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In the previous section I have shown that in the absence of competitive 
preferences the piece-rate equivalent under maximum performance is given by 
𝛿𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 𝜌. Considering the individual deviation from this benchmark 𝑦 = 𝛿𝐸𝑄 − 𝜌
yields a simple measure for individual i’s competitive preferences: 
 𝑦 = 𝑣𝑐 +  𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 (3.4.6) 
In order to separate 𝑣𝑐 from 𝑣𝑤 consider multiple decisions between competitive 
tournaments with different probabilities of winning. Let individual i's probability to win 
tournament 1 be 𝜌1 and let individual i have a higher probability 𝜌2 to win tournament 
2, where 𝜌∆ denotes the difference in winning probabilities: 
𝜌2 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌∆ (3.4.7) 
The concept of piece-rate equivalents allows comparing multiple competitive 
environments by comparing their respective piece-rate equivalents. Let individual i be 
indifferent between a piece-rate equivalent 𝛿1
𝐸𝑄
 and the tournament with a winning
probability 𝜌1 and let individual i ceteris paribus be indifferent between piece-rate 𝛿2
𝐸𝑄
and the tournament with a winning probability 𝜌2. The parameter 𝑣𝑤 is identified by 
subtraction of the indifference conditions: 
𝑣𝑤 =
(𝛿2
𝐸𝑄 − 𝛿1
𝐸𝑄 ) − 𝜌∆
𝜌∆
=
𝑦2 − 𝑦1
𝜌∆
(3.4.8) 
The parameter 𝑣𝑐 is then given by the individual’s deviation from payoff maximization, 
which is independent from the probability of winning and hence, equal in both 
competitive environments:  
𝑣𝑐 = 𝛿1
𝐸𝑄 − 𝜌1 − 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 = 𝑦1 − 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 (3.4.9) 
𝑣𝑐 = 𝛿2
𝐸𝑄 − 𝜌2 − 𝜌2 ∙ 𝑣𝑤 = 𝑦2 − 𝜌2 ∙ 𝑣𝑤  (3.4.10) 
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3.2.5 Including risk-preferences 
Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) highlight that a tournament payment 
differs from a piece-rate payment in two ways: (1) payment depends on the performance 
of others, which is the defining characteristic of a competitive environment, and (2) the 
payment is uncertain. In the model of competitive preferences presented above I use 
linear additive utility functions 𝑈(𝜋, 𝑣𝑐, 𝑣𝑤) with three attributes: the payment 𝜋, the
value of competing 𝑣𝑐, and the value of winning 𝑣𝑤. Since not all of these outcomes 
need to be monetary, I consider multiattribute utility (Wakker, 2010) and in order to 
provide a simple analysis of risk preferences for multiple attributes I continue to assume 
an additive separable utility function: 
𝑈(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = ∑𝑢(𝑥𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1
(3.5.1) 
This functional form implies multivariate risk neutrality (Richard, 1975) as well 
as strong utility independence between the attributes (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). For each 
attribute I use the common assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and 
apply a von Neumann-Morgenstern like utility function  𝑢(𝑥) =
𝑥1−𝜂
1−𝜂
  (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1953). Hence, I assume the following utility functions: 
𝑈𝐴 =
(𝛿 ∙ 𝑝)1−𝜂
1 − 𝜂
(3.5.2) 
𝑈𝐵 = 𝜌 ∙
(1 ∙ 𝑝)1−𝜂
1 − 𝜂
+ 𝜌 ∙
(𝑣𝑤 ∙ 𝑝)
1−𝜂
1 − 𝜂
+
(𝑣𝑐 ∙ 𝑝)
1−𝜂
1 − 𝜂
(3.5.3) 
For any given level of performance an individual with a CRRA of 𝜂 is expected to 
choose setting A over setting B if and only if 𝛿1−𝜂 ≥ 𝜌 + 𝑣𝑐
1−𝜂 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑤
1−𝜂 holds19.
The parameters 𝑣𝑐 and 𝑣𝑤 are then given by: 
19 Both 𝑣𝑐 and 𝑣𝑤 may be negative. The term 𝑣
1−𝜂 is not defined if 𝜂 is no integer and v is
negative. For these cases I assume that the absolute value |𝑣|1−𝜂 is subtracted from the utility of the
competitive setting. Such that an individual with 𝑣𝑐 < 0 becomes indifferent between setting A and
setting B if:    
𝛿1−𝜂 ≥ 𝜌𝑖 − |𝑣𝑐|
1−𝜂 + 𝜌𝑖 ∙ 𝑣𝑤
1−𝜂
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𝑣𝑤 = (
(𝛿2
1−𝜂 − 𝛿1
1−𝜂) − 𝜌∆
𝜌∆
)
1
1−𝜂
(3.5.4) 
𝑣𝑐 = (𝛿1
1−𝜂 − 𝜌1 − 𝜌1 ∙ 𝑣𝑤
1−𝜂)
1
1−𝜂 (3.5.5) 
The values in equations 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 are adjusted for both the subjective 
chance of winning 𝜌 and the individual risk taking preferences as reflected in the 𝜂 
parameter. These values form the theoretical foundation for my subsequent empirical 
analysis. In my experiment (that is described in detail in Section 3.3) individuals have 
multiple sets of choices between the non-competitive environment A and the 
competitive environment B. I exogenously induce a fix 𝜌∆ between competitive 
environments and measure the piece-rate equivalent 𝛿𝐸𝑄 for each competitive
environment as well as the risk aversion parameter 𝜂 for each individual. Based on these 
measures I seek to quantify individual competitive preferences by calculating the value 
of winning 𝑣𝑤 and value of competing 𝑣𝑐 for each individual. 
3.3 THE EXPERIMENT 
In my experiment subjects completed a total 7 tasks. Each experimental session 
lasted approximately 80 min. and proceeded in the following way: (1) Subjects read and 
signed the informed consent and data security forms. (2) Subjects complete a tutorial to 
familiarize with the software and to ensure comprehension of the decision modes. (3) 
Subjects completed three tasks (tasks 1–3) in each of which they had 5 min. to solve 
summation problems. Task 1 was incentivized with a piece-rate, task 2 with a winner-
take-all payment, and in task 3 subjects chose between piece-rate and winner-take-all 
payment. (4) Subjects completed a fourth task (task 4) in which they chose a payment 
scheme for their task 1 performance retrospectively. (5) Subjects completed a fifth task 
(task 5) in which they again performed summations for 5 min. Subjects chose their 
A possible interpretation of this assumption is that the positive value of “not competing” 𝑣𝑛𝑐 =
−𝑣𝑐 enters the utility of a non-competitive setting. Analogously I assume that an individual with 𝑣𝑤 < 0
becomes indifferent between setting A and setting B if:         𝛿1−𝜂 ≥ 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑣𝑐
1−𝜂 − 𝜌𝑖 ∙ |𝑣𝑤|
1−𝜂
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payment (piece-rate or winner-take-all) for different conditions one of which was 
randomly drawn. (6) Subjects chose their payment in the same way as in task 5 for a 
non-agency task (task 6), which then was automatically run on their computer. (7) 
Subjects completed a risk preference task (task 7). (8) Subjects completed a 
questionnaire regarding demographic and other characteristics. (9) Subjects received 
their payment and exited the session. Subjects were guaranteed a minimum payment of 
€5.00 and received an average payment of €14.42. The experiment was conducted using 
z-Tree version 4.09 (Fischbacher, 2007). 
3.3.1 Subjects 
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the University of Wuppertal 
(Germany) in the summer of 2018. I recruited 56 students (33 male, 23 female) from 
undergraduate courses and postgraduate courses of all departments. Subjects, who 
participated in the experiment, were enrolled in Business and Economics (27), 
Engineering (7), Health economics (6), a teacher’s program (5), Chemistry (3), 
Psychology (3), Politics (2), Philosophy (2), and History (1). Prospective subjects were 
told that participation in the experimental session would take about 90 min and that they 
would be paid with a minimum payment of €5.00 for their participation.  
3.3.2 Tutorial 
Before starting the experiment in each session subjects completed a non-
incentivized tutorial in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The tutorial featured four exercises: 
(1) subjects typed and submitted numbers given on the screen; (2) Subjects submitted an 
estimation of the number of people in the lab; (3) Subjects submitted their choice 
between two hypothetical scenarios A and B. No further information was provided 
about the scenarios. (4) Subjects fixed their hypothetical maximum willingness to pay 
for chocolate and coffee, respectively. For each chocolate and coffee subjects decided 
whether to buy or not to buy at each price (€1.00, €2.00, €3.00, €4.00, €5.00). Choices 
were presented in a 5x2 matrix analogous to the 21x3 choice sets in task 5 and task 6 of 
the experiment. Subjects were informed that the tutorial was a tutorial and that choices 
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in the tutorial would have no consequences for their payoff or for the actual experiment. 
After subjects completed the tutorial, the experimenter rechecked with all subjects for 
comprehension issues and technical problems and ensured that those were solved before 
starting the experiment.  
3.3.3 Tasks 1–4: A standard measure of competitiveness 
The first four tasks of my experiment replicate the experiment by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). In each of tasks 1-3 subjects performed summations within a time 
limit of 5 min. Each summation problem consisted of five randomly chosen, two-digit 
numbers displayed horizontally in the center of the computer screen. When subjects 
submitted an answer, the program presented a new summation problem. The number of 
correct and incorrect answers submitted during the task as well as the information, 
whether the last submitted answer was correct or false, were displayed at the top of the 
screen. Subjects received no information regarding the performance of other subjects. 
After the 5 min expired, the task ended automatically and subjects could not submit 
additional answers. Subjects were not allowed to use calculators, but were given a pen 
and scrap paper to use during the session.  
Subjects were shown detailed information regarding the task and payment 
scheme before performing the respective task. In task 1 subjects received a piece-rate 
payment of €0.50 per correct answer. In task 2 each group of four subjects was paid 
according to a €2.00 winner-take-all payment scheme (tournament). Subjects were 
explicitly informed in the instructions that their group included the three other subjects 
sitting in the same row. Under the tournament scheme only the subject who submitted 
the most correct answers within each group received €2.00 per correct answer, while the 
other three group members received no payment. Ties were broken randomly. Seats 
were assigned by a random draw upon subjects’ arrival in the lab. Subjects could 
observe the other subjects in their group and session.  
In task 3 subjects chose their payment scheme between the €0.50 piece-rate (PR) 
used in task 1 and the €2.00 winner-take-all (WTA) payment used in task 2. Subjects 
were explicitly informed that if they choose the €2.00 WTA tournament, then their task 
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3 performance would be compared to the task 2 performances of the other group-
members. Ties were broken randomly. 
In task 4 subjects chose retrospectively between a €0.50 PR payment and a €2.00 
WTA payment for their task 1 performance. Subjects knew how many summation 
problems they solved correctly in task 1, but received no information regarding other 
subjects’ performance.  
In the tasks 2-4 subjects were asked to rank their performance in the respective 
task, i.e. the number of summation problems they solved correctly, relative to the 
performance of the other group-members: 1st best, 2nd best, 3rd best, or 4th best (that is, 
worst). Before performing task 2 subjects ranked their own task 2 performance against 
the other group-mates’ task 2 performances, before performing task 3 subjects were 
asked to rank their own task 3 performance against the other group-mates’ task 2 
performances, and in task 4 subjects retrospectively ranked their own task 1 
performance against the other group-mates’ task 1 performances. Subjects were 
informed that they would be paid an additional €1.00 for the respective task, if they 
ranked their performance correctly. 
3.3.4 Task 5: Multiple competitor pools in a math task 
In task 5 subjects performed the same summation task as in tasks 1–3, but 
applied the strategy method for the subjects’ payment choice between PR and WTA. 
Subjects chose their preferred payment for each combination of 21 different piece-rates 
and three different cases of the winner-take-all tournament. 
For the variation of the PR I used a refined payment scheme that was introduced 
by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a) in order to provide a more detailed measure of 
subjects’ preferences between PR and WTA payments. Subjects were offered a series of 
choices between various PR payments, ranging from €0.00 to €1.00, and a €1.00 WTA 
payment. All choices were presented vertically in a single column. The first choice was 
between a €0.00 PR and €1.00 WTA payment. The next was between a €0.05 PR and 
€1.00 WTA payment. Thereafter, the PR payment increased in €0.05 increments until it 
reached €1.00. This measure identifies the strength of each subject’s preference for a PR 
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payment relative to a WTA payment by observing her switch point: the minimum PR 
payment the subject prefers to a €1.00 WTA payment (extracted from Ifcher & 
Zarghamee, 2016a, p.647). 
For the variation of the WTA payment I introduced a new treatment that 
manipulates the subjects’ probability of winning. In the WTA tournament in task 5 the 
subject’s score was not compared to the three group-mates’ scores, but compared to the 
task 5 score of one unknown competitor. The competitor was determined as follows: 
First, from all previous task 5 performances ten scores were randomly drawn20. Second, 
from these ten randomly drawn scores three competitor pools were set up: (i) an original 
pool, (ii) an easy pool, and (iii) a hard pool. The original pool contained the ten scores 
without any modification. In the easy pool the highest of the ten scores was replaced by 
an all-time-low score of 0 correct answers, therefore each subject’s probability to win 
increased by 1/10 as compared to the original pool. In the hard pool the lowest of the 
ten scores was replaced by an all-time-high score of 20 correct answers, therefore each 
subject’s probability to win decreased by 1/10 as compared to the original pool. 
Subjects fixed their switch point between PR and WTA for each pool separately. All 
choices were presented on a single screen, where choices for the easy pool were shown 
in the left column; choices for the original pool in the middle column; and choices for 
the hard pool in the right column (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A for a screenshot). 
Subjects were explicitly informed about the respective changes in their winning 
probability in the easy and in the hard pool.  
After all payment choices were fixed one of the piece-rates and one of the pools 
were randomly selected and the subject’s competitor was drawn from the selected pool. 
Before performing the summation task the subject was informed about the drawn pool; 
the drawn PR-level; and whether the task would be performed under PR or WTA. The 
subject received no information about the competitor’s score. 
20 For the first experimental session scores of the pilot were used. 
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3.3.5 Task 6: Multiple competitor pools in a non-agency task 
Task 6 was designed to replicate task 5, except the summation task was replaced 
by a dice task similar to the task used by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016b). In this task 
subjects had no agency (Ifcher and Zarghamee; 2016b). Subjects were informed that 
their computer would randomly roll a pair of virtual dice, each die having three white 
sides and three black sides; that their computer would roll the pair of virtual dice 10 
times and display each roll (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A for a screenshot); that each 
roll was independent of all other rolls, so their rolls would not be the same as other 
subjects’ rolls. Task 6 was entirely automated. Once the task had started, subjects could 
not control or alter the trajectory of the task in any way. There was no “continue,” 
“pause,” or “end” button. Thus, subjects could take no actions. Subjects were informed 
that the task would end automatically after 40 seconds.  
Rolling a black side in the task without agency was equivalent to correctly answering a 
summation in the task with agency; subjects were not told this analogy. Subjects 
received no information regarding other subjects’ rolls. Before starting the task subjects 
chose between each combination of a PR (ranging from €0.00 to €1.00) and a WTA 
(easy pool, original pool, hard pool) in the same way as in task 5. Scores in the 
competitor pools were randomly drawn from all previous task 6 scores. The probability 
of each score from 0 to 20 in task 6 was given by a binomial distribution (see Figure 
3.2) and independent from the payment scheme. 
Figure 3.2: Theoretical distribution of scores in the dice-task 
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3.3.6 Subjective probability of winning 
Before subjects fixed their payment choices in tasks 5 and 6 respectively, I 
elicited subjects’ beliefs regarding their subjective probability of winning in the WTA 
using an incentivized estimation question. Instead of guessing their rank as in tasks 2-4 
subjects were asked in tasks 5 and 6 to guess how many out of the ten randomly drawn 
scores in the respective original pool were lower than their prospective own score in this 
task. Subjects were informed that they would be paid an additional €1.00 for the 
respective task, if they ranked themselves correctly.  
Note that as each of the ten scores has the same chance (1/10) of being drawn 
from the original pool, this estimation directly implies the subjective probability of 
winning for all pools. Furthermore, the increase (decrease) of the winning probability 
that is induced by the easy (hard) pool treatment is independent of the subject’s 
estimation21. 
3.3.7 Task 7: Measuring risk aversion 
In task 7 subjects completed a standard risk-preference measure (Holt & Laury, 
2002). Subjects made a series of ten choices between the paired lotteries presented in 
Table 3.1. The potential payoffs for the “safe” Option A (high = €4.00; low = €3.20) 
were less than the potential payoffs in the “risky” Option B (high = €7.70; low = €0.20). 
In the first decision the probability of the high payoff for both options was 1/10, so only 
an extreme risk seeker would choose Option B. In the second choice the probability of 
the high payoff for both options was 2/10 and so on up to a probability of 1 in the last 
choice. All choices were presented vertically on a single screen. As the right column of 
the table indicates, a risk-neutral individual can be expected to choose the safe Option A 
in the first four lines and switch to Option B in the fifth line. The ranges of an 
individual’s relative risk aversion implied by each number of safe choices are identical 
to those in the original experiment by Holt and Laury (2002, table 3). 
21 This does not hold for subjects with an extreme belief. For those subjects believing that they 
can outperform all (none) of the ten others, the easy (hard) pool treatment has no effect. Subjects were 
informed about this exception. 
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Table 3.1: Payment choices in lottery task 
Option A Option B 
Expected Payoff 
Difference 
1/10 of €4.00; 9/10 of €3.20 1/10 of €7.70; 9/10 of €0.20 €2.33 
2/10 of €4.00; 8/10 of €3.20 2/10 of €7.70; 8/10 of €0.20 €1.66 
3/10 of €4.00; 7/10 of €3.20 3/10 of €7.70; 7/10 of €0.20 €0.99 
4/10 of €4.00; 6/10 of €3.20 4/10 of €7.70; 6/10 of €0.20 €0.32 
5/10 of €4.00; 5/10 of €3.20 5/10 of €7.70; 5/10 of €0.20 -€0.35 
6/10 of €4.00; 4/10 of €3.20 6/10 of €7.70; 4/10 of €0.20 -€1.02 
7/10 of €4.00; 3/10 of €3.20 7/10 of €7.70; 3/10 of €0.20 -€1.69 
8/10 of €4.00; 2/10 of €3.20 8/10 of €7.70; 2/10 of €0.20 -€2.36 
9/10 of €4.00; 1/10 of €3.20 9/10 of €7.70; 1/10 of €0.20 -€3.03 
10/10 of €4.00; 0/10 of €3.20 10/10 of €7.70; 0/10 of €0.20 -€3.70 
Note: In task 7 subjects choose ten times between Option A and Option B. Chance of high Payoff 
increases by 0.1 each line. Right column shows expected payoff difference A-B. 
3.3.8 Questionnaire 
After completing all seven tasks subjects completed an additional questionnaire 
including items regarding their demographic and other characteristics, for example, 
program (major), gender, year of birth, place of birth, and native language. In addition, 
subjects created a pseudonymous code that allows matching responses of the same 
subject across multiple experiments. Subjects were paid an additional €3.00, if their 
code matched a code in our database. 
3.3.9 Payments 
Subjects were paid a €5.00 fee for completing the 7 tasks.  Moreover, subjects 
received a payment based on their performance in one of the 7 tasks. By paying only for 
one task, I diminish the chance that decisions in a given task may be used to hedge 
against outcomes in other tasks. For each subject the task to be paid was determined by 
a random draw after all subjects completed the questionnaire. If one of tasks 2-4 was 
drawn subjects received a €1.00 payment for correctly indicating their rank. If task 5 or 
6 was drawn subjects received a €1.00 payment for correctly indicating the number of 
outperformed scores in the respective task. If task 7 was drawn one of the 10 
probabilities for high payments was randomly drawn and the respective lottery was 
implemented. Before choosing their payment schemes for the tasks, subjects received 
detailed instructions regarding the calculation of their payment. Subjects were paid in 
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cash according to their seat number. The payment was given to each subject separately 
without other subjects observing the payment. Subjects exited the session after 
receiving their payment. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Replication of main findings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
I replicate the main results of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). In order to 
improve comparability I present this replication in the same way as the replication 
reported by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a, 2016b). I find no gender difference in 
performance in tasks 1–3, 5, and 6. In task 1 women, on average, solve 7.8 equations 
correctly, and the average of men is 8.1 equations (p = 0.77)22. For both genders I find 
subjects’ performance in the summation tasks to be correlated (Spearman rank 
correlations range from a low of 0.586 for women between tasks 1 and 5 to a high of 
0.834 for men between tasks 3 and 5). Performance of men improves significantly (but 
insignificantly for women) between tasks 1 and 2; performance does not increase 
between tasks 2 and 3; and performance of both genders increases significantly between 
tasks 3 and 5 (men: 8.1, 10.3, 10.2, and 11.4; women: 7.8, 8.6, 8.9, and 9.9, 
respectively). 
In task 3 men are significantly more likely than women to favor the €2.00 WTA 
payment over the €0.50 PR payment (0.55 vs. 0.17, p = 0.005). I find no relationship 
between the task 3 choice and performance on tasks 1 and 2; neither for men, nor for 
women. Consistent with a previous replication those who choose the WTA payment do 
not perform significantly better in tasks 1 and 2 than do those who choose the PR 
payment (see Table 3.2; cf. Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016a). For men, the improvement in 
performance between tasks 1 and 2 is not significantly different for those who choose 
the WTA versus PR payment in task 3 (2.39 vs. 1.93, p = 0.71). For women, however, 
those who choose the PR payment improve significantly more between tasks 1 and 2 
than those who choose the WTA payment (1.37 vs. -1.75, p = 0.03). The four women 
who chose the WTA in task 3 reach on average even a lower score in task 2 than in task 
1. This result diverges from both Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and a recent
22 All p-values reported in this chapter are two-sided. 
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replication by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a, 2016b). A probit regression shows that 
women are significantly less likely than men (marginal effect = -0.37; p = 0.002) to 
choose the WTA payment in task 3, controlling for the task 2 performance, the 
improvement in performance between tasks 1 and 2, and the payment choice in task 4. 
Table 3.2: Task 1 and 2 performance  
by gender and choice of task 3 payment scheme 
Gender payment choice Average performance Obs. 
in task 3 Task 1 Task 2 Task 2 – Task 1 
Women PR payment 7.47(2.99) 8.84(3.61) 1.37(2.59) 19 
WTA payment 9.25(2.87) 7.50(2.08) -1.75(1.5) 4 
p value 0.29 0.49 0.03 
Men PR payment 7.07(4.96) 9.00(4.99) 1.93(3.59) 15 
WTA payment 8.94(3.65) 11.33(4.10) 2.39(3.27) 18 
p value 0.22 0.15 0.71 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The p values correspond to two-tailed tests of equal 
performance for those who chose PR versus WTA payment in task 3. 
3.4.2 Ifcher’s and Zarghamee’s (2016a) PR-equivalents 
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a) suggested identifying the strength of each 
subject’s preference for a PR payment by observing the PR payment equivalent of the 
WTA payment (PR-equivalent). I use a measure based on these PR-equivalents in task 5 
(math task) and task 6 (dice task) of my experiment. Following Ifcher and Zarghamee 
(2016a) subjects who chose the WTA payment for all PR payments, including the €1.00 
PR payment are coded as having a €1.05 PR-equivalent. Subjects who always chose the 
PR payment, even when it is €0.00 are coded as having a €0.00 PR-equivalent. Figure 
3.3 shows the cumulative distribution of PR-equivalents for the WTA payment with the 
original competitor pool in both math task and dice task. I find neither a significance 
difference in mean values (math: 0.597; dice: 0.533; p=0.126), nor in median values 
(math: 0.55; dice: 0.5; p=0.450) between the two tasks. Fischer’s exact test does not 
indicate a significant difference (p=0.748) between the cumulative distributions of both 
task’s PR-equivalents.  
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Figure 3.3: PR-equivalents in math task and dice task 
Note: N=56. Cumulative distribution of PR-equivalents for original competitor pool in the math task 
(black) and the dice task (grey). 
I replicate some of the main findings presented in Ifcher’s and Zarghamee’s 
(2016a) study using the math task PR-equivalent I observe for the WTA payment with 
the original competitor pool. As in the original experiment I find the mean and median 
PR-equivalents in the math task to be significantly greater for men than women, €0.67 
versus €0.49 (p = 0.01), and €0.65 versus €0.50 (p = 0.006), respectively. Subjects’ task 
3 choice of payment scheme (1 = WTA payment and 0 = PR payment) is highly 
correlated with their math-task PR-equivalent (Spearman rank correlation = 0.41, 
p = 0.002). 
Analyzing relative payoffs Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a) argue, that, compared 
to men, women require a 43 % premium, on average (or 37% premium when comparing 
median values), to choose the WTA payment in the math task. Calculating the same 
premium in my experiment I find that women required an average a 38.5% premium (or 
30% premium when comparing median values) to choose the WTA payment in the 
math task. Both experiments consistently suggest that, all else equal, women require a 
larger payoff to compete. 
I also replicate findings regarding PR-equivalents and performance indicating a 
positive effect of task 3 performance on the math task PR-equivalent (columns 2 & 3), 
but no significant effect of task 2 performance on the choice to enter the WTA 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0,00 € 0,20 € 0,40 € 0,60 € 0,80 € 1,00 €
PR-equivalent
89 
tournament in task 3 (column 4). I also find a negative effect of the self-estimated task 3 
rank on the math task PR-equivalent (column 5) that turns insignificant when 
controlling for risk aversion (CRRA) and task 3 performance (column 6). As in the 
original study the gender difference remains (weakly) significant in all models, 
suggesting that gender differences cannot be completely explained by differences in 
performance, confidence, and risk aversion (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016a).   
Table 3.3: Regression results for math task PR-equivalents 
WTA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female   -0.19** -0.16* -0.16* -0.38** -0.14+ -0.14+ 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
Task 2 performance 0.03 
(0.02) 
Task 3 performance  0.02*  0.02* 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Improvement between tasks 1 and 2 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.01)  (0.02) 
Improvement between tasks 2 and 3 -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Task 3 self rank -0.08* -0.05 
(0.04) (0.05) 
CRRA -0.01 
(0.07) 
Constant   0.67***  0.48***   0.46***   0.81***   0.63*** 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.17) 
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.117 0.192 0.203 0.183 0.210 
Note: All columns but 4 report OLS estimates; the dependent variable is the math task PR-equivalent. 
Column 4 reports marginal effects from a probit regression; the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the subject choose the WTA payment in task 3 and zero otherwise. Standard 
errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, + indicate statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
3.4.3 PR-equivalents and the subjective probability to win 
I use an incentivized estimation to elicit subjective probability of winning in 
both the math task (task 5) and the dice task (task 6) for an original pool of ten potential 
competitors. I introduce a treatment that uses modified competitor pools to manipulate 
that subjective probability and compare each subject’s PR-equivalents for the original 
pool, an easy pool (+10% winning probability), and a hard pool (-10% winning 
probability).  
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Figure 3.4: Effects of subjective winning probability on PR-equivalents 
Note: Figure 3.4a (upper left) shows average PR-equivalent of N=50 subjects by competitor pool in the 
math task (black bars) and the dice task (grey bars). Significance reported for difference between easy 
and hard pool. *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.001 level. Figure 3.4b (upper right) shows 
the cumulative distribution of the difference between hard and easy pool PR-equivalents (PReasy – 
PRhard) of N=50 subjects in the math task (black) and the dice task (grey). Figure 3.4c (lower left) shows 
average PR-equivalent (black) with 95% confidence interval (grey) conditional on the subjective winning 
probability for a total N=300 decisions. Figure 3.4d (lower right) shows the bivariate distribution of PR-
equivalent and subjective winning probability for N=300 decisions. Size of the circles indicates number 
of observations.  
Six subjects indicated the belief they would outperform ten of the ten potential 
competitors, or none of them, respectively. By design the treatment does not fully affect 
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these participants. Therefore, they are excluded in further analyses. I analyze a total 300 
PR-equivalent decisions by 50 individuals. Figure 3.4a shows the average PR-
equivalents for all competitor pools in both tasks. I find the average PR-equivalent to be 
significantly higher for the easy competitor pool than for the hard competitor pool in 
both the math task (easy: 0.632; hard: 0.477; p<0.001) and the dice task (easy: 0.605; 
hard: 0.398; p<0.001). Repeating the analysis with median values yields the same result 
(Math: easy=0.65; hard=0.50; p=0.009; Dice: easy=0.60; hard=0.40; p<0.001). 
Figure 3.4b shows the cumulative distribution of within-subject-differences in 
PR-equivalents between the easy pool and the hard pool for both tasks. Fisher’s exact 
test does not indicate significant differences (p=0.439) between the cumulative 
distributions of the math task and the dice task, respectively. I further analyze all PR-
equivalent decisions conditional on the estimated probability of winning, but 
irrespective of the task and the competitor pool. For decisions regarding the easy (hard) 
competitor pool, I code the subjective winning probability as the estimated winning 
probability plus (minus) 10%. Figure 3.4c shows the average PR-equivalent conditional 
on the subjective winning probability indicating a substantial positive correlation 
(r=0.4256; p<0.001)23. The bivariate distribution of PR-equivalent and subjective 
winning probability is shown in Figure 3.4d. 
Table 3.4: Regression results for PR-equivalents 
Dep. Var.: PR-equivalent 
Pooled OLS regression 
Individual 
fixed effects 
(1) (2) (3) 
Probability of winning      0.73***      0.79*** 0.84*** 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Dice Task (contrast code) -0.06+ -0.06+ 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Probability of winning * Dice Task  0.11+  0.11+ 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Constant          0.17**    0.15**   0.12* 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations (Subjects) 300 (50) 300 (50) 300 (50) 
R2 between / R2 overall 0.108 / 0.181 0.112 / 0.187 0.112 / 0.187 
Note: Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, + indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
23 Spearman Rank-Correlation (ρ=0.4644; p<0.001) yields the same result. 
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As reported in Table 3.4 subsequent regression analysis indicates a highly 
significant positive coefficient (0.73) of the subjective winning probability as well as a 
significantly positive constant (column 1). Both results are robust when controlling for 
the task allowing for interaction of task and winning probability (column 2) and when 
including individual fixed effects (column 3). These findings suggest that when the 
chance of winning is approximately zero, the WTA tournament is preferred to a PR 
lower than at least €0.12 to €0.17.  When the chance of winning is approximately one, 
the WTA tournament is preferred to a PR lower than at least €0.90 to €0.96. Moreover, 
I find a weakly significant negative coefficient of the dice task (-0.06) and a weakly 
significant interaction effect (0.11). This suggests that the PR-equivalent for low (high) 
winning probabilities is higher in the math (dice) task. 
3.4.4 Task performance and the maximum performance assumption 
For each PR-equivalent subjects chose in my experiment the realized payment 
scheme was determined by a randomly drawn piece-rate. Only if the drawn piece-rate 
was at least as high as the PR-equivalent a subject chose for the respective competitor 
pool, subjects were paid according to the drawn piece-rate, otherwise the WTA 
tournament scheme was realized. Table 3.5 shows the realized payment schemes in the 
math task and the dice task. 
Table 3.5: Realized payment schemes 
Realized Math Task Dice Task 
Payment Scheme N Av. PR draw N Av. PR draw 
Piece-Rate 22 € 0.73 24 € 0.68 
WTA Tournament 28 € 0.38 26 € 0.28 
Total 50 € 0.54 50 € 0.48 
The exogenous random piece-rate draw enables me to test the plausibility of the 
maximum performance assumption. As shown in Section 3.2.1, when the piece-rate 
payment scheme is realized, optimal performance increases with the piece-rate draw, 
but maximum performance does not. While it is guaranteed that the maximum 
performance assumption holds in the dice task, it is unclear for the math task.  
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In my sample 22 subjects performed the math task under the piece-rate scheme. 
The correlation between the realized piece-rate and the math performance of these 
subjects is close to zero (r = -0.0210). Figure 3.5 illustrates realized performance of 
subjects in tasks 5 and 6 for different levels of the randomly drawn piece-rate. This 
provides no indication of performance optimization, but is consistent with the 
assumption that individuals provide their maximum performance in the math task.  
Figure 3.5: Exogenous random piece-rate draw and task performance 
Note: N=50. Math performance (left) and dice task score (right) under a piece-rate payment 
scheme (black) or a WTA tournament payment scheme (grey) by random piece-rate draw. 
3.4.5 Quantifying the value of competing and winning 
The previous analysis indicates substantial effects of the subjective winning 
probability on PR-equivalents. However, such effects can be expected even in the 
absence of competitive preferences, since the relative expected payoff of the WTA 
tournament is driven by the probability of winning. In order to isolate competitive 
preferences and to quantify the values of competing and winning in my experiment, I 
adjust the observed PR-equivalents for revealed risk aversion as well as for the 
subjective winning probability, which includes overconfidence24. In order to quantify 
the total values rather than per-point-values I then multiply with the subject’s task 5 
performance. Table 3.6 shows summary statistics of the measures included.  
24 Quantifying the individual values of competing and winning does not imply that subjects 
themselves calculate such values during the experiment. 
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics 
N = 50 Quantiles 
mean st.dev. min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max 
PR-equivalent 
Math | easy pool 0.632 0.282 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.65 0.80 1.05 1.05 
Math | original pool 0.580 0.250 0.00 0.30 0.50 0.55 0.70 1.05 1.05 
Math | hard pool 0.477 0.277 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.65 0.88 1.05 
Dice  | easy pool 0.605 0.238 0.00 0.33 0.45 0.60 0.75 1.00 1.05 
Dice  | original pool 0.511 0.220 0.00 0.23 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.75 1.05 
Dice  | hard pool 0.398 0.225 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.65 1.05 
Estimated winning Prob. 
Math 0.526 0.204 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.90 
Dice 0.462 0.097 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.80 
CRRA25 0.416 0.496 -0.49 -0.15 -0.15 0.41 0.68 0.97 1.37 
Math-Performance 10.560 3.791 2.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 13.00 15.50 20.00 
Since my previous analysis suggests, that the maximum performance assumption 
holds for the math task, I am able to pool responses from both tasks and increase the 
degrees of freedom substantially.  For each of the six decisions d of each subject i I 
calculate the deviation yid from the PR-equivalent that would maximize expected utility 
in the absence of competitive preferences. 
y𝑖𝑑 = 𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑
(1−𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑖) −𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑑 (3.6.1) 
I regress the deviation y𝑖𝑑 on the subjective winning probability, derive individual 
coefficients 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖 and 𝛽𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑖, and calculate the individual value of winning (equation 
3.6.3) as well as the individual value of competing (equation 3.6.4) for each subject: 
   y𝑖𝑑 = 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑑 + ε𝑖𝑑 (3.6.2) 
       𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 =  𝛽𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑖
1
1−𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 (3.6.3) 
    𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =  𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖
1
1−𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 (3.6.4) 
Figure 3.6 shows the cumulative distribution of the values of competing and 
winning. I find evidence for a positive (non-monetary) value of competing 
(mean=2.19, p<0.001) in my sample. Testing the median yields the same result 
25 The risk measure by Holt and Laury (2002) specifies an interval of the CRRA parameter for 
each individual. The reported results use the lower bound of these intervals, but using the interval 
midpoint or upper bound instead does not change my conclusion. Tables B.1 and B.2 are provided in 
Appendix B and report results for both alternative risk adjustments. 
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(median=2.07, p<0.001). On average subjects reveal a willingness to give up €2.19 
(median=€2.07) of risk-adjusted expected payment in order to compete in a WTA 
tournament. I do not find evidence for a (non-monetary) value of winning 
(mean=-6.63, p=0.189) in my sample. Testing the median even yields a negative value 
of winning (median=-1.98, p<0.001).This suggests that in my experiment subjects are 
not willing to give up any risk-adjusted expected payment for the chance of winning a 
WTA tournament, but may even prefer a (harder) competition with a lower winning 
probability. 
Figure 3.6: Non-monetary values of competing and winning  
Note: N=50. Cumulative distribution functions of the Value of competing (left) and the Value of winning 
(right). For both values the figure shows the distribution for males (black) and females (grey) as well as 
the overall distribution (dashed line). 
Moreover, I test for gender differences in both competitive preferences. While I 
observe a higher average value of competing for males than for females, this difference 
is not significant (Two-sample t test: diff=2.98-1.19=1.79>0, t=1.52, p<0.136). Testing 
for median differences (male: 2.62; female: 1.59; p=0.393) yields the same result. The 
average value of winning is negative for males and even lower for females, but this 
difference is insignificant (Two-sample t test: diff=-4.60+9.22=4.62>0, t=0.46, 
p<0.650) in my sample. Testing for median differences (male: -2.02; female: 1.98; 
p=0.776) yields the same result. This result is consistent with the study of van 
Veldhuizen (2017), who found that after controlling for overconfidence and risk 
preferences within a refined experimental design the gender difference in self-selection 
into competition did not imply a gender difference in competitive preferences.  
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3.4.6 Relating to other measures of competitiveness 
Table 3.7 shows spearman correlations of the values of competing (Vcomp) and 
winning (Vwin) with the standard competitiveness measure of Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) and the PR-equivalents (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016a). Vcomp and Vwin are 
calculated based on the observed PR-equivalents of tasks 5 and task 6, therefore these 
measures are related by design. The resulting correlations are reported to illustrate these 
relations, but are not to be interpreted as a finding of my study. For both tasks Vwin is 
positively (negatively) correlated with the PR-equivalent of the easy (hard) competitor 
pool, but shows no substantial correlation with the original pool. Hence, Vwin reflects 
the difference subjects make between easy and hard competitions. Vcomp is most 
positively correlated with the PR-equivalents for the hard competitor pools. Hence, 
Vcomp is most reflective of subjects’ decisions in hard and challenging competitions 
with lower a probability of winning.  
Table 3.7: Spearman Correlations 
N = 50 PR-equivalent 
Math Math Math Dice Dice Dice WTA 
Vcomp Vwin 
easy  
pool 
original 
pool 
hard 
pool 
easy 
pool 
original 
pool 
hard 
pool 
round 3 
Value of competing 1.000 
Value of winning -0.835*** 1.000 
PR-equivalent 
Math | easy -0.134 0.390** 1.000 
Math | original 0.142 0.037 0.665*** 1.000 
Math | hard 0.438** -0.280* 0.435** 0.611*** 1.000 
Dice  | easy -0.030 0.247+ 0.413** 0.323* 0.323* 1.000 
Dice  | original 0.258+ 0.022 0.308* 0.341* 0.473*** 0.588*** 1.000 
Dice  | hard 0.605*** -0.415** 0.183 0.384** 0.433** 0.331* 0.562*** 1.000 
Pref. for WTA (task 3) 0.253+ -0.204 0.295* 0.462*** 0.484*** 0.119 0.141 0.218 1.000 
CRRA 0.237+ -0.131 0.069 0.022 -0.002 -0.157 -0.035 0.140 -0.090 
Overconfidence Math -0.170 0.103 -0.043 0.082 0.253+ -0.007 0.094 -0.027 0.174 
Overconfidence Dice 0.023 -0.024 -0.090 -0.094 -0.029 -0.100 -0.087 -0.141 0.088 
Math-Performance 0.302* -0.115 0.403** 0.325* 0.216 0.194 0.149 0.166 0.351* 
Pref. for WTA (task 4) 0.064 -0.059 0.169 0.042 0.172 -0.122 -0.022 -0.144 0.151 
Note: Spearman rank correlations. Vcomp and Vwin are calculated based on the observed PR-
equivalents of task 5 and task 6, therefore these measures are related by design. ***, **, *, + indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
The binary choice between piece-rate payment and winner-take-all tournament 
(task 3) is the standard measure of competitiveness introduced by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) and widely used in behavioral studies (e.g. Buser et al., 2014; 2017). 
97 
I observe a positive correlation between the value of competing (Vcomp) and the task 3 
payment choice, while the value of winning (Vwin) is not significantly correlated with 
this standard measure of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) argued that the preference to enter the WTA 
tournament reflects an individual’s enjoyment of competition, but that each individual’s 
decision to enter the WTA (or choose the PR) can be driven by this preference as well 
as other factors such as overconfidence or risk aversion. In their analysis Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) controlled for the confounding factors and attributed the residual 
gender gap to the preference for competition without having to identify the individual 
utility or valuation of competition. 
Table 3.8: Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var.: WTA task 3 WTA task 3 WTA task 3 PR-eq uivalent PR-eq uivalent 
OL S OL S probit  mfx pooled OLS pooled OLS 
Value of competing 0.03 (0.02)+ 0.04 (0.02)* 0.05 (0.03)+ 0.01 (0.01)+ 0.01 (0.01)+ 
Value of winning 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00)** 
Dice Task (contrast code) -0.04 (0.03) 
Value of competing * Dice 0.00 (0.01) 
Value of winning * Dice -0.00 (0.00) 
Overconfidence Math 0.04 (0.02)+ 0.05 (0.03)+ 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Overconfidence Dice 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
CRRA -0.16 (0.15) -0.19 (0.16) -0.02 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) 
Constant 0.32 (0.08)*** 0.31 (0.10)** 0.53 (0.05)*** 0.53 (0.05)*** 
Observations (subjects) 50 (50) 50 (50) 50 (50) 100 (50) 100 (50) 
R2 between / R2 overall  -- / 0.066  -- / 0.148   0.141 / 0.097   0.141 / 0.122 
Note: Columns 1and 2 report coefficients of linear probability models. Column 3 reports marginal effects 
(mfx) from probit regression. Columns 4 and 5report coefficients of pooled OLS for PR-equivalents in 
both tasks and original competitor pools. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 4 and 5 
report clustered standard errors (clustered on subject level).  ***, **, *, + indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
I use Vcomp and Vwin to decompose the individual decision to enter the WTA 
tournament (task 3) into the effects of enjoying the competition, seeking to win the 
competition, and the effects of other factors like risk preferences and overconfidence. 
Table 3.8 columns 1 – 3 consistently show a (weakly) significant positive effect of 
Vcomp, while Vwin has no significant effect. My results suggest that an additional €1.00 
in the Value of competing increases the probability of self-selecting into the tournament 
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by 5 percentage points. Given the observed distribution of Vcomp the subject at the 3rd 
quartile (€4.06) is about 19 percentage points more likely to enter the WTA tournament 
than the subject at the 1st quartile (€0.33). Moreover, I find a positive effect of 
overconfidence in the math task, suggesting that overestimating the chance of winning 
by 10 percentage points increases the probability of self-selecting into the tournament 
by 5 percentage points. Columns 4 and 5 illustrate the relation between Vcomp and 
Vwin and the PR-equivalent for the original competitor pool in both math task (task 5) 
and dice task (task 6). After adjusting for the subjective winning probability, risk 
preferences, and performance expectations, both values are still positively related to the 
PR-equivalent (column 4). This relation does not depend on the type of task (column 5).  
3.5 DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Summary of results 
In this chapter I introduce a simple utility model describing indifference 
conditions for an individual’s choice between competitive tournaments and non-
competitive environments. In the benchmark model without competitive preferences the 
subjective probability of winning determines the piece-rate equivalent of the 
competitive tournament. I distinguish maximum performance environments, where 
individuals provide their maximum feasible performance, from optimal performance 
environments, where they do not. For both types of environments I show the relation 
between performance expectations and the piece-rate equivalent. Under the maximum 
performance assumption I demonstrate how the introduction of two distinct competitive 
preferences – (1) a non-monetary value of competing, and (2) a non-monetary value of 
winning the competition – changes the indifference condition, i.e. the piece-rate 
equivalent.  
In my experimental treatment I manipulate the probability of winning a 
competitive winner-take-all tournament and identify a causal effect of the treatment on 
subjects’ choice of a PR-equivalent. This effect does not differ between a math task, 
where performance depends on ability and effort, and a dice task, where performance is 
the result of pure luck. Moreover, my results suggest that subjects provide their 
maximum performance in the math task. In order to identify competitive preferences I 
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calculate the deviation from the quantitative prediction of the benchmark model and 
separate it into an individual value of competing and an individual value of winning. 
My experiment provides evidence for a positive average non-monetary value of 
competing among my subjects. Moreover, the individual value of competing is shown 
to increase the likelihood of entering the tournament in a classical competitiveness 
experiment (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007) substantially. This result confirms the 
conjecture of previous research that self-selection into competitive environments is 
driven by an enjoyment of competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Bönte, Procher, 
Urbig, & Voracek, 2017b). I am not able to identify a non-monetary value of winning. 
The average value of winning does not differ significantly from zero. The estimated 
individual value of winning does not have an effect on the likelihood of entering the 
tournament in a classical competitiveness experiment.  
3.5.2 Limitations 
My conclusions are limited to the scope of the theoretical model. I analyze an 
individual’s choice between competitive winner-take-all tournaments and their 
respective piece-rate equivalents. It is unclear, if and how my results are generalizable 
to other competitive and non-competitive environments. I include a value of competing 
and a value of winning and analyze their effects on the piece-rate equivalent of the 
competitive environment under the maximum performance assumption. Hence, my 
results apply only to environments, where individuals provide their maximum feasible 
performance. Moreover, I include risk preferences in a very simple way and assume 
constant relative risk aversion. A more detailed emphasis on risk preferences, which for 
instance includes skewness preferences (e.g. Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker, 2007) 
is likely to provide valuable additional insights. 
My measure of competitive preferences is based on subjects’ deviation from the 
benchmark model of utility maximizing without competitive preferences. Whenever 
such a deviation from more “rational” decision making is measured, the results are 
prone to reflect imperfectly random irrationality (including a lack of comprehension) 
rather than meaningful behavioral tendencies. I tried to increase comprehension levels 
of my subjects by presenting a tutorial in each session before running the actual 
experiment. Moreover, I demonstrate the relation of the observed value of competing to 
100 
established measures competitiveness (cf. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). The relation 
shown by comparison of these two behavioral measures is, unlike the effect of my 
experimental treatment, not to be interpreted causally.  
Moreover, as I apply a within-subject design the uniqueness of my subject pool 
may induce biased results. While I cannot completely rule out this problem, I am able to 
replicate main findings of previous studies by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) as well as 
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a), which supports the assumption that my subject pool and 
experimental setting are consistent with those examined in previous research. 
3.5.3 Implications 
1. Different environments to study competitiveness
Despite these limitations my study presented in this chapter has important 
implications for future research. In my model I have distinguished between optimal 
performance environments and maximum performance environments, where individuals 
provide their maximum feasible performance, e.g. because they can only provide a 
restricted amount of effort. My model suggests, that self-selection into competition and 
behavior within competition are not only conceptually distinct, but do also require 
different environments to be studied most effectively. An investigation of effort 
behavior and performance within competition may be most insightful, when all 
individuals optimize their performance without such restrictions. If some, or all 
individuals face a performance restriction, performance effects are likely to be only 
imperfectly observable.  
My model suggests that self-selection into competition and performance within 
competition are interlinked in optimal performance environments. I show that the 
optimal performance in the competitive tournament is higher than under the non-
competitive piece-rate equivalent as long as the chance of winning increases with higher 
performance and that these anticipated performance differences affect an individual’s 
choice between a competitive and a non-competitive environment. In environments 
where individuals provide maximum performance self-selection into competition can be 
disentangled from performance effects and competitive preferences can be identified 
without the elicitation of the performance distribution anticipated by each individual for 
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each environment. Hence, these environments are likely best suited for studies of 
competitive preferences and their effects on self-selection into competition. 
In most real world situations, such as workplace environments, we cannot expect 
the maximum performance assumption to hold. Often in these environments 
competition is implemented with the very purpose of increasing performance (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981; Connelly et al., 2014). This highlights the importance of controlled 
laboratory environments for the study of individual competitive preferences. However, 
in the math tasks frequently used in economic experiments measuring competitiveness 
(e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Buser et al., 2014; Wozniak et al., 2014) we do not 
know, whether the maximum performance assumption holds. Non-agency tasks (Ifcher 
& Zarghamee, 2016b) can ensure, that by design the maximum performance assumption 
holds, and therefore, might be considered as an alternative for future experiments. If 
researchers seek to isolate competitive preferences, but prefer math tasks for other 
reasons, the maximum performance assumption can be tested, for instance, by 
comparing performance under different piece-rate levels. 
2. Individuals value competing
I provide a utility-based benchmark model that predicts the piece-rate equivalent 
of a competitive tournament and accounts for an individual’s (over-)confidence and risk 
preferences. Consistent with my model individuals in my study adjust their piece-rate to 
a manipulation of the chance of winning, but observed piece-rate equivalents deviate 
from the benchmark model in a systematic way. My results imply that individuals value 
competing. Hence, competitive preferences are shown to be a distinct phenomenon, 
which is not fully explained by other factors such as risk preferences and 
(over-)confidence. Further theoretical and experimental examination of these 
preferences is therefore a promising field for behavioral economists. The identification 
of quantifiable individual values of competing and winning shown in this study 
provides a refined measurement method for future research. Individuals deviate from 
payoff maximization giving up a quantifiable amount of money for their valuation for 
competition. This amount is rather independent of individual chances of winning and 
hence reflects a value of competing itself rather than a value of winning the 
competition.   
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3. Individuals do not value winning?
While the piece-rate equivalents observed in my study provide empirical 
evidence, that individuals value competing, I am not able to identify a non-monetary 
value of winning. For the majority of subjects my calculation yields negative values. A 
negative value of winning indicates that subjects prefer competitive settings with lower 
chances of winning. One possible explanation for such a preference to enter harder 
competitions might be some sort of seeking competitive challenges. In this case the 
value of winning is likely underestimated. However, it might also be necessary for 
contests to include an element of status (Moldovanu, Sela, & Shi, 2007) in order to 
generate the symbolic value of winning (Delfgaauw et al., 2013). In this case the value 
of winning in itself would not be a distinct preference. Additional research is required to 
understand the role of winning for self-selection and performance in competitive 
environments.  
4. Competitive preferences independent from gender differences
Previous research has often used gender comparisons as identification for 
heterogeneity in competitive preferences (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Niederle 2017 
for reviews). In recent work van Veldhuizen (2017) re-examines the gender difference 
in competitiveness and questions the relevance of competitive preferences in the 
absence of such a gender difference. The value of competing presented in my study 
allows an investigation of individual competitive preferences, which is conceptually and 
empirically independent from the identification of gender differences in such 
preferences. Consistent with the study of van Veldhuizen (2017) I observe gender 
differences in self-selection into the competitive environment, but I do not observe 
significant gender differences in the value of competing. However, this does not suggest 
the irrelevance of competitive preferences itself. As discussed above I provide empirical 
evidence that individuals value competing and that this can be considered a distinct 
preference. My design allows comparing individual decisions to a benchmark model, 
and hence, investigating individual heterogeneity in competitive preferences without 
relying on group differences, such as a gender gap.  
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Chapter IV 
Entrepreneurs embrace Competition: 
Evidence from a lab-in-field study 
 “I am asserting that entrepreneurship and competition are two sides of the same coin: 
that entrepreneurial activity is always competitive and that competitive activity is 
always entrepreneurial” (Kirzner 1973, p. 94) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Israel M. Kirzner’s above-quoted assertion tightly links entrepreneurship to 
competition suggesting that individuals who embrace competition might be those who 
are attracted to entrepreneurship. Consistently, Joseph A. Schumpeter describes 
entrepreneurs as being driven by “the will to conquer; the impulse to fight, to prove 
oneself superior to others” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 93). Despite Kirzner’s and 
Schumpeter’s well-known disagreement on the economic function of the entrepreneur26, 
these two distinguished theoreticians seem to agree that entrepreneurial activity is 
inherently competitive and that entrepreneurs tend to embrace competition.  
While Kirzner (1973) and Schumpeter (1934) have notably influenced current 
entrepreneurship research in many ways, their observation that entrepreneurship is 
linked to competition implying that becoming an entrepreneur means selecting into a 
26 Kirzner (1973) suggests that entrepreneurial activities tend to drive markets towards 
equilibrium, while Schumpeter (1934) suggests that that these activities are the driving force behind 
market disequilibria. Recently, Acs, Åstebro, Audretsch, and Robinson (2016, p.37-38) summarize these 
two perspectives as Kirzner referring to entrepreneurship as “competition in the market” and Schumpeter 
referring to “competition for the market”. 
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particularly competitive environment has been almost completely ignored in 
entrepreneurship research. Reviewing the recent extensive literature on the personality 
of entrepreneurs, Kerr et al. (2018) highlight several personality traits, but individuals’ 
attitudes towards competition, such as those described by Schumpeter (1934), are not 
emphasized. Competition only indirectly enters the review through entrepreneurs’ 
optimistic beliefs about their abilities relative to others. Furthermore, Rauch and Frese 
(2007) introduce, based on a survey among expert researchers, entrepreneurs’ 
personality characteristics that can be matched to specific tasks of entrepreneurs. While 
Kirzner (1973) describes the entrepreneurial task as inherently competitive, individuals’ 
attitudes towards competition are not considered by Rauch und Frese (2007) as one of 
the personality characteristics of entrepreneurs that match with the specific demands of 
entrepreneurial environments.  
Outside the context of entrepreneurship empirical studies suggest that individual 
competitiveness measured by economic experiments is related to selection into more 
competitive educational and occupational environments (e.g. Buser et al., 2014, 2017; 
Reuben et al., 2015; Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2016). 
Entrepreneurship as an environment particularly attractive for competitive individuals, 
however, has received just as little attention in economic research as in recent 
entrepreneurship research (see Bönte & Piegeler, 2013, and Holm, Opper, & Nee, 2013, 
as exceptions). 
In Chapter IV we address the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
individual competitiveness. In order to improve our understanding of this link, we apply 
the general framework of individual competitiveness introduced in Chapter I 
highlighting three different motives to self-select into competitive environments. We 
link each of these motives to entrepreneurship and hereby connect entrepreneurship 
research to psychological research, which has identified these different motives to enter 
competitive environments, i.e. a desire to win, personal development and mastery of 
tasks, and enjoyment of competition (e.g. Ryckman et al., 1990, 1996; Newby & Klein, 
2014, Houston et al., 2002b). While individual competitiveness has rarely been 
explicitly addressed in entrepreneurship literature, two of the three motives of 
competitiveness are at least indirectly linked to constructs discussed in entrepreneurship 
research. First, a strong desire to win can result in higher efforts to win a competition 
but may also lead to aggressive or even unethical behavior (Ryckman et al., 1990; 
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Houston et al., 2002a; Newby & Klein, 2014). A positive association between such 
behaviors and entrepreneurship has already been demonstrated in the literature (e.g., 
Berge, Bjorvatn, Pires, & Tungodden, 2015; Utsch, Rauch, Rothfuß, & Frese, 1999; 
Hmieleski & Lerner, 2016; Levine & Rubinstein, 2017). Second, striving for personal 
development and mastery of tasks may also affect individuals’ decision to enter 
competitions (Ryckmann et al., 1996, Newby & Klein, 2014). This facet of competition 
is closely related to achievement motivation, which is often viewed as one of the most 
prominent characteristics of entrepreneurs (e.g. McClelland, 1965, Rauch & Frese, 
2007). 
The relationship between entrepreneurship and enjoyment of competition, 
however, has not been investigated in entrepreneurship research. Our previous analysis 
in Chapters II and III suggests, that individuals’ decisions to self-select into competitive 
environments in incentivized economic experiments are driven by their enjoyment of 
competition and that such an enjoyment of competition reflects a non-monetary value 
individuals gain by competing. In Chapter IV we examine the relevance of individuals’ 
enjoyment of competition for career choices. We hypothesize that entrepreneurs decide 
to enter a competition for the sake of competition itself, independent of the prospect of 
winning the competition or personal development and mastering the tasks in the 
competition. If entrepreneurs had a stronger general tendency to favor competitive over 
non-competitive environments than non-entrepreneurs and if this tendency was driven 
at least partially by enjoyment of competition, this could have relevant practical 
implications. For instance, among the three facets of individual competitiveness, 
especially the enjoyment of competition might provide an additional explanation for 
potentially excessive market entry by entrepreneurs and perseverance in face of low 
odds of success and in face of a lack of controllability, e.g. due to the influence of pure 
chance, beyond the well-known factors such as overconfidence (cf., Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999) and high willingness to take risks27 (e.g., Caliendo, Fossen, & Kritikos, 
2009, Wu & Knott, 2006).  
27 Given that there is substantial work demonstrating a lack of relevance of risk preferences (e.g., 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Miner & Raju, 2004; Palich & Bagby, 1995; Wu & Knott, 2006) and, in 
particular, Holm et al. (2013) report that general risk preferences are not distinguishing entrepreneurs 
from others, but only preferences related to risks in strategic interaction, including competitions, 
enjoyment of competition might even be more important and explain some of the seeming risk taking of 
entrepreneurs. 
106 
Following recent economic literature that relates individuals’ self-selection into 
competitive environments in incentivized economic experiments to career choices (e.g. 
Almås et al., 2016, Buser et al., 2017; Buser et al., 2014; Reuben et al., 2015), we adapt 
the experimental design introduced by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), where 
participants perform well-defined tasks and choose between two performance-related 
payment schemes. Participants can choose between a non-competitive piece-rate 
payment scheme and a competitive winner-take-all tournament payment scheme. 
Conducting a “lab-in-the-field” study with 224 visitors at a shopping mall in a large 
German city we demonstrate that entrepreneurs—both revealed entrepreneurs 
(individuals who are or have been entrepreneurs) and potential entrepreneurs (who 
consider entrepreneurship a possible future option)—are more likely to select into 
competition than non-entrepreneurial individuals (who have no intention at all to start a 
business)28.  
We employ an experimental design that allows us to examine the extent to which 
entrepreneurs’ tendency to select into competitive environments is driven by enjoyment 
of competition rather than driven by a desire to win or achievement motives. We isolate 
enjoyment of competition from a desire to win by showing that this effect does not 
depend on entrepreneurs’ levels of confidence in winning the competition. If 
individuals’ enter competitions despite believing that they are unlikely to win, their 
preferences for competition are not solely driven by their desire to win.29 Moreover, we 
isolate enjoyment of competition from achievement motivations by showing that the 
effect holds for both a skill-related task, i.e. verifying simple single-digit equations 
(Mayr et al., 2012), and a skill-independent task, i.e. rolling dice (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 
2016b). In contrast to the math-based competition, the outcomes of the dice task are 
determined by chance only. Individuals’ selection into this dice-based competition does 
28 For the sake of this chapter, we follow Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and use the terms 
entrepreneurship and self-employment interchangeably by employing a conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship of a medium scope; that is, beyond individuals starting their own business with the 
intention to grow and employ other people, we also include individuals who run their own business 
without employees or without the intention to grow. However, we exclude people who act 
entrepreneurially in an employment position, such as managers or any sort of corporate entrepreneurs or 
employees who manage corporate spin-offs without actually owning that spin-off. A more differentiated 
analysis of revealed entrepreneurs distinguishing between start-up founders and other forms of self-
employment is provided in Chapter V. 
29 If individuals enter competitions despite believing that they will not win, their preferences for 
competition are not solely driven by their desire to win. As discussed above, if individuals have a strong 
desire to win and do not believe that they can win, then it will be less likely that they enter competitive 
environments. 
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not tend to be driven by skill-related considerations such as individuals’ striving for 
personal development or achievement motivations, which include mastery of tasks and 
the demonstration of skills.  
We test the association of entrepreneurship and enjoyment of competition for 
both revealed entrepreneurs, who have experience in entrepreneurship, and potential 
entrepreneurs, who have no entrepreneurial experience but are considering starting their 
own businesses in the future. Thereby we tentatively examine whether individuals’ 
behavior in economic experiments is related to selection into entrepreneurship.  
In the remainder of this chapter we discuss the respective conceptual relations 
between the three distinct motives of individual competitiveness and entrepreneurship 
in Section 4.2. We focus on their critical contingencies, which need to be distinguished 
to isolate enjoyment of competition. Building on this discussion Section 4.3 then 
outlines our empirical approach. Following a report of our results and a large set of 
robustness checks in Section 4.4, Section 4.5 discusses how our findings contribute to 
entrepreneurship and economics research.    
4.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
In psychological, economic, and entrepreneurship research the notion of 
competitiveness has various meanings. In order to clarify our conceptualization of 
individual competitiveness, we separate our conceptualization that focuses on 
individuals’ selection into competitive environments from other conceptualizations that 
focus on the ability to win in competitions or on behavior within competitive 
environments. We then highlight three facets of individual competitiveness, namely 
enjoyment of competition, desire to win and personal development, and discuss how 
these facets can be linked to entrepreneurship research. We thereby document that 
enjoyment of competition is the one of the three facets that has not yet been 
convincingly linked to entrepreneurship.  
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4.2.1 Individual competitiveness 
As discussed in the general framework in Chapter I we follow previous 
psychological and economic research that focuses on individual competitiveness defined 
as individuals’ general tendency to favor competitive over non-competitive 
environments. This reflects a competitive preference which is distinct from risk 
preferences and overconfidence. As any competition implies a chance of winning and a 
risk of losing, both risk preferences and overconfidence may make competitive 
environments more attractive, but they both do not relate to a unique preference for 
competitive versus non-competitive environments (Niederle, 2017; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007). Competitive environments are characterized by institutions where 
individuals' goals are not simultaneously achievable given the sets of possible 
behaviors. Hence, in competitive environments every attempt of individuals to get 
closer to their own goals makes it less likely for other individuals to achieve their goals 
(Deutsch, 1949; Lazear, 1999). This negative relationship of individuals’ goals can be 
established, for instance, by “the perceived presence of a rival or a group of competitors 
who serve as performance standards for the individual” (Smither & Houston 1992, p. 
408). This very general definition of competitive environments also comprises 
environments where the performances of individuals are not under their control or 
where the performances are neither affected by efforts of individuals, nor by their 
abilities and skills. According to this conceptualization of individual competitiveness, 
competitive individuals select into competitive environments, because they have 
preferences over particular institutions linking individuals’ performances to their 
rewards, but not because they have preferences over particular tasks they are competing 
in. 
Our conceptualization differs from two other conceptualizations of competitive 
individuals that have been used in previous research, but relate to completely different 
settings and mechanisms. First, competitiveness is sometimes defined as individual 
ability to win competitions or to perform better than others (e.g., Manning & Taylor, 
2001; Hönekopp et al., 2006). While the ability to win a competition may indirectly 
affect individuals’ decisions to select into competitions, a high probability of winning 
does not imply that an individual has a unique preference for competitive over non-
competitive environments (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). A general tendency to favor 
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competitive environments, as suggested here, implies that an individual tends to select 
into competitions, irrespective of the own ability to win.  
Second, following economic research (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), we separate the 
tendency to enter competitive environments from individuals’ behavior within 
competitive environments. Alfred Marshall (1920), for instance, asserts that “a 
manufacturer or a trader is often stimulated much more by the hope of victory over his 
rivals than by the desire to add something to his fortune” (p.19) and, hence, accepts 
lower profits within a competition for the sake of winning. Aggressive behavior in 
competitive environments does not necessarily imply, however, that individuals 
generally like situations in which they compete with others. For instance, individuals 
who dislike competitions may be forced to enter competitive environments and may 
respond to this by competing aggressively. While aggressive behavior in competitions 
has already been associated with entrepreneurs (e.g., Utsch et al., 1999; Hmieleski & 
Lerner, 2016), such behavioral tendencies within competitive environments are distinct 
from preferences to enter competitions.30 Relatedly, individuals maximizing own 
rewards relative to others’ rewards have also been considered to be competitive 
individuals (e.g., van Lange et al., 1997; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and these 
distributional preferences have been linked to selection into entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Weitzel, Urbig, Desai, Acs, & Sanders, 2010). While significant correlations between 
such distributional preferences and individual competitiveness have been reported 
(Bartling et al., 2009), distributional preferences also differ from our conceptualization 
of individual competitiveness, because they relate to behavior in contexts where 
individuals’ rewards are mutually dependent on one another, that is, to behavior within 
competitive environments, but not to preferences to select into such environments. In 
sum, the two presented alternative conceptualizations of competitiveness refer to 
individuals’ behaviors and performances within competition, but do not focus on 
selection into competitive environments, which is the focus of our research. 
30 In psychological research the individual competitiveness as a preference for competition and 
behavior within competitions are sometimes viewed as one construct. For instance, hypercompetitiveness 
as “an indiscriminate need by individuals to compete and win (and to avoid losing) at any cost” 
(Ryckman et al. 1990, p. 630) and the competitiveness dimension in the work and family orientation 
questionnaire defined as “enjoyment of interpersonal competition and the desire to win and be better than 
others” (Spence & Helmreich, 1983, p. 41) clearly mix preferences to compete with preferences for 
specific behaviors within competitions. Depending on the particular research question, such a 
combination can reduce the ability to sufficiently differentiate mechanisms affecting individuals’ 
behaviors related to selection into and behavior in competitions. 
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4.2.2 Enjoyment of competition as a facet of individual competitiveness 
Individuals may voluntarily select into competitive environments for different 
reasons. Psychological research has identified different facets of individual 
competitiveness, each of which relates to a distinct motive making competitive 
environments attractive for individuals (Helmreich & Spence, 1978; Houston et al., 
2002a, 2002b; Newby & Klein, 2014). Three facets emerge as the most important ones: 
the desire to win, personal development, and enjoyment of competition (Ryckman et al., 
1990, 1996; Newby & Klein, 2014). While entrepreneurs’ desires to win and their need 
for achievement and personal development have already been indirectly addressed in 
entrepreneurship research (e.g. Utsch et al., 1999; Levine & Rubinstein, 2017; 
McClelland, 1965; Rauch & Frese, 2007), enjoyment of competition has neither directly 
nor indirectly been investigated. We therefore focus on enjoyment of competition, 
reflecting the non-monetary benefits associated with competing against others. These 
intrinsic benefits are related to the institution of competition itself and do not depend on 
the outcome of a competition, i.e. whether a competition has been lost or won. 
Moreover, these benefits arising from competing with other individuals are independent 
of the particular tasks carried out in the competition. This implies that enjoyment of 
competition results from competing irrespective of performing a particular task, 
irrespective of demonstrating superior skills, and irrespective of winning a competition. 
Enjoyment of competition can be distinguished from individuals’ willingness to 
win (Newby and Klein, 2014; Ryckman et al., 1990). Individuals with a desire to win 
may feel that they need to win and avoid losing at any cost (Ryckman et al., 1990) and 
compete for the sake of winning itself, independent of associated rewards. These 
individuals are likely to invest more effort and accept higher costs to leverage odds of 
winning than individuals not having such a desire. More importantly, in order to have a 
chance of winning a competition, it is inevitable to enter a competition. Hence, the 
desire to win can be an important motivation to enter competitive rather than non-
competitive environments. This, however, does not imply that individuals having a 
strong desire to win do also have a general tendency to favor competitive over non-
competitive environments. On the contrary, individuals with a strong desire to win 
might even shy away from competitions they believe that they are not able to win 
(Connelly et al., 2014; Coffey & Maloney, 2010). Hence, the desire to win may affect 
the likelihood that individuals select into competitive environments, but this effect is—
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in contrast to the effect of enjoyment of competition—conditioned on individuals’ 
expectations of winning the competition. Through this inherent interaction between 
confidence in winning a competition as a belief, and the desire to win as a preference, 
we are able to empirically discriminate between a desire to win as an expectancy-
dependent facet and other facets of individual competitiveness, including the enjoyment 
of competition.  
Enjoyment of competition can also be distinguished from a third facet of 
individual competitiveness that is driven by personal development motives (Newby and 
Klein, 2014; Ryckman et al., 1996) and related achievement motivations (Nicholls, 
1984; Elliot & McGregor, 1999). Individuals competing to satisfy personal develop-
ment goals, do not focus on winning a competition, but rather seek mastery of a given 
task (Ryckman et al., 1996). Similarly, achievement motivations drive individuals to 
strive for accomplishments and the mastering of skills and, hence, relate to tasks that 
require individuals’ skills or allow individuals to display their skills (Nicholls, 1984; 
Elliot & McGregor, 1999).31 Hence, personal development and achievement moti-
vations can be expected to be especially relevant for selection into competition based on 
tasks that require and challenge individuals’ skills and competencies. In contrast, such 
personal development motives are likely to be irrelevant if competition relies on luck 
and, thus, does not offer opportunities to develop or demonstrate mastery of skills. 
Varying the degree to which a competition depends on individuals’ skills, therefore, 
provides a way to indirectly identify the potential influence of personal development 
motives and achievement motivation on individuals’ tendencies to enter competitions.  
Being able to conceptually distinguish different motivations for entering 
competition does not imply that such a distinction is meaningful with respect to 
predicting individuals’ economic behavior, i.e., that there is some external validity and 
practical relevance of these distinctions. However, in Chapter II we demonstrate that 
competitiveness resulting from personal development motives displays substantially 
different associations with basic personality dimensions (Big Five) compared to 
competitiveness not resulting from personal development motives. In fact, for 
31 Since some researchers equate competitiveness with achievement motivation, it is important to 
note that the here discussed differences imply that both are distinct constructs. Competitiveness only 
matters for competitive environments, but need for achievement may also affect engagement in tasks 
performed in non-competitive environments. Hence, “[n]eed for achievement and competitiveness may 
occur in the same individual, but competitiveness need not be present in a highly achieving person” 
(Smither & Houston, 1992, p. 409). 
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neuroticism, we even find opposite signs of the associations with these two facets of 
competition. Furthermore, in Chapter II we show that these two different motives of 
competitiveness relate differently to participants’ interest in a managerial career. Hence, 
distinguishing between different motivations to enter competitions is valid and 
potentially relevant for individuals’ occupational choices. 
4.2.3 Entrepreneurs’ enjoyment of competition 
We have claimed that enjoyment of competition is distinct from the desire to win 
and, thus, independent of confidence in winning, and from personal development 
motives and, thus, independent of whether a given task depends on one’s skills and 
competencies or on pure chance. We now argue that particularly entrepreneurs may 
display enjoyment of competition, leading to selection into entrepreneurship as a 
competitive environment (Kirzner, 1973). Entrepreneurs tend to face market compe-
tition more directly than wage-earning employees, as illustrated by Bartling and 
colleagues (2009, p.93): “a self-employed lawyer is in constant competition for clients, 
whereas a lawyer working as a civil servant in a public authority is not”. Both desire to 
win and achievement motivations may make entrepreneurial individuals more likely to 
enter competitive environments. Whether entrepreneurs also demonstrate higher levels 
in the third facet of individual competitiveness has yet to be investigated. We argue that 
entrepreneurs’ higher enjoyment of competition, independent of potential differences in 
desires to win and desires to master tasks and demonstrate skills, might be another 
mechanism to explain why entrepreneurs have been observed to start businesses despite 
low odds of success (Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007). Given that success as an 
entrepreneur depends not only on skills and competencies but also on chance (Monsen 
& Urbig, 2009), enjoyment of competition might be a particularly interesting 
explanation, because it does not require that individuals believe to be in full control of 
their performances.  
Evidence on whether entrepreneurs are more or less likely to enter competition 
is scarce and evidence, especially on whether or not they enjoy competition itself rather 
than the desire to win or the related mastery of tasks, is absent. Following psychological 
research (e.g. Helmreich & Spence, 1978; Newby & Klein, 2014), Bönte and Piegeler 
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(2013) use cross-sectional and self-reported32 data obtained from a large-scale multi-
country survey to demonstrate that individuals who prefer self-employment over paid 
employment and those who are currently taking the first steps towards starting new 
ventures also tend to report that they like situations in which they compete with others. 
Bönte and Piegeler’s (2013) study provides no indication regarding the extent to which 
their measurement of individual competitiveness might be driven by individuals’ desires 
to win and achievement motivations. In fact, examining the relationship between both 
psychometric self-reported and economic behavioral measurements in Chapter II, we 
find that self-reported measures of individual competitiveness can reflect multiple 
motives for favoring competition and, in particular, are likely to reflect personal 
development motives. This is consistent with findings that self-reported attitudes 
towards competition significantly relate to achievement motivations (Elliot, Jury, & 
Murayama, 2018). Furthermore, Bönte and Piegeler (2013) do not control for 
individuals’ desire to win or the heterogeneity in individuals’ expectations to win in 
competitions. Hence, they cannot rule out the possibility that entrepreneurs like 
competition because they exaggerate their chances of winning these competitions or 
because of personal development and achievement motives.  
Using an economic experiment, Holm and colleagues (2013) provide some 
evidence that CEOs of Chinese firms, including owner managers and founding 
managers, are more likely to select a competitive over a non-competitive payment 
scheme than a control group of non-CEOs. In their empirical analyses, Holm and 
colleagues (2013) do not control for risk preferences and perceived odds of winning, 
which, however, is needed to isolate individual competitiveness from risk preferences 
and overconfidence (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Furthermore, since Holm and 
colleagues (2013) employ a quiz-task implying that performance is based on 
individuals’ knowledge, the effect might still be driven by CEOs’ need for achievement, 
the need to demonstrate to be better than others. In sum, both Bönte’s and Piegeler’s 
(2013) and Holm’s and colleagues’ (2013) studies provide only limited evidence with 
respect to entrepreneurs’ enjoyment of competition, because both studies do not control 
for important confounding effects, such as risk preferences and confidence in winning 
(Holm et al., 2013), or for alternative motives and, in particular, for achievement 
32 Self-reported measures are sometimes regarded with suspicion in economic research, and 
behavioral measures of individual competitiveness obtained from incentivized economic experiments are 
often preferred (e.g., Niederle, 2017; Buser et al., 2014). 
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motivations (Holm et al., 2013, Bönte & Piegeler, 2013). Given that achievement 
motivation is one of the characteristics most robustly associated with entrepreneurs 
(Rauch & Frese, 2007; Kerr et al., 2018), this could explain both Bönte’s and Piegeler’s 
(2013) and Holm’s and colleagues’ (2013) findings.  
When discussing the differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial 
individuals, we can distinguish two important reasons for the emergence of such 
differences. On the one hand, entrepreneurs may be more likely to enjoy competition 
because they are exposed to competition all the time and become accustomed to it. 
Accordingly, a higher level of enjoyment of competition would be the result of being 
socialized in entrepreneurship33. On the other hand, individuals who intend to start new 
ventures may expect that they will be exposed to competition and, therefore, those who 
enjoy competing may be more likely to become entrepreneurs. Consequently, a higher 
level of enjoyment of competition would then be a reason for selecting into 
entrepreneurship in the first place rather than a consequence of being an entrepreneur.  
We suggest that enjoyment of competition makes entrepreneurship more 
attractive for individuals and, hence, makes them more likely to become entrepreneurs. 
If, however,  individuals enjoy competitions only after having been an entrepreneur, 
then individuals who find entrepreneurship attractive and may once start but have not 
yet started own businesses would not be found to enjoy competition as much as 
revealed entrepreneurs. Hence, comparing revealed entrepreneurs with potential 
entrepreneurs, i.e. individuals who consider entrepreneurship as a possible future 
option, is informative with respect to excluding explanations for the association 
between being an entrepreneur and the likelihood of selecting into more competitive 
environments that are based on reverse causality. Since we suggest that enjoyment of 
competition affects selection into entrepreneurship, we expect that both revealed 
entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs are more likely to enjoy competitive 
environments than non-entrepreneurial individuals. The following two hypotheses 
summarize our discussion. 
33 Evidence for related effects has been reported for risk-taking behavior (e.g., Brachert, Hyll, & 
Titze, 2017). 
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Hypothesis 1: Revealed entrepreneurs are more likely to select into competition 
than non-entrepreneurial individuals, independent of confidence in winning and 
independent of whether performing a task that depends on skills or on chance only. 
Hypothesis 2: Potential entrepreneurs are more likely to select into competition 
than non-entrepreneurial individuals, independent of confidence in winning and 
independent of whether performing a task that depends on skills or on chance only. 
4.3 STUDY DESIGN 
4.3.1 Identification of enjoyment of competition34 
We examine differences between individual competitiveness of entrepreneurs 
(revealed and potential) and non-entrepreneurial individuals based on a behavioral 
measure of individual competitiveness. This behavioral measure is obtained from an 
artificially created environment, which ensures comparability of responses even 
between individuals with highly heterogeneous experiences and personal backgrounds. 
Participants anonymously choose whether they want to be paid for their performance in 
a task according to either a competitive or a non-competitive payment scheme (Niederle 
& Vesterlund, 2007). In order to relate our study to existing experimental studies on 
individual competitiveness, we follow previous research and employ a simple math task 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010).  
Our theoretical considerations suggest, however, that a participant’s decision to 
enter a competition may not only depend on enjoyment of competition but also on the 
two other facets of competition, namely development motives and the desire to win. In 
order to exclude the possibility that potential differences in individual competitiveness 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial individuals can be explained by these 
two facets, we slightly adjust an often used behavioral measure of individual 
34 The identification of enjoyment of competition in this study differs from the more elaborated 
identification of the value of competing shown in Chapter III. In this study we use a simplified design that 
does not allow the quantification of an individual value of competing. This is due to practical constraints. 
The identification of the value of competing in Chapter III builds on an experimental design that requires 
a laboratory setting, but was not suitable for our lab-in-field studies of Chapters IV and V.  
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competitiveness and conduct regression analyses in order to control for relevant 
confounds.   
First, we introduce an alternative task where participants’ performances are not 
influenced by their efforts, skills, and abilities. To take out the potential influence of 
individual considerations related to efforts, skills and abilities as well as related desires 
and needs, we employ rolling dice as a task (cf., Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016b).35 By 
definition, individuals’ performances in dice competition are determined by chance 
only.36 Consequently, it can be expected that the decision to enter a dice competition is 
not influenced by personal development and achievement motivations. 
Second, we indirectly control for the desire to win as a motive for selection into 
competition. Since winning requires competing, the desire to win can create an 
incentive to enter a competition, which, however, is conditioned on an individual’s 
expectation to win. Individuals with a strong desire to win may be more likely to enter a 
competition if they expect to win the competition, but expecting to lose would deter 
their entry into a competition. Revealed and potential entrepreneurs may therefore be 
more likely to enter a competition than non-entrepreneurial individuals because they 
have a stronger desire to win and expect to win the competition. This would imply that 
the effect of entrepreneurship on selection into the math or the dice competition was 
moderated by the expected probability of winning and vice versa. In order to control for 
unobserved differences in the desire to win, we therefore take this into account by not 
only including in our regressions the individual confidence to win but also its 
interaction with being an entrepreneur. If entrepreneurs are more likely to enter a 
competition than non-entrepreneurial individuals because of a stronger desire to win, the 
estimated effect of this interaction will be positive and statistically significant.   
35 Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016b) demonstrate that a dice competition is sufficient to generate 
gender-variant preferences for competition, even when controlling for risk preferences. 
36 One might be tempted to conclude that competing based on rolling dice might remove any 
element of competition and, hence, attitudes towards competition may not be relevant anymore but only 
risk preferences (cf., Große & Riener, 2010). However, the situation is still interactive in the sense that 
outcomes for one individual depend on outcomes of other individuals, such that one loses when the other 
wins. Based on a perspective that individuals maximize their own expected payoffs only, this situation 
clearly is equivalent to a complex lottery. Enjoyment of competition, however, as defined above (cf., 
Deutsch, 1949; Lazear, 1999, Smither & Houston, 1992), deviates from such a perspective, such that 
individuals derive a utility from the particular structure of the institutional regime that they are embedded 
in as well as from the fact that outcomes of individuals they are interacting with are negatively related to 
their own outcomes. See Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016b) for an alternative discussion of why competition 
based on rolling dice is not the same as a lottery. 
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4.3.2 Sample and procedures 
We conducted a “lab-in-the-field” experiment in a shopping mall in a large 
German city over the course of five days in June and October 2014. To provide low 
barriers to participation, we conducted the experiment using a paper-and-pencil 
approach. The experimental design focused on measuring individuals’ tendencies to 
select into competition under various conditions. Mall visitors were approached and 
asked whether they would like to participate in an experiment on “decision-making 
behavior of adults” lasting 10–15 minutes, where they could earn between at least €5.00 
and at maximum €15.50. In total, 224 adults participated; 113 men and 111 women. We 
started with a brief survey to collect data on each participant’s socio-economic 
background, e.g., age, education, and occupation as well as self-reported propensity to 
take risks, which serve as control variables. 
After completing the brief survey, which familiarized participants with the 
interview situation, they played two rounds of an incentivized competition game, where 
they chose between a competitive winner-take-all tournament payment scheme and a 
non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme.37 In each round, individuals had to 
perform a different task, such that their decisions to select or avoid competition are 
based on a skill-dependent task (involving math) or a skill-independent task (rolling 
dice). Participants were informed that at the end of the experiment only one of the two 
rounds would be randomly drawn and paid for in cash. The order of tasks was 
randomized. Following Mayr et al. (2012), participants in the math task verified up to 
20 simple equations within 30 seconds. Each equation consisted of four single digits 
added or subtracted and a positive result of one or two digits (e.g., “7+2+3–6=5. Is the 
result true or false?”). The sets of 20 equations were randomly composed and randomly 
assigned. Equations were equally difficult mathematically. One out of every two 
equations was wrong, but these odds were not revealed to participants. A correctly 
37 One might suspect that asking for the job and entrepreneurial intentions before the experiment 
might through priming affect behavior in the experiment. Asking for gender, which even lay people 
associated with differences in competitive behavior, before playing competitions, however, has been 
found to not affect competitive behavior in economic experiments (Boschini, Dreber, von Essen, Muren, 
& Ranehill, 2018). Arguably, both the fact that the artificial experiment involving a competition based on 
math tasks or rolling-dice (not involving any investments, creative performance, or any business 
decisions) is sufficiently different from entrepreneurial environments as well as the incentives for the 
experiment should reduce potential priming effects. Furthermore, asking for entrepreneurial intentions 
after the incentivized experiment would, due to having no incentives on the measurement of 
entrepreneurial intentions, be even more susceptible to related priming effects. 
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verified equation added one point to the participant’s score, while an incorrect 
verification subtracted one point38. No performance feedback was provided before the 
end of the experiment. In the dice task participants rolled five times a pair of fair six-
sided dice (with three white sides and three black sides), earning one point for each die 
that displays a black side (cf., Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016b). 
At the beginning of each round, participants were shown a task description, 
which included examples. Participants then had to choose between a non-competitive 
payment scheme, i.e. a piece-rate of €0.25 per point, and a competitive payment 
scheme, i.e. €0.50 per point if their own overall score was higher than the score of a 
randomly selected anonymous participant, and €0.00 otherwise. The results achieved by 
previous participants were noted on cards. Each competitor’s score was randomly drawn 
from a pool of 10 previous participants’ scorecards and not shown to participants before 
the end of the experiment.39 Subsequently participants performed the respective task. 
4.3.3 Variables 
Selecting into a competitive environment 
An individual’s tendency to select into competitive environments was measured 
based on the above-introduced incentivized economic experiment (c.f., Buser et al., 
2014). We used a dummy variable indicating whether participants chose the competitive 
payment (1) or the non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme (0). 
While participants had to choose between a competitive winner-take-all and a 
piece-rate payment scheme, forced choices of indifferent participants are less 
informative and may attenuate the effects. To separate clear-cut preferences from 
possibly random choices in cases of indifference, we asked participants to indicate on a 
scale running from 0 (indifference) to 10 (alternative would not even be considered) the 
extent to which they actually preferred the chosen payment scheme. We classified 
38 Participants were told that if they reached a negative score, their score would be set to 0 points. 
39 One might argue that enjoyment of competition might be different if competing individuals 
would see one another. Since competition in business is often indirect through customers and market 
interaction, however, we consider this appropriate when measuring enjoyment of competition as relevant 
for entrepreneurial and business-related settings. 
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decisions where individuals indicated that it was equally likely they would have 
selected the alternative payment scheme as indifference decisions. 
As the competitive payment scheme was characterized by a wider spread of 
possible payoffs and the probability of receiving the payoff additionally depended on 
others’ performances, the self-selection into the more competitive payment scheme 
might reflect not only individual differences in enjoyment of competition, but also 
individual differences regarding both risk preferences and confidence in performing 
better than others, which reflect characteristics that have also been associated with 
entrepreneurs (cf., Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Wu & Knott, 2006). To control for these 
potentially confounding effects, we follow standard practice (e.g. Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007) and statistically control for both effects as described below. 
Revealed and potential entrepreneurs versus non-entrepreneurs 
To identify revealed entrepreneurs, we asked participants to indicate whether 
they were currently self-employed or had ever been self-employed before.  
Within the group that denied both, we separated potential entrepreneurs from 
unambiguously non-entrepreneurial individuals. We included a three-item measure of 
entrepreneurial intentions that refers to the potential of future entrepreneurship. We took 
two items from Thompson (2009): “I intend to set up a company in the future” and “I 
spend time learning about starting a firm”. As a third item we included “I frequently 
think about starting my own business.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale 
ranging from ‘does not apply at all’ (1) to ‘fully applies’ (7); responses were averaged 
(Cronbach’s α=0.84). We classified those who had not been entrepreneurs and 
displayed the lowest possible score on each of the three items as non-entrepreneurial 
individuals. These individuals unambiguously reject entrepreneurship as an option for 
the future, they are not at all intending, not at all preparing themselves, and are clearly 
not thinking about starting an own business. Despite this very strong criterion, about 30 
percent of all participants fall into this category. Individuals, who indicated for at least 
one of these items that they do not clearly reject it, might, in fact, see a chance to 
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engage in entrepreneurship in one way or another.40 These individuals are classified as 
potential entrepreneurs. The 224 participants were partitioned correspondingly into 
three groups: non-entrepreneurial individuals (67), potential entrepreneurs (100),41 and 
revealed entrepreneurs (57).  
As a robustness check we furthermore explore heterogeneity within the groups 
of potential entrepreneurs and revealed entrepreneurs and test whether the effects differ 
for relevant subgroups. To explore if the effect differs within the group of potential 
entrepreneurs depending on their specific level of the entrepreneurial intent, we split the 
group of potential entrepreneurs into two subgroups of low entrepreneurial intentions (N 
= 51 with average intention = 1.91) versus high entrepreneurial intentions (N = 49 with 
average intention = 4.41). The split is based on the median by assigning those with an 
entrepreneurial intention less or equal to the median to the subgroup with low intentions 
and the others to the group with high intentions. Furthermore, we split the group of 
revealed entrepreneurs into two subgroups of those who are still with their own business 
(25) and those who have given up running their own business (32). 
Control variables 
To measure individuals’ confidence in terms of beliefs about the winning 
probabilities we asked them to estimate the number of individuals out of ten potential 
competitors who, compared with themselves, had an equal or lower score. If 
participants guessed the number correctly, they received an additional €0.50 at the end 
of the experiment. 
Risk preferences were elicited through a self-reported measure, which has often 
been used and demonstrated to be valid (e.g., Caliendo et al., 2009; Dohmen et al. 
2011). On a 7-point scale ranging from ‘does not apply at all’ to ‘fully applies’, 
participants evaluated the following statement: “In general, I am willing to take risks”. 
As context-specific risk preferences might be more relevant than a general risk 
40 Among the 100 potential entrepreneurs, 89 indicated that they do not fully disagree when 
being asked about intending to set up a company in the future. Among the other 11 potential 
entrepreneurs, 9 did not fully reject that they think about starting a firm, and the remaining 2 currently 
spend time on learning how to start a firm. 
41 For those who consider entrepreneurship a potential future career option, i.e. potential 
entrepreneurs, this is not necessarily the most preferred option and, thus, many of these individuals will 
not start businesses. However, that is why this group is only referred to as potential entrepreneurs. 
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preference (Bönte, Procher, & Urbig, 2015; Caliendo et al., 2009), in a robustness check 
we controlled for risk-taking that is more specifically related to one’s career develop-
ment and financial issues, respectively, with the following two statements: “For 
financial investments, I am willing to take risks”, and “Within my professional career, I 
am willing to take risks”. 
Additionally, we controlled for variables that relate to the specific setup of our 
behavioral measurement of individual competitiveness. For example, we controlled for 
whether the dice task or the math task was presented first (order of treatments), the day 
of data collection, and whether the experimenter was male or female. As demographic 
control variables we include dummies for participants’ age (classes: below 26, 26–35, 
36–45, 46–55, above 55), gender (male vs. female), and the highest level of secondary 
school education attained, a dummy for having a vocational degree, and a dummy for 
having a university degree. With respect to secondary schooling, we differentiate bet-
ween the following types: “less than Hauptschule” (no secondary schooling diploma), 
“Hauptschule” (grades 5–9, the least demanding level of secondary school), Realschule 
(grades 5–10), “Fachabitur” (grades 5–11 or 5–12, depending on the federal state), 
Abitur (the highest-level secondary school diploma, grades 5–12 or 5–13, depending on 
the federal state), and a dummy indicating when educational information is missing. 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Sample statistics 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for revealed and potential entrepreneurs as 
well as for non-entrepreneurial individuals. Potential entrepreneurs are substantially 
younger than revealed entrepreneurs (while 41 percent of the potential entrepreneurs are 
below 26 years old, the share is only 4 percent among the revealed entrepreneurs), 
which is consistent with the idea that potential entrepreneurs may, over time, discover 
suitable opportunities, start businesses and, hence, with advancing age move into the 
group of revealed entrepreneurs. Moreover, the share of males is higher among revealed 
(54%) and potential (57%) entrepreneurs than among non-entrepreneurial individuals 
(37%), which is consistent with the gender gap in entrepreneurship reported by previous 
studies (e.g. Bönte & Piegeler, 2013).  
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Non-
entrepreneurs 
Potential 
entrepreneurs 
Revealed 
entrepreneurs 
Observations 67 100 57 
Demographics 
   Gender: male 37% 57% 54% 
   Age: less than 26 19% 41% 4% 
   Age: 26-35 13% 28% 30% 
   Age: 36-45 24% 9% 26% 
   Age: 46-55 24% 14% 21% 
   Age: above 55 19% 8% 19% 
   Education: School – less than Hauptschule 4% 2% 4% 
   Education: School – Hauptschule 16% 10% 7% 
   Education: School – Realschule 18% 15% 21% 
   Education: School – Fachabitur 12% 16% 11% 
   Education: School – Abitur 45% 54% 53% 
   Education: University degree 37% 26% 39% 
   Education: Vocational degree 48% 30% 58% 
   Education: Education missing 4% 3% 5% 
   Risk preference: General (1-7) 4.30 (SD=1.46) 4.89 (SD=1.37) 5.18 (SD=1.39) 
   Risk preference: Financial (1-7) 2.12 (SD=1.34) 3.03 (SD=1.55) 3.18 (SD=1.79) 
   Risk preference: Career (1-7) 3.84 (SD=1.60) 4.63 (SD=1.54) 5.02 (SD=1.70) 
   Entrepreneurial intent (1-7) 1.00 (SD=0.00) 3.13 (SD=1.50) - 
Experimental conditions 
   Day: 1 22% 28% 26% 
   Day: 2 46% 49% 44% 
   Day: 3 31% 23% 30% 
   Male experimenter 69% 71% 72% 
   Math competition second 51% 50% 47% 
Participants’ responses 
   Performance in  math task (0-20) 5.42 (SD=2.73) 5.62 (SD=2.63) 5.84 (SD=1.83) 
   Performance in  dice task (0-20) 5.48 (SD=1.43) 4.83 (SD=1.58) 4.91 (SD=1.38) 
   Confidence for math task (0-10) 5.37 (SD=1.83) 5.46 (SD=1.68) 5.40 (SD=1.78) 
   Confidence for dice task (0-10) 5.10 (SD=1.24) 5.18 (SD=1.16) 5.05 (SD=1.16) 
   Choose competitive payment for math task 43% 57% 58% 
   Choose competitive payment for dice task 43% 64% 65% 
Notes: SD = standard deviation 
Consistent with findings reported in previous research we also observe higher 
preferences for general, financial, and career-related risks among revealed and potential 
entrepreneurs than among non-entrepreneurs (cf. Caliendo et al., 2009; Bönte et al., 
2015). We do not observe, however, statistically significant differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial individuals with respect to confidence in winning 
the math and dice tasks. We also observe no substantial differences across the three 
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groups of revealed and potential entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial individuals with 
respect to performances in these tasks.42 
4.4.2 Group and treatment comparisons 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the shares of participants, who chose the competitive 
payment scheme, across the categories of non-entrepreneurial individuals, potential 
entrepreneurs, and revealed entrepreneurs. Comparing non-entrepreneurial individuals 
with the combined group of potential and revealed entrepreneurs, we observe a 
significantly lower portion choosing the competitive payment scheme for both the math 
task (two-sample test of proportions: 43% vs. 57%, z=1.93, p=0.05) and the dice task 
(two-sample test of proportions: 43% vs. 64%, z=2.92, p=0.004).  
Figure 4.1: Shares of revealed, potential, and non-entrepreneurs 
choosing a competitive payment 
Notes: Shares of non-entrepreneurs (black) potential entrepreneurs (light grey), and revealed 
entrepreneurs (dark grey) choosing the competitive tournament payment. 
42 A repeated-measure analysis of variance reveals that the difference between performances in 
math versus dice tasks seems to slightly differ between the three groups of people (MS=10.89, F=2.45, 
p=0.089). As can be seen from table 4.1 and by post-hoc task-specific analyses of variance, indeed the 
groups’ average performances differ slightly in the dice task (MS=9.08, F=4.14, p=0.017) but not in the 
math task (MS=4.36, F=0.66, p=0.516). The overall significance level, which accounts for repeated tests, 
of p=0.089, and observing that the effect is related to the dice task and, furthermore, very small, suggests 
that we face a purely random artifact. 
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While providing initial insights, these tests cannot account for the fact that 
differences in observed choices may result from differences in risk attitudes or 
confidence (and the related desire to win) rather than from differences in enjoyment of 
competition. 
4.4.3 Regression analyses 
Table 4.2 reports the results of our regression analyses, which include relevant 
control variables. Having measured each individual’s competitiveness with respect to 
both the math task and the dice task, we employ random effects logistic regression 
analyses and include interaction terms to check whether the measures can be pooled. 
We report coefficients and related standard errors of seven logistic regression models. 
For the focal effects, i.e. the difference between potential or revealed entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurial individuals, we additionally report the average marginal effects and 
robust standard errors. Model 1 indicates that, despite controlling for general risk 
preferences and confidence, both potential and revealed entrepreneurs select into 
competition more often than non-entrepreneurial individuals (i.e., 16.1 and 19.5 
percentage points, respectively).  
Model 2 tests whether the effects differ within the group of potential 
entrepreneurs depending on their level of entrepreneurial intentions and within the 
group of revealed entrepreneurs depending on whether they still are entrepreneurs or 
have already given up their own business. We introduce a contrast code that is -1 for 
low intentions and +1 for high intentions and zero for those who are not potential 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, we introduce a contract code that is -1 for past entrepreneurs 
and +1 for current entrepreneurs and zero for those who are not revealed entrepreneurs. 
With this coding, the main effects of potential and revealed entrepreneurs are the 
averages of the effects of the corresponding two subgroups and the estimated 
coefficients of the contrast codes show how the corresponding two subgroups differ 
from the related average effects. We do not observe any statistically significant 
differences within the two groups and the effect sizes are small. Hence, the distinction 
between those who do not consider entrepreneurship a potential option versus those 
who consider it or have already acted upon and thereby revealed their intentions is what 
drives the difference in behavior. 
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Model 3 includes terms for interactions between potential entrepreneurs and 
revealed entrepreneurs with the experimental treatment (dice vs. math). We observe that 
the differences between entrepreneurs (potential and revealed) and non-entrepreneurial 
individuals do not depend on whether competitiveness was measured based on a math 
task or a dice task.  
By controlling for individuals’ confidence in winning we avoided attributing 
entrepreneurs’ possible optimism about winning to their enjoyment of competition. This 
tactic does not, however, enable us to test whether entrepreneurs’ individual 
competitiveness operated independently of their confidence in winning. That is, we 
cannot exclude the alternative explanation that the willingness to win drives our 
findings instead of enjoyment of competition. To demonstrate that entrepreneurs enjoy 
competition independently of their desire to win, Model 4 allows the effects of revealed 
and potential entrepreneurs to be moderated by confidence in winning. Through the 
interaction with the confidence in winning, we can identify whether the observed effect 
is driven by the desire to win (cf., Coffey & Maloney, 2010). We observe that the 
estimated coefficients of interaction terms are not statistically significant. Consequently, 
the estimated effects of entrepreneurship are not conditioned on confidence and, hence, 
the observed effects can be considered independent of individuals’ confidence and their 
responses to confidence and, by implication, independent of their potential desire to 
win. 
4.4.4 Robustness checks 
In order to explore the robustness of our main results, we have run a set of 
additional robustness checks reported in Table 4.3. First, regarding payment-scheme 
decisions, for 11 percent, that is 51 out of 448 decisions, participants reported that they 
were in fact indifferent and could as well have taken the alternative payment scheme. 
Excluding these decisions removes an additional random component from the analyses, 
which may have led to slightly attenuated effects in our main analysis. Consistent with 
this intuition, in Model 5 we observe slightly stronger effects for both potential and 
revealed entrepreneurs (i.e., 18.2 and 22.5 percentage points). 
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Second, while we already controlled for dichotomous differences between 
potential entrepreneurs with high versus low entrepreneurial intentions, we could also 
control for the continuous variation in entrepreneurial intent among potential 
entrepreneurs. In Model 6, we include these entrepreneurial intentions for potential 
entrepreneurs. We center this variable within the group of potential entrepreneurs, such 
that the effect of potential entrepreneurs still reflects the effect of the overall group 
averaged over the subgroups (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Supporting the 
analysis based on the dichotomous measure, we also do not observe any effect of the 
level of entrepreneurial intent for the continuous measure and the focal group 
differences remain robust (i.e., differences of 16.1 and 19.4 percentage points).  
Third, while we controlled for general risk preferences, more specific forms of 
risk-taking may actually affect entrepreneurial intentions, specifically financial and 
career-related risk-taking (Bönte et al., 2015; Caliendo et al., 2009). If the related, more 
specific risk attitudes also affect behavior involved in the behavioral measure of 
individual competitiveness—e.g. financial risk-taking would be relevant for both 
entrepreneurship and behavior in financially incentivized experiments—then general 
risk-taking might be a weak control variable. In a robustness check (Model 7), we 
therefore additionally included measures of these more specific risk preferences related 
to financial and career-related risks. We observe that financial risk-taking indeed is 
statistically significant and the previously positive but statistically insignificant effect of 
general risk-taking fully disappears when controlling for financial and career-related 
risk-taking. With respect to our main variables, we observe that the estimated effects of 
being a potential or of being a revealed entrepreneur decrease slightly when controlling 
for additional variables. The marginal effect for revealed entrepreneurs declines by 2.5 
percentage points (compare Models 2 and 4), leaving 16.9 percent as a statistically 
significant effect.  
In sum, our results are robust to alternative explanations based on desires to win 
or achievement motivations as well as robust to several variations in model 
specification. 
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4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
4.5.1 Summary of findings 
The results obtained from our lab-in-the field study suggest that entrepreneurs, 
both revealed and potential, are more likely than non-entrepreneurial individuals to 
choose competitive payment schemes in experimental settings, irrespective of their 
confidence in winning and irrespective of whether the task in which they compete 
relates to their skills or to chance alone. This suggests that entrepreneurs’ selection into 
competitive situations is driven by their enjoyment of competition, which is 
independent of their confidence in winning and whether the competition is based on 
skills or dice. Employing a behavioral measurement approach based on well-defined 
environments, i.e. the artificially created experiment, adds significantly to our under-
standing of the nature of the link between individual competitiveness and the emergence 
of entrepreneurship. Our focus on real behavior in a laboratory-like setting helps us to 
exclude alternative explanations. 
The marginal effects of enjoyment of competition we observe after controlling 
for gender, risk-taking, and confidence (see table 4.2), which are between 12 and 18 
percentage points for potential entrepreneurs and between 16 and 23 percentage points 
for revealed entrepreneurs, indicate a substantial relationship between enjoyment of 
competition and entrepreneurship. These effect sizes are comparable to levels that are 
observed for other variables considered as relevant, such as gender differences in 
competitiveness (e.g., Apicella, Demiral, & Mollerstrom, 2017).  
4.5.2 Limitations 
Although we make relevant contributions to entrepreneurship research and 
research on occupational choices in general, this study also faces potential limitations. 
Most importantly, our study is based on cross-sectional data. Hence, it should be inter-
preted cautiously with respect to causality. Nevertheless, observing similar effects for 
potential and revealed entrepreneurs provides some evidence that enjoyment of 
competition might affect selection into entrepreneurship. Future research could further 
examine the causal link between selection into entrepreneurship and individual competi-
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tiveness, e.g., through the use of panel data or the identification of potential 
instrumental variables. 
While we explore some heterogeneity within the groups of potential and 
revealed entrepreneurs, there might be more relevant unobserved heterogeneity. For 
instance, in our empirical analysis we identified revealed entrepreneurs based on 
whether they are or have been involved in running their own business. This may include 
self-employed people as well as entrepreneurs engaged in growth-oriented start-ups. 
The degree of competitiveness might be more prevalent among those growth-oriented 
start-ups than among the self-employed individuals. Furthermore, the revealed 
entrepreneurial behavior might also result from what is referred to as necessity 
entrepreneurship, that is, individuals, who do not find employed positions and 
consequently must engage in independent and often self-employed work (Block & 
Koellinger, 2009). As the lack of alternatives has driven these individuals into 
entrepreneurship, their selection is likely to not be driven by their enjoyment of 
competition and, hence, they should not display higher levels of enjoyment of 
competition. Both kinds of heterogeneity most likely attenuate the effects that we 
observe for the group of revealed entrepreneurs, such that our study is even 
conservative regarding the true influence of the enjoyment of competition. Future 
research might be able to explore such heterogeneity in more detail. 
Furthermore, our study explicitly focuses on the link between entrepreneurship 
and individuals’ selection into competition but does not aim at examining the link 
between entrepreneurship and individuals’ behavior in competitive environments. Some 
work already links selection into competition in economic experiments to 
entrepreneurs’ behavior, their way of managing businesses, and their performance (e.g. 
Berge et al., 2015), but experimental measures of behavior within competitions, such as 
being motivated to invest more effort or even cheat in competitions, have not yet been 
linked to entrepreneurship or individuals’ occupational choices, in general. Since 
selection into competition might be a weak proxy for behavior within competitions, 
future research may go beyond our as well as Berge’s and colleagues’ (2015) studies 
and explore how experimental measures of behavior within competition are associated 
with selection into entrepreneurship and other occupations. Over time we might then be 
able to actually capture the full complexity of Schumpeter’s (1934) description of 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors as driven by “the will to conquer; the impulse to fight, to prove 
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oneself superior to others”, which we suggest is linked to three distinct characteristics, 
that is, entrepreneurs’ desire to win, their achievement motivations, and as demonstrated 
in this study, their enjoyment of competition. 
4.5.3 Contributions and implications 
1. Enjoyment of competition and market entry
We examine the link between entrepreneurship and individual competitiveness 
and we contribute to the body of research that investigates entrepreneurs’ responses to 
competition by conceptually distinguishing between different facets of competitiveness 
and by providing empirical evidence that entrepreneurs are more likely to select into 
competitive environments than non-entrepreneurs because of their enjoyment of 
competition, a facet of competitiveness for which there has not been reliable evidence 
as yet. This study complements previous research examining behavior of entrepreneurs 
in competition and suggesting that entrepreneurs tend to be more aggressive and 
possibly even ruthless in competitions (Utsch et al., 1999; Hmieleski & Lerner, 2016; 
Levine & Rubinstein, 2017), having a high need for achievement motivation 
(McClelland, 1965; Rauch & Frese, 2007), and might be generally more likely to favor 
competitive over non-competitive environments (Bönte & Piegeler, 2013; Holm et al., 
2013). 
Entrepreneurs enjoy competition irrespective of whether they expect to win, 
which rules out the desire to win as a motivation for entry into competition, and 
irrespective of the degree to which a task depends on skills, which rules out mastery-
related motives and, more generally, achievement motivations as a reason for entering 
competition. Thus, possibly excessive market entry by entrepreneurs might not only be 
explained by possibly unrealistically optimistic beliefs about winning (cf., Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999), less risk aversion (e.g., Caliendo et al., 2009, Wu & Knott, 2006), but 
might also be explained by intrinsic benefits from competing, that is, enjoyment of 
competition. Considering an intrinsic value from competing itself in addition to 
corresponding benefits of winning, e.g., in terms of status and prestige, might also 
explain why entrepreneurs do not give up so easily, once winning becomes less likely, 
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but continue competing. Hence, the enjoyment of competition may help us to better 
understand why entrepreneurs may persist in seemingly unfavorable conditions. 
2. Enjoyment of competition and occupational choice
Our second contribution is that our analysis of revealed and potential 
entrepreneurs tentatively suggests that individuals’ behavior in economic experiments is 
related to selection into entrepreneurship. As discussed above, the alternative 
explanation that selection into competition is driven by entrepreneurial experience 
cannot explain why we find similar effects for potential entrepreneurs, who have not yet 
worked as entrepreneurs. Our study thereby contributes to research linking competitive 
behavior in economic experiments to selection into more competitive careers, such as 
managerial positions (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), careers in 
financial industries (Reuben et al., 2015), and selection into prestigious academic tracks 
(Buser et al., 2014). When studying the link between competitiveness and selection into 
particular industries, for example, future research might additionally control for whether 
a career will be pursued as an entrepreneur or in paid employment; the relationships 
may differ substantially.  
Observing that entrepreneurship is attractive for competitive individuals does not 
imply that we suggest that these entrepreneurs are always competing. To improve the 
chances of winning within the market, entrepreneurs often start their business as highly 
cooperative teams and may even cooperate with competitors within markets. Hence, 
while entrepreneurship seemingly offers opportunities to satisfy needs derived from 
participating in competitions, it does not imply that entrepreneurs are unwilling to 
cooperate.  
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Chapter V 
Entrepreneurship, Individual Competitiveness, 
and Individuals’ Perceptions of 
Intensity of Competition 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent experimental studies suggest that individuals may be deterred by 
competitive workplaces. Flory, Leibbrandt, and List (2015) find that a competitive 
compensation scheme causes differential job entry where women disproportionately shy 
away from competitive work settings. Their findings complement a larger and more 
general stream of literature suggesting that individuals’ willingness to self-select into 
competitive environments shapes their educational and occupational choices (Buser et 
al., 2014, 2017; Reuben et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2016). Environments that are found to 
be more attractive to competitive than to non-competitive individuals include industries 
such as finance and professional services (Reuben et al., 2015), or prestigious academic 
tracks such as science and mathematics (Buser et al., 2014). 
Our findings presented in Chapter IV complement this research. Consistent with 
Schumpeter’s (1934, p. 93) conjecture that entrepreneurs are driven by “the will to 
conquer; the impulse to fight” and Kirzner’s (1973, p. 94) assertion “that 
entrepreneurial activity is always competitive and that competitive activity is always 
entrepreneurial” as well as with empirical findings by Bönte and Piegeler (2013), who 
report that individuals assessing themselves as individuals enjoying competitive 
situations are more likely to start new businesses, we find that entrepreneurs embrace 
competitive environments. In Chapter IV we demonstrate that both revealed and 
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potential entrepreneurs are more likely to self-select into competitive environments 
within an incentivized experiment than non-entrepreneurial individuals and we show 
that their self-selection is driven by an enjoyment of competition rather than by desires 
to win, or by personal development motives. While previous findings highlight the 
practical relevance of individual competitiveness for important economic decisions, we 
have not yet provided comprehensive evidence why enjoying competition makes some 
environments more attractive than others. Moreover, based on existing literature we can 
hardly derive systematic predictions which occupations are most attractive to 
competitive individuals. 
In Chapter V we focus on the mechanism relating enjoyment of competition to 
career choices and investigate why some careers and occupations are more attractive for 
competitive individuals than others. Definitions of individual competitiveness refer to 
individuals favoring competitive environments over non-competitive environments 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Smither & Houston, 1992) and the general framework 
introduced in Chapter I suggests that the influence of an individual’s enjoyment of 
competition on the individual’s self-selection into one of two environments can be 
expected to be conditioned on the individual’s belief that one environment is more 
competitive than the alternative environment. Hence, the difference between 
competitive environments and non-competitive environments is integral for the concept 
of individual competitiveness. While existing literature tends to assume – implicitly or 
explicitly – that certain environments are more competitive than others, e.g. top-level 
executive and managerial positions (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), 
industries such as finance and professional services (Reuben et al., 2015), or 
entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1934; Bönte & Piegeler, 2013), we empirically 
investigate individuals’ perceptions of competitive intensity in occupational 
environments.  
In addition to individual heterogeneity in competitive preferences, we argue that 
potential heterogeneity in individuals’ perceptions of competition associated with 
different occupations creates moderating effects on the relation between individual 
competitiveness and career choices. While heterogeneity in individuals’ perceptions is 
largely unexplored in the literature on competitiveness, its relevance has already been 
highlighted in the literature on risk-taking, where empirical results suggest that 
individuals’ behaviors and choices are influenced even more by heterogeneity in their 
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perceptions of risk associated with certain environments than by heterogeneity in their 
willingness to take risks (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). 
We empirically examine individual and systematic differences in perceptions of 
competitive intensity in 27 different occupations. We focus on a comparison between 
entrepreneurship versus paid employment and further distinguish these groups with 
respect to business founders versus other self-employment as well as managerial 
employment versus non-managerial employment. Our empirical analysis is based on 
two complementary studies with 429 participants with 8,553 judgments of competitive 
intensity of particular occupations; the first study with 227 students includes 10 forms 
of entrepreneurship and 17 forms of paid employment and uses self-reported measures 
of both competitive preferences and the individuals’ intentions to enter particular 
occupations. The second study with 202 people from the general population includes 
reduced sets of 6 forms for each of these categories and employs incentivized 
behavioral measures of competitiveness from a lab-in-the field experiment and revealed 
occupational choices. 
In the remainder of this chapter we conceptualize the relevance of individual 
heterogeneity in perceptions of competitive intensity for individual competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the datasets, study designs, and 
variables of both studies, as well as the econometric approach. Section 5.4 presents the 
results including validations and multiple robustness checks. Finally, Section 5.5 
discusses how our findings contribute to entrepreneurship and economics research. 
5.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
5.2.1 Entrepreneurs embrace competitive environments 
Schumpeter (1934) already claimed that founders’ entry decisions are driven by 
their willingness to compete and that founders are, hence, more competitive. It can be 
argued that competition is less intense in paid employment as compared to self-
employment, since entrepreneurs tend to face market competition more directly than do 
paid employees. Bartling et al. (2009, p.93), for instance, state that “a self-employed 
lawyer is in constant competition for clients, whereas a lawyer working as a civil 
servant in a public authority is not”. Studies by Holm and colleagues (2013) and Bönte 
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and Piegeler (2013) provide first empirical evidence for a link between individual 
competitiveness and selection into entrepreneurship. Using an economic experiment, 
Holm and colleagues (2013) investigate specific risk preferences and provide some 
evidence that CEOs of Chinese firms, including owner-managers and founding 
managers, are more likely to select competitive over non-competitive payment schemes 
than a control group of non-CEOs. Since their empirical analyses focus on specific risk 
taking rather than competitiveness, Holm and colleagues (2013) do not control for risk 
preferences and perceived odds of winning, which, however, is needed to isolate 
individual competitiveness from risk preferences and (over-)confidence (Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007). Using data obtained from a large-scale survey conducted in 36 
countries, Bönte and Piegeler (2013) find that individuals who like situations in which 
they compete with others are more likely to prefer self-employment over paid 
employment (latent entrepreneurs) and they are also more likely to actually start new 
ventures (nascent entrepreneurs). Moreover, their results confirm the finding of 
laboratory experiments that women are less competitively inclined than men43 and 
Bönte and Piegeler (2013) report that this gender difference in competitiveness 
contributes significantly to the gender gap in entrepreneurship. In contrast to 
experimental studies, however, Bönte and Piegeler (2013) employ an approach that is 
typically used by psychologists to measure an individual’s competitiveness, i.e. they 
make use of a self-reported psychometric measure reflecting enjoyment of competition. 
Hence, existing research provides some evidence that in general entrepreneurs are also 
more likely to select into competitive environments.  
The study presented in Chapter IV provides additional evidence that individuals, 
who already revealed their entrepreneurial spirit by entering entrepreneurship are more 
likely to opt for a competitive tournament incentive scheme in an incentivized economic 
experiment than other individuals. Moreover, we distinguish different motives of 
competitiveness and provide empirical evidence that entrepreneurs are more likely to 
select into competitive environments than non-entrepreneurs because of their enjoyment 
of competition itself, rather than other motives. Entrepreneurs enjoy competition 
irrespective of whether they expect to win, which rules out the desire to win as a 
motivation for entry into competition, and irrespective of the degree to which a task 
43 Bönte (2015) reports that this gender difference in competitiveness persists even when 
controlling for a number of potentially relevant variables and that it is hardly affected by the stage of life 
cycle. 
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depends on skills, which rules out mastery-related motives and, more generally, 
achievement motivations as a reason for entering competition (see Chapter IV). 
However, observing that revealed entrepreneurs are more likely to select into 
competition in an experimental setting, does not necessarily imply that these revealed 
entrepreneurs became entrepreneurs because they were highly competitive in the first 
place. An alternative explanation for such a finding could be that experience or 
occupation-specific socialization effect related to intense competition in entrepreneurial 
environments may make individuals more competitive over time. In order to examine 
whether entrepreneurs are more competitive before starting a business in Chapter IV we 
compare the individual competitiveness of potential entrepreneurs–individuals who are 
likely to start a business in the future but did not do so in the past–with the 
competitiveness of non-entrepreneurial individuals44. We find that potential 
entrepreneurs are more likely to opt for competitive payment schemes and enjoy 
competing more than non-entrepreneurial individuals. The alternative explanation that 
selection into competition is driven by entrepreneurial experience cannot explain why 
we find similar effects for potential entrepreneurs, who have not yet worked as 
entrepreneurs (see Chapter IV). 
5.2.2 Perceptions of competitive intensity 
While our findings in Chapter IV are a first step towards a causal link between 
competitiveness and selection into entrepreneurship, it is still not clear, whether 
competitive individuals enter entrepreneurship because intensity of competition is high 
in entrepreneurship. In order to examine whether competitive intensity of work 
environments affects job-entry decisions into paid employment, Flory, Leibbrandt, and 
List (2015) run a natural field experiment by posting employment advertisements to an 
internet job-board in sixteen major US cities. Job-seekers are randomized into different 
compensation regimes for the same job and employment advertisements are 
experimentally manipulated by varying the role that interpersonal competition plays in 
setting the wage. Flory, Leibbrandt, and List (2015) find that a competitive 
44 Compelling evidence suggests that entrepreneurial intention precedes individual's actual 
founding of a new firm (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Thompson, 2009), and, consequently, potential 
entrepreneurs can be characterized as individuals having the intention to start a business, whereas non-
entrepreneurial individuals are individuals having no entrepreneurial intention at all. 
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compensation scheme causes differential job entry where women disproportionately shy 
away from competitive work settings. Together with the well-established finding that 
within lab experiments men are more competitive than women (e.g. Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007), their results suggest a causal effect of individual competitiveness on 
the selection into more competitive employment positions.  
Of course, manipulating the intensity of competition within entrepreneurship 
with the method of Flory, Leibbrandt, and List (2015) is not feasible. In particular, there 
are no employment advertisements for entrepreneurs. In other words, the missing link 
for a causal effect of competitiveness on selection into entrepreneurship is the 
unobserved intensity of competition in entrepreneurship. In this chapter we provide an 
attempt to identify this link by analyzing the individuals’ perceived intensity of 
competition in entrepreneurship.  
Subjective perceptions are highly important for individuals’ occupational 
choices and particularly the selection into entrepreneurship. Related research, for 
instance, shows that entry decisions of nascent entrepreneurs rely on subjective 
perceptions rather than on objective expectations of success (Arenius & Minniti, 2005). 
Fauchart and Gruber (2011) distinguish three ideal types of founder identities and 
suggest that founders perceive as opportunities only those situations that are consistent 
with their respective identity type. With respect to competition they highlight that one 
ideal type tends to perceive competitors as their primary frame of reference, while the 
other types rather tend to perceive competitors as less relevant and focus on society and 
social groups instead (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011, p.942). Moreover, perception has been 
demonstrated to be an important driver of choices under risk and there is a substantial 
literature on the concept of risk perception (e.g. Arrow, 1982; Slovic, 1987, 2000; 
Weber et al., 2002). Weber and Milliman (1997) highlight that situational differences in 
risky choices are likely to be driven by differences in individuals’ perception of risk 
rather than differences in individuals’ willingness to take risks.  
We argue that in the same way self-selection into certain competitive 
environments can be driven by differences in individuals’ perception of competitive 
intensity in addition to differences in individuals’ competitive preferences. According to 
psychological competitiveness research the interpersonal nature of individual 
competitiveness implies that the construct is inextricably tied to an individual's actual or 
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perceived social environment and competitiveness requires the perceived presence of a 
rival or a group of competitors (Smither & Houston, 1992). Individuals can only form 
beliefs about intensity of competition associated with certain environments based on 
their respective individual experience and socialization. Every individual tends to know 
and remember a unique set of particular instantiations of entrepreneurs as well as of any 
occupation. As far as individual perceptions of competitive intensity in an occupation 
are constructed from the set of particular instantiations that the individual experienced 
the heterogeneity of these particular instantiations should be reflected as individual-
level heterogeneity in perceptions of competition. This individual-level heterogeneity is 
not necessarily induced by any kind of perception bias, but results from the idiosyncrasy 
of individual experience. Hence, individuals may not only be heterogeneous with 
respect to individual competitive preferences, but also with respect to their subjective 
perception of intensity of competition associated with certain occupations. 
We argue that the relationship between individual competitiveness and selection 
into occupations is moderated by individual perceptions of intensity of competition in 
the respective work environment. More (less) competitive individuals are expected to 
prefer occupations that they perceive as more (less) competitive. Hence, we expect that 
individual perceptions of competition moderate the effects of individual competitive-
ness on self-selection into entrepreneurship, which leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of individual competitiveness on selection into 
entrepreneurship is moderated by perceived intensity of competition. 
5.2.3 Idiosyncratic and systematic perceptions of competitive intensity 
According to Hypothesis 1, individual heterogeneity in perceptions of 
competitive intensity might to some extent account for differences in selection into 
entrepreneurship. To illustrate this by an extreme example, suppose a case where all 
individuals are reluctant to enter competitive situations, but some individuals perceive 
entrepreneurship as highly competitive, whereas other people believe that competitive 
intensity in entrepreneurship is low. In this case, only those individuals perceiving 
competitive intensity as low will be willing to self-select into entrepreneurship. 
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However, this simple example neglects the individual’s choice between entrepreneur-
ship and other occupations. If there was a causal effect of individual competitiveness on 
selection into entrepreneurship, a perceived high relative competitive intensity in 
entrepreneurship would be a necessary condition for this effect. That is, competitive 
individuals should be more likely to select into entrepreneurship, only to the extent to 
which they perceive entrepreneurship to be more competitively intense than other 
occupations.  
If individual perceptions of competition are non-systematic and idiosyncratic, 
perceived intensity of competition in entrepreneurship will, on average, not differ from 
perceived intensity of competition in paid employment. In this case differences in the 
perception of competitive intensity could not explain the findings of previous research 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to select into competitive environments (see Bönte & 
Piegeler, 2013; Holm et al., 2013; see also Chapter IV). In contrast, if there is a 
commonly shared view on intensity of competition in entrepreneurship and in paid 
employment, there will be systematic differences in perceptions. Based on Kirzner’s 
(1973) assertion that entrepreneurial activity is always competitive and that competitive 
activity is always entrepreneurial, we expect that individuals tend to perceive 
entrepreneurship to be more competitively intense than paid employment. This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurship is on average perceived (rated) as more 
competitive than paid employment jobs. 
Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity between different occupations 
within both groups. Entrepreneurship may comprise various activities ranging from 
working as an IT freelancer over owning a restaurant to starting a new venture in a 
high-tech industry and this heterogeneity has evoked controversial discussion within 
entrepreneurship literature. While, for instance, Spencer, Kirchhoff, and White (2008, 
p.9) suggest to “focus more on entrepreneurs that form and operate independent new 
firms”, Acs, Åstebro, Audretsch, and Robinson (2016, p. 41) state that “the typical 
‘‘entrepreneur’’ is a sole proprietor with no other employees and who is working in a 
relatively mature and competitive industry such as the trades (e.g., construction), small-
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scale services, or who owns a restaurant or a retail business. While most of this 
discussion is well beyond the scope of this work, the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship 
might be reflected in perceived competitive intensity. The notions of competition faced 
by entrepreneurs are as heterogeneous as the entrepreneurial opportunities itself. 
Innovative entrepreneurs may create new combinations by challenging conventional 
wisdom to overcome social resistance and skepticism (Schumpeter, 1934), exploit 
market failures and destroy monopoly positions (Dean & McMullen, 2002), and engage 
in rivalrous competition with other entrepreneurs for profitable market opportunities 
(Kirzner, 1997). Yet most entrepreneurs may rather enter into highly contested markets, 
with products and services that are typically already offered, and where there is already 
a large supply present (Acs et al., 2016). In his general theory of entrepreneurship Shane 
(2003) distinguishes self-employment from founding of new businesses as the two 
operational definitions of entrepreneurship typically used in empirical research45. We 
follow this distinction between self-employment and founding new businesses and 
explore the perceived intensity of competition associated with both kinds of 
environments. 
Not only entrepreneurship, but also paid employment tends to be heterogeneous 
with respect to perceived competitive intensity. Particularly top-level executives and 
managerial positions may be viewed as extremely competitive (Gneezy et al., 2003; 
Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). On the one hand managers are more in touch with the 
market competition their organizations face than other paid employees; on the other 
hand managers and particularly executives have to face substantial intra-organizational 
competition. Especially within large organizations becoming a top level manager might 
require competing and winning in promotion tournaments (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  
In order to provide a more fine grained analysis, we further distinguish between 
four different occupational categories: Within entrepreneurial occupations we 
distinguish between business founders, and other self-employed occupations. Within 
paid employment we distinguish between managers and non-managerial employment. 
We explore the perceived competitive intensity within these four occupational 
categories. 
45 Shane and Venkataraman (2000) define entrepreneurship as the identification, evaluation, and
exploitation of opportunities. Shane (2012) criticizes the distinction between this conceptual definition 
and other operational definitions of entrepreneurship (e.g. firm formation) in entrepreneurship research. 
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5.3 METHOD 
To empirically investigate the role of the perceived intensity of competition in 
the context of the relationship between individual competitiveness and career choices, 
we analyze data from two separate empirical studies, which are based on a sample 
consisting of 227 undergraduate university students (Sample 1) and a general population 
sample consisting of 202 visitors of a shopping mall (Sample 2). For Sample 1, we 
make use of self-reported measures of competitive preferences focusing on enjoyment 
of competition and use job intentions as a measure of career choice. For Sample 2, we 
build on revealed behavior for both the measure of competitive preference and the job 
preference. Specifically, we employ an incentivized “lab-in-field” experiment to elicit 
participants’ competitive preference (and control for related measures of risk 
preferences and confidence) and look at revealed job choices.  
Using a general population sample with revealed entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs allows investigating whether competitiveness is related to actual job 
choice. However, as discussed in Chapter IV having experience as an entrepreneur may 
affect perception of competitiveness as well as individual competitive preferences. 
Moreover, participation in a “lab-in-field” experiment is voluntary and participants are 
likely to have high opportunity costs of participating. Within the student sample, these 
problems are smaller, because the intent is directed towards future behavior and due to 
the early stage in their professional development they are less likely to be affected by 
job-specific experiences, such that “student samples provide a good balance between 
threats of reverse causality and sample selection biases” (Bönte et al., 2015, p.9). 
Especially in classroom surveys participants are likely to have very low opportunity 
cost of participation, which likely reduces the selection bias stemming from voluntary 
participation and allows implementing more detailed and complex measures.  
5.3.1 Study designs and sample descriptions 
Sample 1 
In 2016 we conducted a survey examining the perception of competitiveness of 
occupations among 2nd year undergraduate students at a large German university. At the 
beginning of the survey, students were informed that participation was voluntary and 
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that their identities were not recorded to ensure confidentiality. Participants were not 
informed about the specific research question. A total 237 respondents provided full 
information regarding all specific occupations. For the within-subject comparison of 
four different occupational environments, we have a total sample of 887 sufficient 
information sets provided by 227 respondents. Respondents are on average 23 years old 
and all achieved the same education level required to access a university in Germany. 
Descriptive statistics for these participants are provided in table 5.4 and table 5.6. 
Sample 2 
For three days in November 2017 we conducted a “lab-in-field” experiment in a 
shopping mall in a large German city. Given time-constraints and in order to provide 
low barriers for participation, we conducted the experiment using a paper-and-pencil 
approach. Mall visitors were approached and asked whether they would like to 
participate in a 15-20 minutes experiment on “decision-making behavior of adults” in 
return for earnings between at least €5.00 and at maximum €16.00. At the beginning, 
participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that their identities were 
not recorded to ensure confidentiality. Participants were not informed about the specific 
research question. We continued with a brief survey on participant’s socio economic 
background, including gender, age, education, occupation. Subsequently, participants 
played two rounds of incentivized games.  
In the first round participants were exposed to one of two task treatments: math-
based competition (MC) or dice-based competition (DC). In the math-based competition 
treatment (MC), participants collected points by performing a math task that is similar 
to those implemented by Mayr et al. (2012). For 30 seconds, participants verified up to 
20 simple single-digit equations (e.g. “7+2+3–6=5. Is the result true or false?”). The 
sets of 20 equations were each randomly composed and randomly assigned. Equations 
were mathematically equally difficult. One out of two equations was false, but 
participants were not informed about this share. A correctly verified equation added one 
point and an incorrect verification subtracted to the participants score. The task 
description presented to participants included three representative examples, which 
participants solved without incentives. In the dice-based competition treatment (DC), 
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participants collected points by rolling two fair six-sided dice (each with 3 white sides 
and 3 black sides) five times, earning one point for each die that displays a black side. 
Independent of the task treatment participants were presented three payment 
schemes: (1) A piece-rate scheme (€0.25 for each point), (2) a risky piece-rate scheme 
(rolling a fair dice determines whether participant receives €0.50 per point, or, €0.00 
otherwise) and (3) a competitive payment scheme (€0.50 per point if the participant’s 
overall score was higher than the score of a randomly selected previous anonymous 
participant, and €0.00 otherwise). Participants make a set of three conditioned choices 
selecting their preferred payment scheme for each possible combination of two payment 
schemes. The choice between piece-rate versus competition reflects the classic choice 
from typical competitiveness experiments (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). The 
choice between risky piece-rate and piece-rate allows us to proxy individuals’ risk 
preferences without losing the feature that the risky outcome also depends on the own 
abilities. The third choice of competition versus risky piece-rate was introduced to 
identify participants’ transitivity of choices. We exclude participants who display 
intransitive choices, because the factors of their choices are most likely not decom-
posable into the different parts of competition, risk, and confidence, which is needed to 
correctly interpret the results of the competitiveness measurement. The payment for this 
first round is determined by these choices and a previously drawn (sealed) card 
indicating one of the three payment scheme combinations to be the one that eventually 
determines the relevant choice set. After making these choices, participants were asked 
to estimate how many out of the ten other participants reached a lower score than they 
themselves will prospectively reach. Participants received €1.00 for a correct 
estimation. 
In the second round we adopted the Eckel-Grossman task as an incentivized 
measure of risk preferences (Eckel & Grossman, 2008), which has been argued to be 
particularly useful for participants with low mathematical skills (Dave, Eckel, Johnson, 
& Rojas, 2010). Participants choose one out of six 50/50 lotteries. In lottery #1 
participants received an expected payment of €2.80 and an absolute risk of €0.00. In 
lotteries #2 to #5 the expected payment increases in steps of €0.20, while absolute risk 
increases in steps of 0.60€. Lottery #6 (€0.20; €7.00) has the same expected payoff as 
lottery #5, but higher absolute risk. 
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After the second round, participants answered additional survey items regarding 
their current and previous occupation, their perception of competitive intensity in 12 
different jobs, and the occupation of their parents. At the end of the experiment, we 
randomly determined, using a die, which of the two played rounds would be paid. 
From the overall 331 participants, we excluded 90 students and 6 participants, 
who were older than 66 years or older, because these individuals’ job choices are most 
likely not only between the different occupational categories, but also the non-
participation alternative is likely very dominant. Furthermore, 13 participants were 
excluded because of missing responses. We also excluded 20 participants due to their 
intransitive choices in the experiment as previously described. Hence, our final sample 
includes 202 valid and reliable responses. Descriptive statistics for these participants are 
provided in Table 5.5 and Table 5.7. 
5.3.2 Model variables 
Perceived competitive intensity of job categories 
Our measurements of perceived competitive intensities of the four occupational 
categories are based on related judgments of examples of these categories. We adapted 
the single-item measure of job competitiveness from the O*NET database46. Based on 
the description that competitive workplaces “require the worker to compete or to be 
aware of competitive pressure” respondents rate occupations on 7-point scales (1 = not 
competitive at all; 7 = extremely competitive).  
We initially started, in Sample 1, with examining the perceived competitiveness 
of 27 specific occupations derived from the general job categories described by the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations ISCO-08 (ILO, 2012) and specific 
jobs linked to these categories by the O*NET database. We aimed at two general 
categories of job activities: entrepreneurship and paid employment, which each is 
46 The Occupational Information Network (O*NET) is developed under the sponsorship of the 
U.S. Department of Labor/Employment and Training Administration and is a primary source of 
occupational information for the U.S. The O*NET database contains a large set of standardized and 
occupation-specific descriptors on more than 900 occupations covering the entire U.S. economy. The 
database is publicly available and continually updated from input by workers in each occupation (cf. 
National Center for O*NET Development, 2019 https://www.onetcenter.org/overview.html).  
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divided into two sub-categories: Start-up founder, (other) Self-employment47, 
Management, and (non-managerial) Employment without management role. We 
included 9 job descriptions from O*NET assigned to occupations from the ISCO-08 
subgroups of “Major Group 1 – Managers”. Furthermore, we included 8 other O*NET 
job descriptions assigned to the other major groups of the ISCO-08.  
As O*NET data only cover paid employment and do not have explicit categories 
for entrepreneurship, we additionally created 10 descriptions of entrepreneurial jobs 
including different kinds of entrepreneurship ranging from founding a growth-oriented 
start-up to owning and managing a family firm or working as a self-employed specialist. 
To derive robust indicators for perceptions of competitive intensity in these four 
job categories we run an exploratory factor analysis with Promax rotation (see Table 
5.1). Extracting the conceptually expected number of four factors, we observe that each 
of the extracted factors can be clearly and unambiguously matched with one of the 
conceptually expected factors. There are a few unexpected loadings and cross loadings. 
The founder of a service firm loads on both the start-up founder factor and the other 
self-employment factor. The clinician and the employed architect both load on the 
factor reflecting the managerial employments, though with rather small loadings. In 
both cases, we believe that to some extent managerial duties could be part of these jobs. 
To simplify measurements for Sample 2 we selected three jobs that best represent each 
factor; the highest loading ones with also low cross loading (marked in bold in 
Table 5.1).  
Running a confirmatory factor analysis for Sample 1 (N=237, χ2(48)= 130.466, 
p<0.001, RMSEA=0.085, SRMR=0.079, CFI=0.899), which should be interpreted with 
care because the original exploratory analysis was run on this sample, and Sample 2 
(N=202, χ2(48)=89.984, p<0.001, RMSEA=0.066, SRMR=0.065, CFI=0.942), which is 
a true confirmatory test, both indicate a good fit, particularly for Sample 2. Table 5.2 
reports Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability for the respective three selected jobs 
of all four job categories in both samples.  
47 The distinction between founders and self-employment is of course not a perfectly disjunctive 
classification, but acknowledges the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship. 
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Table 5.1: Exploratory factor analysis 
for perceptions of competitive intensity for 27 jobs 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness  
Single founder of a high-tech start-up * 0.7558 0.3606 
Team founder of a high-tech start-up * 0.7627 0.3993 
Founder of a growth-oriented start-up * 0.5974 0.3787 
Founder of a Service-Business 0.3370 0.3441 0.5793 
Architect with own Architect's Office * 0.8129 0.3435 
Kiosk Owner 0.4546 0.6924 
Dentist with own Dental Surgery * 0.7752 0.4469 
Hairdresser with own shop * 0.5776 0.6278 
Owner-Manager of a family firm 0.4501 0.5890 
Self-employed IT-specialist 0.5253 0.5622 
Sales manager 0.4807 0.7527 
Marketing manager 0.5097 0.6856 
Human resource manager * 0.5485 0.6408 
Supply chain manager 0.4788 0.6157 
Emp. chief executive of a family firm 0.3474 0.7864 
Computer or information system manager * 0.5820 0.5793 
Top Manager of a large corporation * 0.6612 0.5177 
Construction Manager 0.4257 0.6253 
Investment Fond Manager 0.5038 0.7203 
Clinician 0.4350 0.7653 
Architect - employed in an Architect's Office 0.3653 0.7739 
Employed Child Care Worker * 0.7284 0.4769 
Retail Salesperson 0.4581 0.7923 
Police Patrol Officer 0.3239 0.8352 
Legal Secretary 0.5162 0.6171 
Public Sector Clerk * 0.5935 0.6233 
Busdriver * 0.6556 0.6154 
Notes: Blanks represent factor loadings below 0.3. Jobs selected for the brief measurement instrument, 
i.e. the highest loading ones, are marked by a star. 
Table 5.2: Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability  
for 4x3 item measure of perceptions of competitive intensity 
Perception of Study 1 Study 2 
Competitive 
Intensity 
Cronbach’s α Composite Rel. Cronbach’s α Composite Rel. 
Employment 0.6843 0.6869787 0.7598 0.7681859 
Manager 0.6328 0.6522628 0.6609 0.6733331 
Self-Employment 0.7475 0.7587271 0.4638 0.4618238 
Founder 0.8055 0.8060962 0.8538 0.8534977 
Average 0.717525 0.7260162 0.684575 0.68921013 
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Self-reported individual competitiveness (Sample 1) 
In Sample 1, we measured individual competitive preferences using three items 
of the self-reported competitiveness scale introduced in Chapter II that focus on the 
enjoyment of competition: “I like situations in which I compete with others”; “I enjoy 
competing against others”; “I prefer competing with others when pursuing a goal over 
pursuing the goal alone”. All items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ( 1 = completely 
disagree; 7 = completely agree). The centered average score of these three items forms 
the variable indicating individual competitive preferences (α=0.822); hence, zero 
represents the sample mean.  
Revealed individual competitiveness (Sample 2) 
In Sample 2, we use the choice between the “tournament” and the “piece-rate” 
as an incentivized behavioral measure of revealed competitive preferences; the dummy 
variable is zero for participants choosing the non-competitive piece-rate and one for 
participants choosing the competitive tournament. Because competitive preferences are 
by definition distinct from risk preferences and expectations of winning (Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007) we include variables measuring risk preferences and expectation of 
winning within the competitiveness measurement as statistical controls, such that the 
employed measure of individual competitiveness is, in fact, the residual independent of 
the risk preference and the expectations of winning. We use the choice between the 
“risky payment” and the “piece-rate” as an incentivized behavioral measure of revealed 
risk preferences; the dummy variable is zero for participants choosing the piece-rate and 
one for participants choosing the risky payment. Expectations of winning are measured 
by the response to the incentivized estimation of how many of ten other participants will 
display a lower performance.  
Job preferences as self-reported intentions (Sample 1) 
In Sample 1, for each occupational environment we include a three-item scale. 
The first item is a generalized version of the Thompson (2009) item used in study 1 (“I 
intend to [set up a company, be self-employed, work in a management position, work as 
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an employee] in the future.”) 48. The second item is a reversed version of the third item 
of study 1 (“I have never thought about [setting up a company, working as a self-
employed, working as a manager, working as an employee]” (R)). Moreover, we 
include a very general item (“I would like to [set up a company, be self-employed, work 
in a management position, work as an employee]”). Each item is rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1=completely disagree; 7=completely agree). We use the average score of 
these three items as measure for the attractiveness of each occupation. 
Job preferences as revealed previous job engagement (Sample 2) 
In sample 2, for each occupational environment we include the respondent’s 
previous job engagement. We ask participants, whether they have “ever founded a 
business before”, “ever been self-employed”, “ever been employed in management 
position”, and “ever worked as an employee without a management role”. To measure 
respondents’ revealed job preferences for each occupational environment we use 
dummy variables, which take the value one, if the respondent reveals previous 
engagement in that environment, and zero otherwise.  
5.3.3 Additional control variables 
In both samples we included the following individual level control variables. 
Gender (contrast code), age, two dummies for whether mother or father were self-
employed. Sample 1 is, compared to Sample 2, rather homogeneous with respect to 
education; they all possess the minimum requirement to enter university programs, i.e. 
the A level (Abitur). We included the grade of this degree to control for different levels 
of educational attainment. In Sample 2, we included dummies for different levels of 
educational attainments (Hauptschule, Realschule, Fachabitur, Abitur, vocational 
training, university degree). Sample 1 also included a measure of the number of 
siblings, which might be related to individual competitiveness. Besides the above-
mentioned control variables, risk preferences and confidence related to the behavioral 
measurement of individual competitiveness, analyses of Sample 2 also included 
48 The other item from Thompson 2009 we used in study 1 (“I spend time learning about starting 
a firm”) is hardly applicable to the more general occupational categories, e.g. to employment. 
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dummies for the specific day of the experiment and whether or not participants were 
native speakers of German. 
In Sample 1, we included two additional job-specific control variables. First, 
individuals may be more familiar with some occupations than with others and therefore 
have more informed evaluations of these more familiar occupations. We control for 
such differences by including a measure of familiarity, i.e. the response to the single 
item (“In my personal environment there are [Managers, Founders, Self-Employed; 
Employees]”) rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely 
agree). Furthermore, people may choose a seemingly more competitive environment 
because they believe to be more successful. To account for such heterogeneity, we 
include a measure of confidence for each occupation using the average response to a 
two-item scale with one item indicating to what extent individuals believe they are able 
to successfully work in each occupation (“I will likely be able to [set up a company, be 
self-employed, work in a management position, work as an employee]”) and the other 
item indicating whether individuals believe they would be among the best in each 
occupation (“If I worked as a [Manager, Founder, Self-Employed; Employee], I would 
be among of the best of them.”).  Both items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree).  
5.3.4 Vignettes: Experimental Scenarios 
As an additional plausibility check we investigate the perception of competition 
in abstract scenarios among our student sample. In this section of the survey we present 
four different scenarios, which were designed to resemble the payment schemes used in 
typical economic competitiveness experiments (e.g Gneezy et al., 2003, Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007). Each scenario is presented to the participants as a short vignette. In 
Scenario A we describe a typical piece-rate condition. In scenario B we add an element 
of risk to it. These scenarios are considered to represent non-competitive settings. In 
Scenarios C and D we describe a competitive tournament condition. In Scenario D we 
emphasize a tournament condition of competing while performing different tasks, which 
again includes an element of chance and reduces the impact of individual ability beliefs. 
Moreover, this may reflect a feature of competition in various occupations (e.g. between 
start-up firms with different production technologies or managers working on different 
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projects). Table 5.3 presents the German original text and English translation of each 
scenario. 
Including these scenarios reflecting typical experimental conditions has 
advantages for the comparison of competitive perceptions. First, it allows to distinguish 
between the perception of different institutions and different perceptions of (the same) 
institutions. While different instantiations of the same occupation may still include 
heterogeneous sets of institutions, using standardized scenarios helps to isolate the 
effect of perceiving identical institutions differently from the effect of facing different 
institutions. Second, for these standardized scenarios we have clear theoretical 
predictions that the tournaments (Scenarios C and D) represent competitive settings and 
should be perceived as highly competitive, while the piece-rates (Scenario A and B) 
represent non-competitive setting and should not be perceived as competitive. 
Perceived competitive intensity of abstract scenarios 
Our measurements of perceived competitive intensities of the four scenarios are 
based on the single-item measure we adapted from the single-item measure of job 
competitiveness from the O*NET database. Respondents rate each scenario on a 7-point 
scale (1 = not competitive at all; 7 = extremely competitive). 
Self-reported scenario preferences 
Our measurements of participants’ preference for each of the four scenarios are 
based on simple single-item measures: “In Scenario [A, B, C, D] I would like to 
participate”. Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1=completely disagree; 
7=completely agree). 
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Table 5.3: Vignette texts 
Szenario A 
Mehrere Personen lösen unabhängig voneinander für 
Geld die gleichen Aufgaben. Eine Person erhält für 
jede von ihr richtig gelöste Aufgabe einen Punkt. Am 
Ende der Bearbeitungszeit bekommt diese Person ihrer 
Gesamtpunktzahl entsprechend 1 € pro Punkt 
ausgezahlt. Die Person erfährt nur ihre eigene 
Gesamtpunktzahl, nicht jedoch die Punktzahlen der 
anderen Personen. 
Scenario A 
Multiple persons are paid for independently solving 
the same tasks. A person receives one point for 
every task he/she solves correctly. At the end of the 
working period the person is paid €1 per point 
according to his/her total score. The person is 
informed solely about his/her own total score, but 
not about scores of the other persons.
Szenario B 
Mehrere Personen lösen unabhängig voneinander für 
Geld die gleichen Aufgaben. Eine Person erhält für 
jede von ihr richtig gelöste Aufgabe einen Punkt. Am 
Ende der Bearbeitungszeit wird die Bezahlung der 
Person ausgelost. Mit einer 50% Chance bekommt die 
Person ihrer Gesamtpunktzahl entsprechend 2 € pro 
Punkt ausgezahlt. Mit der gleichen Wahrscheinlichkeit 
erhält die Person 0 €. Die Person erfährt nur ihre 
eigene Gesamtpunktzahl, nicht jedoch die Punktzahlen 
der anderen Personen. 
Scenario B 
Multiple persons are paid for independently solving 
the same tasks. A person receives one point for 
every task he/she solves correctly. At the end of the 
working period the person’s payment is determined 
by a lottery. With a probability of 50% the person is 
paid €2 per point according to his/her total score. 
With the same probability the person receives €0. 
The person is informed solely about his/her own 
total score, but not about scores of the other 
persons.
Szenario C 
Mehrere Personen lösen unabhängig voneinander für 
Geld die gleichen Aufgaben. Eine Person erhält für 
jede von ihr richtig gelöste Aufgabe einen Punkt. Am 
Ende der Bearbeitungszeit wird die Gesamtpunktzahl 
dieser Person mit der Gesamtpunktzahl von 3 
zufälligen anderen Personen verglichen. Ist die 
Punktzahl der Person höher, als die Punktzahlen aller 
3 anderen Personen, erhält sie ihrer Gesamtpunktzahl 
entsprechend 4 € pro Punkt ausgezahlt. Ansonsten 
erhält die Person 0 €. Die Person erfährt nur ihre 
eigene Gesamtpunktzahl, nicht jedoch die Punktzahlen 
der Anderen.  
Scenario C 
Multiple persons are paid for independently solving 
the same tasks. A person receives one point for 
every task he/she solves correctly. At the end of the 
working period the person’s total score is 
compared to the total scores of 3 other randomly 
chosen persons. If the person’s total score is higher 
than the total scores of all 3 other persons, the 
person is paid €4 per point according to his/her 
total score. Otherwise the person receives €0. The 
person is informed solely about his/her own total 
score, but not about scores of the other persons. 
Szenario D 
Mehrere Personen bearbeiten unabhängig voneinander 
für Geld unterschiedliche Aufgaben, die auch einen 
unterschiedlichen Schwierigkeitsgrad haben können. 
Für jede Person wird eine Gesamtpunktzahl ermittelt. 
Am Ende der Bearbeitungszeit wird die Gesamt-
punktzahl einer Person mit der Gesamtpunktzahl von 3 
zufälligen anderen Personen verglichen. Ist die 
Punktzahl der Person höher, als die Punktzahlen aller 
3 anderen Personen, erhält sie ihrer Gesamtpunktzahl 
entsprechend 4 € pro Punkt ausgezahlt. Ansonsten 
erhält die Person 0 €. Die Person erfährt nur ihre 
eigene Gesamtpunktzahl, nicht jedoch die Punktzahlen 
der Anderen. 
Scenario D 
Multiple persons are paid for independently solving 
different tasks, which may have different difficulty 
levels. A person receives one point for every task 
he/she solves correctly. At the end of the working 
period the person’s total score is compared to the 
total scores of 3 other randomly chosen persons. If 
the person’s total score is higher than the total 
scores of all 3 other persons, the person is paid €4 
per point according to his/her total score. 
Otherwise the person receives €0. The person is 
informed solely about his/her own total score, but 
not about scores of the other persons.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics for study I (individual level variables) 
Variable Mean s. d. Min Max 
Competitive Preferences 3.971 1.351 1 7 
Gender (Female=1) 0.498 0.501 0 1 
Age 22.555 3.067 17 36 
Mother self-employed 0.211 0.409 0 1 
Father self-employed 0.066 0.249 0 1 
Abitur degree 2.371 0.534 1 3.7 
No. of siblings 1.348 1.140 0 7 
Notes: N=227. Competitive preferences before centering the score. 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics for study II (individual level variables) 
Variable Mean s. d. Min Max 
Competitive Preferences 0.490 0.501 0 1 
Risk: Risky Payment 0.594 0.492 0 1 
Risk: CRRA 1.078 1.218 0 3.46 
Gender (Female=1) 0.473 0.500 0 1 
Age 39.946 11.833 18 65 
Mother self-employed 0.317 0.466 0 1 
Father self-employed 0.178 0.384 0 1 
Education: Hauptschule 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Education: Realschule 0.297 0.458 0 1 
Education: Fachabitur 0.153 0.361 0 1 
Education: Abitur 0.347 0.477 0 1 
University Graduation 0.396 0.490 0 1 
Professional Job Training 0.386 0.488 0 1 
Education: Other 0.084 0.278 0 1 
German natives 0.782 0.414 0 1 
Day2 0.361 0.481 0 1 
Day3 0.356 0.479 0 1 
Notes: N=202 
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5.3.5 Econometric approach 
For our econometric analyses of individuals’ perceptions of competitive 
intensity we employ fixed effects regression analyses. Our econometric specification 
has its foundation in a random utility model describing individual preferences for J 
different environments and can be seen as an adaptation of McFadden’s (1974) choice 
model. The model includes two sets of independent variables for each individual i. First, 
the J×p matrix Xi denotes p alternative-specific variables that vary among alternatives 
and individuals. Second, the 1×q vector zi denotes q individual-specific variables that 
vary only among individuals. Moreover, we include both individual-fixed and job-fixed 
effects. The J×1 vector w reflects the vector of alternative-specific fixed effects, which 
might include tendencies that for some reasons, e.g. social norms, all individuals report 
lower attractiveness of, e.g., non-managerial employments. The scalar vi reflects the 
individual-specific fixed effect, which for instance might include individuals’ 
tendencies to generally find all alternatives more attractive. A random-utility model can 
then be expressed as 
ui = Xiβ + (ziA)
′ +w+ vi + ϵi (5.3.1) 
with β being a p×1 vector of alternative-specific regression coefficients and 
A = (α1,…, αJ) being a q×J matrix of alternative-specific regression coefficients, i.e. αj
is a p×1 vector with coefficients specific for alternative j versus a base alternative. For 
the base alternative we set α1 = 0. The elements of the J×1 vector ϵi are independent 
random variables with the usual properties (mean equals zero, uncorrelated with itself, 
uncorrelated with Xi, uncorrelated with vi, and homoskedastic). In sum, including the 
fixed effects implies that Xiβ + (ziA)
′ only describes individual differences in relative
utilities both between jobs and between individuals.  
In Section 5.4.1 we first investigate self-reported individual preferences for four 
artificial scenarios indexed by j = 1,…, 4 (referring to 1 as Scenario A, 2 as Scenario B, 
3 as Scenario C, and 4 as Scenario D) in Sample 1. Scenario A serves as the base 
category. In our main analysis in Section 5.4.2 we then investigate individual 
preferences for occupational categories (henceforth referred to as jobs) as dependent 
variables. We have a set of four unordered alternatives, i.e. jobs, indexed by j = 1,…, 4 
(referring to 1 as non-managerial employment, 2 as managerial employment, 3 as self-
employment, and 4 as start-up founder).  Non-managerial employment serves as the 
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base category. The measurement of job preferences varies between our samples. In 
Sample 1 individual job preferences are elicited as self-reported intentions for each job. 
These measures are assumed to be directly linked to probabilities to enter these jobs in 
the future. In Sample 2 we elicit whether an individual has previously been engaged in a 
job. We do not model an exclusive choice between these jobs, but individuals may 
reveal to engage (or have been engaged) in more than one job or in no job at all. We 
employ a linear probability model for these revealed job choices, but employing a logit 
rather than linear link does not change the conclusions. 
For all three dependent variables (scenario preferences; job intent; revealed job 
engagement) we assume probabilistic selection into environments based on the same 
underlying random utility model. As link between the utility and the observed variable, 
we assume a linear link between ui and both the observed intent in Sample 1 and the 
probability of observed engagement in a job in Sample 2. As all regression models 
include individual fixed effects as well as job fixed effects, we estimate relative effects 
for each environment as compared to the base group. Hence, matrix A indicates the 
effects of individual-level variables on the probability to enter each specific 
environment rather than entering the base group environment. The coefficient vector β 
can be interpreted as the effects of alternative-specific variables on the probability to 
enter any environment rather than entering the base group environment, when variable 
values are one point higher in the respective environments than in the base group 
environment. 
In Section 5.4.3 we employ a similar fixed effect regression model to estimate 
the perceived competitive intensity (PoC) across different jobs. The J×1 vector w 
reflects the vector of alternative-specific fixed effects, which is the independent variable 
of main interest here. Moreover, we include a 1×q vector zi consisting of q individual-
specific control variables as well as individual-specific fixed effects vi. The model can 
then be expressed as 
PoCi = vi + (ziA)
′ +w+ ϵi (5.3.2) 
with A = (α1,…, αJ) being a q×J matrix of alternative-specific regression 
coefficients. For the base alternative we set α1 = 0. The elements of the J×1 vector ϵi are 
independent random variables with the same properties as described above. 
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The reports of estimations include the full vector β reflecting the individual-
specific effects of all alternative-specific variables and rows of the matrix A with three 
columns of alternative-specific effects on each of the three environments for individual-
specific variables of main interest. Tables reporting the full matrix A of the respective 
models are provided in Appendix C. Moreover, we report environment-specific fixed 
effects w, relative to the base environment, i.e. scenario A or non-managerial employees 
respectively. Individual-specific fixed effects vi are omitted from all reports. 
5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 Testing perception measures with experimental Scenarios 
Figure 5.1 shows the average levels of perceived competitive intensity in each of 
the four scenarios. As expected scenarios A and B, which describe piece-rates, are 
perceived as substantially less competitive than scenarios C and D, which describe 
winner-take-all tournaments. Among the piece-rates scenario B, which includes an 
element of risk, is perceived as significantly more competitive, than scenario A 
(mean A = 2.29; mean B = 2.59; p = 0.0126). Among the WTA tournaments scenario D, 
which includes an element of uncertainty due to heterogeneity of tasks, is perceived as 
significantly less competitive, than scenario C (mean C = 5.55; mean D = 5.04; 
p < 0.0001). The difference between scenario B and scenario D is highly significant 
(mean B = 2.59; mean D = 5.04; p < 0.0001). 
Figure 5.1: Perceived competitive intensity of scenarios 
Note: Figure shows mean values and 95% confidence intervals for each scenario. Anchors: 1=”not at all 
competitive”; 7=”extremely competitive” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 mean s.d.
Piece-Rate - Scenario A 2.29 1.72
Risky Piece-Rate - Scenario B 2.59 1.76
WTA Tournament - Scenario C 5.55 1.46
Het. WTA Tournament - Scenario D 5.04 1.82
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Table 5.9: Regression results for scenarios 
Dependent variable Study 1: Scenario Preference 
Alternatives (base: Scenario A – piece-rate) Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
Model 1 
Competitive preference 0.07 (0.10) 0.22 (0.10)* 0.19 (0.11)+ 
Constant (scenario fixed effect) -1.37 (0.12)*** -0.80 (0.14)*** -1.46 (0.15)*** 
Ind. fixed eff. incl. 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.206 /  0.088 (25.97)*** 
Model 2 
Competitive preference 0.07 (0.10) 0.03 (0.15) 0.01 (0.15) 
Constant (scenario fixed effect) -1.40 (0.13)*** -1.17 (0.20)*** -1.79 (0.21)*** 
Perception of competition (PoC) 0.11 (0.05)* 
PoC X Competitive preference 0.06 (0.03)+ 
Ind. fixed eff. incl. 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.223 /  0.081 (20.79)*** 
Model 3 
Competitive preference - - -  
Constant (scenario fixed effect) -1.39 (0.13)*** -1.17 (0.20)*** -1.78 (0.21)*** 
Perception of competition (PoC) 0.11 (0.05)* 
PoC X Competitive preference 0.06 (0.02)* 
Ind. fixed eff. incl. 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.222 /  0.078 (32.25)*** 
Model 4 
Competitive preference - - - 
Control variables incl. incl. incl. 
Constant (scenario fixed effect) -0.56 (0.61) -0.90 (0.72) -1.28 (0.84) 
Perception of competition (PoC) 0.11 (0.05)* 
PoC X Competitive preference 0.05 (0.03)* 
Ind. fixed eff. incl. 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.237 /  0.083 (8.29)*** 
All models Observations 890 
Number of Individuals 228 
Notes: Individual and scenario fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific (i.e. scenario-
specific) as well as individual-specific explanatory variables; the latter being entered with alternative-
specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies for alternatives and reported in corresponding 
columns). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Model 4 includes the 
following individual-level control variables: Gender, age, parental entrepreneurship, Abitur degree, No. 
of Siblings. Estimates for control variables and overall constant are omitted from table but provided in 
Appendix C. Significance levels: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
Table 5.9 reports regression results of the vignette study. In Model 1 we 
investigate the scenario-specific effect of individual competitive preferences on the 
preference for each scenario. We find positive coefficients of competitive preferences in 
both tournament scenarios (βC = 0.22, se = 0.10; βD = 0.19, se = 0.11), but no significant 
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effect in scenario B as compared to scenario A, which serves as the base group. This 
result indicates that individuals reporting a stronger competitive preference are more 
likely to like tournament scenarios relative to piece-rate scenarios, which is line with 
our previous findings in Chapter II.  
In Model 2 we additionally include the perception of competitive intensity and 
its interaction with individual competitive preferences. In this model the effects of 
competitive preferences in both tournament scenarios turn insignificant and decrease by 
about 88% in size as compared to Model 1, while the effect in scenario B remains 
unchanged and still insignificant. The interaction of perceived competitiveness and 
individual competitive preferences shows a positive effect (β = 0.06, se = 0.03) 
suggesting that individuals reporting to be more competitive prefer scenarios they 
perceive as more competitive. More importantly, the effect of competitive preferences 
in both tournament scenarios appears to be almost entirely covered by this interaction 
effect.  
Excluding the scenario-specific effects of competitive preferences from the 
estimation in Model 3 does not change the size of the interaction effect between 
perceived competitive intensity and competitive preferences (β = 0.06, se = 0.02). 
Moreover, the effect is robust when including a set of controls in Model 4. 
From these results we conclude that perceived competitive intensity measured 
by our self-reported measure reflects competition as perceived by individuals in winner-
take-all tournaments. While the measure tends towards less extreme responses, if 
elements of risk or uncertainty are added, this does not reduce the measure’s capability 
to clearly distinguish competitive tournaments from non-competitive piece-rates. 
Hence, we consider our measure of perceived competitive intensity sufficiently valid for 
the investigation of occupations. 
5.4.2 The moderating role of perceptions of competition in jobs 
For a first impression of the relation between competitive preferences and 
preferences for different occupations we provide some descriptive data analysis. In both 
samples we observe a positive correlation between competitive preferences and the 
individual’s preferences for founding a business (sample 1: r = 0.16; sample 2: r = 0.23) 
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as well as for other self-employment (sample 1: r = 0.13; sample 2: r = 0.14). In sample 
1 we further observe a positive correlation for management (r = 0.20) and a negative 
correlation for employment (r = -0.15), while there are no correlations between 
competitive preferences and the preferences for management or employment in sample 
2.  
Figure 5.2: Descriptive interaction between individual competitiveness 
and perceived competitive intensity 
Note: Descriptive interaction based on pooled data from both samples. Low (high) PoC indicates a 
perceived competitive intensity below (above) the median rating. Low (high) Comp indicates individuals 
with competitive preferences below (above) the median preference.  
Figure 5.2 shows pooled data for occupational preferences from both samples. 
Using mean split dummies for both perceptions of competitive intensity and the 
respective measure of competitive preferences yields a simple interaction plot. 
Competitive individuals are slightly more attracted to occupations they perceive as 
competitively intense, whereas non-competitive individuals are substantially less 
attracted to occupations they perceive as competitively intense. Moreover, when 
occupations are perceived to have a low competitive intensity, these occupations are 
less attractive to competitive individuals (mean = 0.50) than to non-competitive 
individuals (mean = 0.55). In contrast, when occupations are perceived to have a high 
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
low PoC high PoC
low Comp high Comp
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competitive intensity, these occupations are substantially more attractive to competitive 
individuals (mean = 0.53) than to non-competitive individuals (mean = 0.36). 
Table 5.10 reports regression results for both samples49. In all models we 
investigate the within-subject differences between the effects on the preference for 
employment, which serves as base group, and the effects on preferences for the other 
three categories of occupations (management, self-employment, becoming a business 
founder). In Model 1 we investigate the occupation-specific effect of individual 
competitive preferences on the preference for each occupation. Relative to the base 
group of employment we observe positive coefficients of competitive preferences for all 
occupational categories in both samples. In the student sample this effect is significant 
for management (βM = 0.23, se = 0.12), while in the general population sample we find 
a significant effect of competitive preferences on individuals revealed preference to 
become a business founder (βF = 0.19, se = 0.09). This result is line with previous 
findings suggesting that competitive individuals tend to be attracted by management 
positions (see Chapter II) as well as entrepreneurship (Bönte & Piegeler, 2013; see 
Chapter IV).  
In Model 2 we additionally include the perception of competitive intensity and 
its interaction with individual competitive preferences. In this model the interaction of 
perceived competitiveness and individual competitive preferences shows a positive 
effect in both the students sample (β = 0.06, se = 0.03) and the general population 
sample (β = 0.08, se = 0.03). This indicates that more competitive individuals prefer 
occupations they perceive as more competitive and provides empirical support for 
Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the effects of competitive preferences for all occupations in 
both samples turn (or remain) insignificant and decrease in size as compared to Model 
1, or even show a negative sign. Hence, the occupation-specific effects of competitive 
preferences appear to be covered by this interaction effect. Excluding the occupation-
specific effects of competitive preferences from the estimation in Model 3 does slightly 
reduces the size of the interaction effect between perceived competitive intensity and 
competitive preferences in both samples (sample 1: β = 0.05, se = 0.02; sample 2: 
β = 0.06, se = 0.02), but does not change our conclusion. 
49 In order to improve clarity of presentation, we only report regression results for the variables 
of primary interest. The full results of all models are reported in Appendix C. 
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We run a set of robustness checks for this analysis based on the specification of 
Model 3. Results of all robustness checks are reported in Appendix C. 
First, since gender differences in competitiveness are well documented by 
previous research (e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), we investigate whether our 
findings are gender-specific. We include interactions of all model variables with the 
gender contrast variable. We do not find an indication that our results are gender-
specific neither in the student sample, nor in the general population sample. 
Furthermore, while in English only some occupations have gender-specific job titles 
(e.g. policewoman, policeman), in German language all occupations have a male and a 
female form. For the general population sample we randomized the job titles, such that 
half of the respondents were presented female job titles, while the others were presented 
male job titles. Including interaction terms for perceptions of competitive intensity with 
a job title contrast variable indicates that our findings are robust against the gender of 
the job titles. 
Second, we check the robustness of our results against minor variations of 
measurement in the general population sample. As we used two different tasks for the 
behavioral measure of competitive preferences in sample 2, we run an additional 
robustness check including interactions of perceptions of competitive intensity with a 
math-dice-task contrast variable.  
Moreover, we use a context specific measure of risk preferences. While using 
context-specific measures of controls variables have advantages (Holm et al., 2013), we 
include a robustness check using an established more general measure of risk 
preferences (Eckel & Grossman, 2008). Our findings are robust against all of these 
variations of measurement. Finally, applying a logistic regression model instead of a 
linear probability model in sample 2 does not change our conclusion. 
Based on the specification of Model 2 we predict the effect of an individual’s 
competitive preferences on the individual’s preference for an occupation conditional on 
the perceived competitive intensity in the occupation. Figure 5.3 shows the prediction 
for both samples. In the student sample the effect ranges from an insignificant negative 
effect (β = -0.26, p = 0.15) for an occupation, which is perceived as not at all 
competitive, to a positive effect (β = 0.12, p = 0.08) for an occupation, which is 
perceived as extremely competitive. In the general population sample the effect ranges 
165 
from a negative effect (β = -0.40, p = 0.04) for an occupation, which is perceived as not 
at all competitive, to a positive effect (β = 0.10, p = 0.09) for an occupation, which is 
perceived as extremely competitive. 
Figure 5.3: Predicted interaction between individual competitiveness 
and perceived competitive intensity 
Notes: Predicted coefficient of Competitive Preference for different levels (1=”not at all competitive” to 
7=”extremely competitive”) of perceived competitive intensity. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence 
interval. 
Moreover, we calculate the indirect effects of each occupational category on the 
relation between competitive preferences and the relative attractiveness of the 
occupation, which are due to their differences in perceived competitive intensity. Table 
5.11 reports these indirect effects for both samples. Our results indicate that the 
difference in perceived competitive intensity between founding a business and working 
as an employee makes an individual’s competitive preference increase the attractiveness 
of business founding relative to the attractiveness of employment by 0.231 (sample1) to 
0.288 (sample 2). Our results also indicate positive, yet slightly lower, indirect effects 
for self-employment relative to employment (sample 1: 0.193; sample 2: 0.227) and 
management relative to employment (sample 1: 0.167; sample 2: 0.199). 
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Table 5.11: Indirect job-specific effects of individual competitiveness 
on job attractiveness mediated by perceptions of competitive intensity 
Study 1 Study 2 
Indirect effect CI95% Indirect effect CI95% 
Founder vs. employees .231+ [-.024 .367] .288* [.015 .545] 
Self-Employment vs. 
employees 
.193+ [-.030 .421] .227* [.012 .421] 
Manager vs. employees .167+ [-.036 .500] .199* [.017 .385] 
Notes: We analyze the intervening variable effect of perceptions of competitive intensity categories on the 
link between individual competitiveness and job attractiveness by tests of the difference in coefficients 
(Freedman & Schatzkin 1992; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). We employ 
models reported in Table 5.10 and compare coefficients of job-specific effects of individual 
competitiveness before and after including the interaction of individual competitiveness with perceptions 
of competitive intensity (i.e. individual competitiveness conditioned on the perceived competitive 
intensity). We use bootstrapping with 5.000 replications to calculate bias-corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals. We report the 95% confidence interval. The p-value associated with the largest 
confidence interval not including zero is assumed to indicate the significance level. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
5.4.3 Perceptions of competition in jobs 
Figure 5.4 summarizes the evaluations of the 27 jobs. We see that on average 
entrepreneurial jobs are perceived as more competitively intense than paid 
employments; however and as expected, within both groups there is substantial 
heterogeneity, start-ups are perceived as more competitively intense than self-
employment and managerial jobs are perceived as more competitively intense than non-
managerial jobs. 
Based on the results of factor analyses described in Section 5.3.2 (see Table 5.1) 
we selected three jobs for each of the four occupational categories. Figure 5.5 
graphically reports the average evaluations for each of these 12 jobs as well as the 
average for each of the four job categories for both samples. We observe in Figure 5.5 
that the evaluations are similar between the student sample and the general population 
sample. Based on the reported confidence intervals for these evaluations of the four job 
categories, we can already see that start-ups are perceived as most and non-managerial 
paid employment is perceived as least competitively intense. 
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Figure 5.4: Perceived competitiveness of 27 jobs – sample 1 
Notes: Perceived competitive intensity of occupations(1=”not at all competitive” to 7=”extremely 
competitive”). Dots indicate mean value, horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Entrepreneurial jobs are perceived as more competitively intense than paid 
employments in both the student sample (Paired t-test: diff=5.42-3.59=1.83>0, t=23.10, 
p<0.001) and the general population sample (Paired t-test: diff=5.55-3.83=1.71>0, 
t=17.41, p<0.001). Within the group of entrepreneurship occupations start-up founding 
is perceived as more competitively intense than other self-employment (paired t-tests: 
sample 1: diff=5.73-5.11=0.62>0, t=7.23, p<0.001; sample 2: diff=5.78-5.33=0.45>0, 
t=5.15, p<0.001) and within paid employment managerial jobs are perceived as more 
competitively intense than non-managerial employment (paired t-tests: sample 1: 
diff=4.91-2.26=2.65>0, t=29.97, p<0.001; sample 2: diff=5.01-2.66=2.36>0, t=18.69, 
p<0.001). Self-employment and managerial paid employment are on average rather 
similar, though both are very heterogeneous. While top-management positions are 
E
n
trep
ren
eu
rsh
ip
 
P
aid
 E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
O
th
er E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
S
elf-E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
F
o
u
n
d
er
r
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 mean s.d.
Founder of a growth-oriented start-up 5.89 1.14
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Team founder of a high-tech start-up 5.68 1.42
Single founder of a high-tech start-up 5.61 1.59
Hairdresser with own shop 5.36 1.69
Architect with own Architect's Office 5.27 1.51
Self-employed IT-specialist 5.16 1.55
Owner-Manager of a family firm 4.75 1.62
Dentist with own Dental Surgery 4.69 1.68
Kiosk Owner 4.52 1.67
Top Manager of a large Corporation 5.87 1.37
Investment Fond Manager 5.54 1.29
Marketing Manager 5.42 1.23
Sales Manager 5.08 1.26
Supply Chain Manager 4.76 1.22
Emp. Chief Executive of a Family Firm 4.50 1.50
Computer or Information System Manager 4.46 1.41
Human Ressource Manager 4.42 1.41
Construction Manager 4.29 1.32
Architect - employed in an Architect's Office 4.14 1.35
Clinician 3.99 1.63
Retail Salesperson 3.47 1.72
Legal Secretary 3.41 1.42
Police Patrol Officer 2.89 1.59
Public Sector Clerk 2.45 1.38
Employed Child Care Worker 2.29 1.27
Busdriver 2.05 1.19
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perceived almost as competitively intense as start-up founding, the other management 
positions are perceived as less competitively intense. 
 Table 5.12 reports regression results for both samples. In all models we 
investigate the within-subject differences between the effects on the perception of 
competition for non-managerial employment, which serves as base group, and the 
effects in the other three categories of occupations (management, self-employment, 
becoming a business founder). In Model 1 we test the perception of entrepreneurship 
occupations compared to paid employment by constraining the coefficient of 
management to zero and constraining the coefficients of self-employment and founders 
to be equal. The model indicates that entrepreneurship is perceived as more competitive 
than paid employment (sample 1: β = 1.90, se = 0.08; sample 2: β = 1.71, se = 0.10).  
Relaxing both constraints in Model 2 indicates that managerial occupations are 
perceived as more competitive (sample 1: β = 2.69, se = 0.09; sample 2: β = 2.36, 
se = 0.13) than non-managerial employment. The coefficients of self-employment 
(sample 1: β = 2.93, se = 0.11; sample 2: β = 2.67, se = 0.13) and start-up founders 
(sample 1: β = 3.52, se = 0.10; sample 2: β = 3.12, se = 0.16) are higher in both samples. 
Moreover, comparing the coefficients of start-up founders and self-employment yields a 
significant difference in both samples (sample 1: diff = 0.59 > 0, t = 6.39, p < 0.001; 
sample 2: diff = 0.45 > 0, t = 5.14, p < 0.001). Including a set of control variables in 
Model 3 does not change the conclusion. These results are consistent with the results of 
previous t-tests and provide empirical support for Hypothesis 2. 
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5.4.4 Perceptions of competition in O*NET 
Since we perform within-subject analyses, we further examine the uniqueness of 
our samples. While the main focus of our previous analyses is on entrepreneurship 
occupations, we also measured the perceived competitive intensity of 17 occupations in 
paid employment including 9 managerial and 8 non-managerial occupations. For these 
occupations O*NET data on job competitiveness are available50.  
Figure 5.6: Comparison of our student sample to O*NET 2018 
Note: O*NET ratings are originally measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. O*NET values are 
transposed to a seven point scale ranging from 1=”not at all competitive” to 7=”extremely competitive”. 
Managerial occupations are displayed in grey; non-managerial occupations are displayed in black. 
50 In the comparison with O*NET data we drop the occupation clinician from the analysis, since 
O*NET does not list this occupation, but lists several specialist (e.g. radiologists) with different 
competitiveness ratings. Moreover, O*NET does not discriminate different firm sizes, so our observations 
for top managers of large corporations and chief executives of family firms are combined and compared 
to O*NET data for chief executives. 
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Figure 5.6 shows the comparison of average perceived competitive intensity of 
occupations in our student sample with the average perceived competitive intensity 
reported for these occupations by the O*NET database in 2018. We observe that 
occupations are on average perceived as slightly more competitive in the O*NET data 
than in our sample. In general managerial occupations are perceived as more 
competitive than non-managerial occupations in both samples. Moreover, most 
occupations are shown to be perceived similarly competitive in our sample and the 
O*NET data. Particularly the ratings of several managerial occupations (e.g. human-
resource manager, or marketing-manager) are almost identical. The largest differences 
can be observed for architects and retail salespersons, which are perceived as more 
competitively intense by the O*NET respondents. We report the score for employed 
architects, while the perceived competitive intensity for self-employed architects in our 
sample is higher (see Figure 5.4). The O*NET rating might include employed as well as 
self-employed architects, which might at least partially explain the deviation. Neither 
architects, nor retail salespersons were included in our final set of 12 occupations. 
Table 5.13: Comparison of factor av. scores 
in both our samples to O*NET 2016 and 2018 
Student 
Sample
General 
Population
O*NET 2016 O*NET 2018 
Managers 
CEO / HR / CIS 
4.91 5.01 4.88 5.02 
Employees 
Childcare / Clerk / Busdriver 
2.26 2.66 2.72 2.72 
Note: O*NET values are originally measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. O*NET values are 
transposed to a seven point scale ranging from 1=”not at all competitive” to 7=”extremely competitive”. 
The similarity between our samples and the O*NET ratings is even stronger 
when we compare perceptions for occupational categories rather than specific 
occupations. Based on our final set of 12 occupations we measure the perceived 
competitive intensity of managerial occupations by an average score of (1) top-
managers, (2) computer and information system managers, and (3) human resource 
managers. Moreover, we measure the perception of competition within non-managerial 
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employment by the average score of (1) employed childcare workers, (2) municipal 
clerks, and (3) bus drivers. As a comparison we also calculate these two average scores 
based on the O*NET ratings for the respective occupations. Table 5.13 reports these 
average scores (management & non-managerial employment) for both our student 
sample and our general population sample as well as for the ratings reported by O*NET 
in 2016 and in 2018. For management the perceived competitive intensity in both our 
samples (sample 1: 4.91; sample 2: 5.01) is between the O*NET data of 2016 (4.88) and 
2018 (5.02). For non-managerial employment the values observed in our samples, 
particularly in the student sample (2.26), are slightly lower than the values reported by 
O*NET (2.72).  
5.5 DISCUSSION 
5.5.1 Summary of findings 
Chapter V examines the mechanisms linking individual competitiveness to the 
respective individual’s career choices. In the general framework in Chapter I the 
competitive intensity of environments is conceptualized as the critical contingency of 
enjoyment of competition, which is a motive to enter these environments. In Chapter V 
we investigate individual heterogeneity in perceptions of competitive intensity of 
occupations. We hypothesize, that individual heterogeneity in perceptions of 
competitive intensity moderates the relationship between individual competitiveness 
and career choices. Moreover, based on our finding from Chapter IV that entrepreneurs 
embrace competition we hypothesize that entrepreneurship is perceived as more 
competitive than paid employment. 
We investigate perceived competitive intensity of occupations in two separate 
studies. Study 1 features self-reported measures of individual competitiveness and job 
intentions of 227 undergraduate students. Study 2 employs behavioral measures of 
individual competitiveness and revealed occupational choices in a general population 
sample of 202 individuals.  
In support of Hypothesis 1 both studies provide empirical evidence for the 
moderating effect of individuals’ perceptions of competitive intensity. Competitive 
individuals are shown to be more likely to prefer and enter those occupations they 
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perceive as more competitive, while non-competitive individuals tend to avoid those 
occupations. In both studies the predicted effect of individual competitiveness is 
positive (negative) for occupations with high (low) perceived competitive intensity. Our 
findings suggest that the differences in relations between self-selection into competition 
and preferences for the respective occupations are largely explained by the competitive 
intensity individuals perceive in the respective occupations. These results are in line 
with previous research in the domain of risk taking behavior (Weber & Milliman, 1997; 
Weber et al., 2002) indicating the importance of individual heterogeneity in perceptions 
rather than only in preferences for the explanation of individuals’ choices in specific 
environments. 
To further demonstrate the relevance of perceptions for individuals’ selection 
into the examined job categories we identify positive indirect effects of founding 
businesses, self-employment, and management relative to the base group of non-
managerial employment mediated by perceptions of competitive intensity on the 
relation between individual competitiveness and job attractiveness. These estimations 
suggest that due to differences in perceived competitive intensity competitive 
individuals are more likely to prefer entrepreneurship as well as management over other 
paid employment. 
Moreover, in support of Hypothesis 2 our results indicate that individuals assess 
entrepreneurship, on average, as substantially more competitive than paid employment. 
Our studies provide empirical evidence that perceptions of both students and the general 
population sample systematically support Kirzner’s (1973) assertion that entrepreneur-
ship is inherently competitive. We also find systematic differences in perceived 
competitive intensity between start-up founders versus other self-employment as well as 
between managerial employment versus non-managerial employment. Our findings also 
support the view of previous economic competitiveness literature (e.g. Gneezy et al., 
2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) that top-managers and chief-executives work in 
highly competitive environments. The levels of perceived competitive intensity in the 
respective occupations are very similar between our students sample and our general 
population sample and consistent with the average assessment of job insiders reported 
by the O*NET database51.  
51 O*NET data are only available for paid employment, but not for entrepreneurship. 
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An additional plausibility check confirms that consistent with our definition of 
competitive environments winner-take-all tournaments are perceived as highly 
competitive, while the competitive intensity within piece-rate schemes is perceived as 
very low. Moreover, individual heterogeneity in the perceived competitive intensity of 
these artificial scenarios moderates the effect of individual competitiveness on the 
attractiveness of these scenarios.  
5.5.2 Limitations 
While we believe this chapter to make worthwhile contributions to our 
understanding of individual competitiveness, we acknowledge limitations implied by 
our specific research design. This chapter reports results from two separate studies, 
which are based on different samples (undergraduate students vs. general population), 
apply different measures of individual competitiveness (self-reported vs. behavioral) 
and of job preferences (intent vs. revealed choice), and use different sets of controls. 
While we consider this an advantage of our design allowing us to demonstrate the 
robustness of our findings, it also implies that we can neither combine data from both 
studies, nor replicate one study with the other. Hence, we cannot fully rule out the 
possibility of different measurement errors inducing the same result in both studies. 
Since both studies are based on cross-sectional data, we cannot measure a causal 
effect and the estimated coefficients are to be interpreted as correlations. Nonetheless, 
our finding that the effect of individual competitiveness on both intentions to enter an 
occupation in the future (study 1) and revealed choice of having already entered an 
occupation (study 2) are moderated by individual perceptions of competition is 
suggestive of a causal link between individual competitiveness and occupational choice, 
because intense competition in an occupation appears to be a necessary condition for 
competitive (non-competitive) individuals to systematically favor (avoid) the respective 
occupation. Moreover, we test the interaction of perceived competitive intensity with 
both risk aversion and confidence, but do not find significant moderation effects. Hence, 
alternative explanations, such that risk-averse individuals avoid the risks of intense 
competition, or that more confident individuals tend to prefer occupations with higher 
competitive intensity, are not supported by our results. 
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We use self-reported, non-incentivized measures of perceived competitive 
intensity for both studies. Hence, these measures rely on the assumption of “epsilon 
truthfulness” (see Cummings et al., 1997) discussed in Chapter II. Should participants in 
our studies have any reason to systematically misreport their perception of different 
occupations, our results might be biased. We are neither aware of any such systematic 
misincentives, nor aware of any way to incentivize truthful responses regarding 
subjective perception. 
5.5.2 Contributions and implications 
1. Influencing individuals’ competitive behavior
Emphasizing the role of individual heterogeneity in perceptions of competitive 
intensity extends the interpretation of previous findings (e.g. Reuben et al., 2015) in an 
important way, because individual beliefs, other than preferences, can be influenced 
directly by additional information or different framing (e.g. Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Mollerstrom, Munkhammar, 2012).  
After Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggested that the way men and women 
respond to competitive environments might give rise to inefficiencies, subsequent 
studies examined how changing the rules of a competition affects individuals’ decision 
to enter (Shurchkov, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013, Leibbrandt et al., 2017). Niederle, 
Segal, and Vesterlund (2013, p.1), for instance, argue that “high-performing women fail 
to enter competitions they can win” and seek to increase their entry. While this is a 
promising field for behavioral market design (Niederle, 2017), recent experimental 
research also highlights unintended consequences of modifying the rules of competition 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2017). In addition to such institutional changes, future research might 
also explore effective ways to influence individual beliefs regarding competitive 
intensity e.g. providing additional information about certain career paths or educational 
programs. If inefficiencies in behavioral responses to competitive environments have 
been identified, shaping individual beliefs about competition in favor of more desirable 
responses may in some cases be more feasible and less costly than modifying the 
environment to induce more desirable responses. This is of particular interest for 
environments such as entrepreneurship, where designing competition by institutional 
regulation is extremely difficult. 
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2. Systematic order of competitive occupations
Our study of perceived competitive intensity in Chapter V provides a systematic 
approach to the relations between self-selection into competition in incentivized 
experiments and different career choices. By demonstrating that perceived competitive 
intensity moderates this relation our study suggests that perceived competitive intensity 
provides a systematic and meaningful order of various occupations. This approach 
enables future research to predict which occupational choices are most likely influenced 
by individuals’ preferences for competition.  
While we investigate perceptions of 27 specific jobs, we use the same measure 
of perceived competitive intensity that is used in the O*NET database. O*NET does not 
provide individual-level data and no data at all on entrepreneurship, but reports average 
competitiveness ratings for more than 900 different jobs and occupations. For those 
occupations that are included in both our studies as well as in the O*NET database we 
find that average perceived competitive intensity in these occupations is consistent 
between our undergraduate students, our general population sample in Germany, and 
the ratings of Job insiders in the U.S. as reported by O*NET.  
Hence, we suggest, that future research can use O*NET data not only as a 
systematic indicator of competitive intensity in various jobs, which is already used in a 
recent psychological study (Houston et al., 2015), but also to predict for any set of 
occupations, whether and to what extent individuals’ choices between these occupations 
are likely influenced by the individuals’ competitive preferences. This is particularly 
useful to derive predictions for future studies similar to the one by Reuben and 
colleagues (2015), where individuals are likely to select a job from a specific subset of 
occupations with similar characteristics (e.g. require the degree, have similar 
prospective earnings). 
3. Multiple individual heterogeneities
In addition to individual heterogeneity in competitive preferences we find 
substantial heterogeneity regarding the perception of competition within the same 
occupation by different individuals. The implications of such heterogeneous beliefs may 
differ depending on the particular research questions and definition of competitiveness. 
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Future research viewing individual competitiveness and beliefs of competitive 
intensities as distinct constructs might follow a line of research in the literature on risk 
taking behavior that distinguishes individual perception of risk from perceived-risk 
aversion (Weber & Milliman, 1997; Weber et al., 2002). Based on this distinction 
Weber and Hsee (1998, p.1205) identify “cross-cultural differences in risk perception, 
but cross-cultural similarities in attitudes towards perceived risk”. A similar approach 
might be useful for cross-country studies on competitive preferences like the one by 
Bönte (2015). Future studies might examine individual competitiveness as an 
individual’s general tendency to self-select into environments, which the individual 
perceives to be competitive. As perceptions of competition moderate the influence of 
competitive preferences on career choices, and might also moderate its effects on other 
choices, future research that is interested in preferences for perceived competition might 
additionally elicit and control for such perceptions, in order to isolate effects of 
heterogeneous preferences from effects of heterogeneous perceptions. Particularly, an 
examination of cross-country differences in perceptions of competition in addition to 
differences in preferences for perceived competition might be a promising extension for 
competitiveness research. 
In contrast, most previous economic research investigates individual 
competitiveness as an individual’s tendency to self-select into an objectively defined set 
of environments, which are considered as competitions by a theory or the researcher 
(e.g. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Buser et al., 2014, 2017, Reuben et al., 2015; see 
also Chapter III). Future research interested in behavioral responses to particular 
institutions or environments (cf. Niederle et al., 2013; Flory et al., 2015) might follow 
this approach and, thereby, explicitly or implicitly include individual perceptions of 
competitive intensity alongside competitive preferences as a second determinant of the 
individual’s competitiveness. Future research following this broader concept of 
competitiveness might emphasize the potential role of heterogeneous perceptions in the 
interpretation of findings.  
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4. Perception of competition in the lab
We also investigate the perceived intensity of competition within artificial 
scenarios. We find that winner-take-all tournaments are perceived almost as competitive 
as the most competitive occupation (e.g. founders of high-tech start-ups, or top 
managers of large corporations), while the perceived intensity of competition within 
piece-rate payments is similar to the least competitive occupations in our study (e.g. bus 
drivers, or employed childcare workers). Hence, in terms of perceived competitive 
intensity the environments within economic experiments seem to represent the extreme 
points of an individual’s spectrum of potential occupational choices.  
Moreover, we find that individual heterogeneity in perceived competition within 
these artificial scenarios moderates the relation between individuals’ self-reported 
competitiveness and the attractiveness of the respective scenario.  On the one hand our 
results confirm that experimental designs, where subjects choose between winner-take-
all tournaments and piece-rate payment schemes (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Reuben et al., 2015), reflect the subjects’ deliberate decision to 
self-select into (or avoid) competition. On the other hand, our results suggest that even 
self-selection into artificial competitive environments in the lab might to some extent be 
driven by individual heterogeneity in perceived competitive intensity rather than by 
competitive preferences only. 
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Chapter VI 
Overall Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In this thesis I have provided an interdisciplinary approach to address the gap in 
conceptual foundations of the economic literature on individual competitiveness. 
Drawing on more than 100 years of psychological competitiveness research I have 
suggested a general framework of individual competitiveness in order to examine two 
related research questions:  
(1) What drives individuals’ decisions to self-select into competitive versus non-
competitive environments? 
(2) How are individuals’ decisions to self-select into competitive versus non-
competitive environments in incentivized economic experiments related to these 
individuals’ decisions to pursue certain career paths? 
In this framework individual competitiveness denotes an individual’s general 
tendency to select into competitive environments. Competitive individuals are those 
individuals who favor competitive over non-competitive environments (Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2011; Smither & Houston, 1992), irrespective of possibly associated risks 
and differences in confidences in winning. Competitive environments are characterized 
by institutions where individuals’ goals are not simultaneously achievable given the sets 
of possible strategies (Deutsch, 1949).  
181 
I adapted three potential motives of individuals’ self-selection into competition 
from psychological competitiveness research (Ryckman et al., 1990, 1996; Houston et 
al., 2002b, 2012): (1) seeking personal development in competition, (2) a desire to win 
in competition, and (3) an enjoyment of competition. Furthermore, I discussed the role 
of individuals’ beliefs as critical contingencies for each motive’s effect on self-selection 
into particular environments, i.e. a desire to win can only motivate an individual to self-
select into a certain environment to the degree to which the individual believes the 
environment offers a chance of winning. Similarly personal development motives 
require an environment that offers opportunities to improve skills and mastery, whereas 
an enjoyment of competition can only be an effective motivation, if an environment is 
believed to be sufficiently competitive. Each of the studies presented in this thesis has 
applied this general framework in order to conceptually and empirically examine both 
research questions.  
6.1.1 What drives self-selection into competitive vs. non-competitive environments? 
Based on the general framework, studies presented in Chapters II and III focus 
on the first research question and examine why individuals would enter competition and 
what they value about competitive environments. Chapter II focusses on the 
identification of potential motives of individuals’ self-selection into competitive 
environments. My co-authors and I investigate the relationship of the three different 
motives of competitiveness that have been identified by psychological research: (1) 
seeking personal development in competition, (2) a desire to win in competition, and (3) 
an enjoyment of competition, with self-selection into competition. We empirically test 
whether and to what extent these different motives are related to the self-selection into 
competition in an incentivized experiment as studied by behavioral economists. 
Our study demonstrates that a standard behavioral measure of individuals’ self-
selection into a competitive environment and a psychometric scale of individual 
competitiveness are positively associated and that this association is primarily driven by 
the enjoyment of competition. Consistent with our conjecture that competitive 
environments in economic experiments offer little opportunities for personal 
development, we find no relation between personal development motives and self-
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selection into competition and when we exclude personal development motives from the 
self-reported measure, the positive relation of the remaining motives with the behavioral 
measure increases. This distinction is validated based on divergent associations with 
personality. While enjoyment of competition and self-selection into competition show 
very similar relations with the Big Five personality dimensions, the patterns of 
correlations of these personality dimensions with personal development motives differ 
substantially. For the desire to win and in our particular setting, we find no relationship 
with self-selection into competition and the correlations with personality dimensions are 
similar to those of personal development competitiveness.  
In Chapter III I test whether these motives constitute preferences for competitive 
environments. For this purpose I link self-selection into competition to an individual’s 
utility maximizing behavior by providing a utility-based model that includes both an 
enjoyment of competition and a desire to win in the individual’s utility function. 
Thereby, I provide a theory-driven attempt to disentangle genuine preferences for 
competitive environments from utility maximizing behavior that can be explained by 
well-known economic preferences. Within this model I derive expected effects of both a 
value of competing reflecting an individual’s enjoyment of competition and a value of 
winning reflecting an individual’s desire to win on the individual’s self-selection into 
competitive versus non-competitive environments. 
In order to experimentally quantify the individual value of these motives I 
introduce an experimental treatment that allows manipulating the probability of winning 
the competition exogenously and identify piece-rate equivalents for multiple 
competitive environments. Based on this experiment I calculate a non-monetary value 
of competing as well as a non-monetary value of winning. In support of the model I 
identify a causal effect of the probability of winning on subjects’ piece-rate equivalent. 
This effect is similar between a math task, where performance depends on ability and 
effort, and a dice task, where performance is the result of pure luck. Subjects’ deviation 
from the benchmark model provides evidence for a significant positive average value of 
competing, but no evidence for a value of winning among the subjects. Moreover, I 
show that subjects with a higher individual value of competing are substantially more 
likely to self-select into the competitive tournament in a classical Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) experiment. 
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The studies presented in Chapters II and III identify an enjoyment of 
competition as a relevant motive of individuals’ self-selection into competition and 
indicate that such a non-monetary value of competing can be interpreted as a 
competitive preference. I conclude, that enjoyment of competition drives individuals’ 
self-selection into competitive environments, while at least for self-selection into the 
investigated competitive environments in incentivized experiments personal 
development motive and a desire to win are rather irrelevant. I further conclude that 
enjoyment of competition, which is conceptualized as a personality characteristic in 
psychological research, has a meaningful economic interpretation as a unique non-
monetary value associated with competing, which also provides a quantifiable measure 
to identify a single individual’s competitive preference.  
6.1.2 How is self-selection into competitive environments related to career choices? 
Based on my general framework and findings from Chapters II and III, studies 
presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V focus on the second research question and 
examine how self-selection into competitive environments in experiments is related to 
career choices and which career paths are more attractive to competitive individuals 
than others. Since the previous analyses have highlighted the enjoyment of competition 
as driver for self-selection into competitive environments in experiments, while the 
other motives are shown to be less relevant for these choices, I focus on enjoyment of 
competition as a potential explanation for the relation between self-selection into 
competitive environments in experiments and self-selection into certain career paths. 
In Chapter IV I demonstrate the relevance of enjoyment of competition for the 
relationship between self-selection into competition and career choices. My co-authors 
and I conduct a lab-in-the-field study with 224 visitors at a shopping mall in a large 
German city and demonstrate that entrepreneurs—both revealed entrepreneurs 
(individual who are or have been entrepreneurs) and potential entrepreneurs (who 
consider entrepreneurship a possible future option)—are more likely to select into 
competition than non-entrepreneurial individuals (who have no intention at all to start a 
business). Employing particular experimental designs to account for individuals’ desires 
to win and mastery-related achievement motivations, our results indicate that 
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entrepreneurs tend to enter competition for the sake of competition itself rather than for 
the prospect of winning a competition or personal development in competition. Our 
results suggest that enjoyment of competition might be an additional factor driving 
entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions beyond well-known factors like overconfidence 
and risk taking. This study demonstrates that an individual’s enjoyment of competition 
is a sufficient constituent for the relationship between that individual’s self-selection 
into an artificial competitive environment and the individual’s career choices. 
Chapter V seeks to further scrutinize this finding and investigates the 
mechanisms by which the condition that some individuals enjoy competing more than 
others influences the relationship between self-selection into competition and the 
respective individual’s career choices. While Chapter IV treats entrepreneurs all alike, 
entrepreneurship research often separates growth-oriented start-ups from other 
entrepreneurs that are rather classified as self-employed (cf. Shane, 2003; Spencer et al., 
2008; Acs et al., 2016), Chapter V acknowledges these differences. Furthermore, for the 
group of employed people Chapter V differentiates between managerial and non-
managerial employment. We provide empirical evidence for the moderating effect of 
individuals’ perceptions of competitive intensity. Competitive individuals are shown to 
be more likely to prefer and enter those occupations, they perceive as more competitive, 
while non-competitive individuals tend to avoid those occupations. Our findings suggest 
that the differences in relations between self-selection into competition and preferences 
for respective occupations are largely explained by the competitive intensity individuals 
perceive in the respective occupations. Conducting two separate studies we find this 
interaction effect of individual competitiveness and perceived competitive intensity of 
occupations on both the job intentions of undergraduate students (study 1) and revealed 
occupational choices in a general population sample (study 2).  
Moreover, our results indicate that individuals assess entrepreneurship, on 
average, as substantially more competitive than paid employment. We also find 
systematic differences in perceived competitive intensity between start-up founders 
versus other self-employment as well as between managerial employment versus non-
managerial employment. The levels of perceived competitive intensity in the respective 
occupations are very similar between the student sample and the general population 
sample and consistent with the average assessment of job insiders reported by the 
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O*NET database52. An additional plausibility check confirms that consistent with my 
definition of competitive environments winner-take-all tournaments are perceived as 
highly competitive, while the competitive intensity within piece-rate schemes is 
perceived as very low.  
By investigating individual perceptions of competitive intensity in various 
occupations my co-authors and I demonstrate a simple mechanism indicating why 
certain occupations are more (less) attractive for competitive individuals and provide a 
systematic approach predicting which career choices are most likely related to 
competitive behavior in incentivized experiments. Figure 6.1 illustrates my conclusion. 
Figure 6.1: Enjoyment of competition in the lab and in the labor market 
Based on the findings presented in this thesis I conceptualize enjoyment of 
competition as an individual preference for competition (Chapter III) that drives 
individuals’ self-selection into competitive environments in economic experiments 
(Chapter II) as well as individuals’ self-selection into competitive occupations in the 
52 O*NET data are only available for paid employment, but not for entrepreneurship. 
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labor market (Chapter IV). In contrast to the general framework presented in Chapter I 
I do not include desires to win and personal development motives, since my co-authors 
and I find no relationship between these motives and individuals’ choices in an 
incentivized experiment. Yet as discussed in Chapter II these motives may still be 
relevant for individuals’ self-selection into competitive occupations in the labor market. 
As in my general framework I still conceptualize the perceived competitive 
intensity of an environment as critical contingency for the influence of an individual’s 
enjoyment of competition. When individuals choose between two given environments 
(e.g. entrepreneurship vs. paid employment) the effect of enjoyment of competition on 
this decision is supposed to depend on perceptions of relative competitive intensity, i.e. 
if individuals perceive one environment as substantially more competitive than the 
other, I expect a strong effect of enjoyment of competition, but if individuals perceive a 
high (low) competitive intensity in both environments, I expect no effect of enjoyment 
of competition.  
In principle this mechanism is the same in experiments and in the labor market. 
Hence, enjoyment of competition co-determines an individual’s choices between the 
respective alternative environments in these different domains to the extent to which the 
individual perceives differences in competitive intensity between the artificial 
environments in the lab and between the occupations in the labor market. In this case 
decisions in incentivized experiments are predictive for occupational choices. If either 
in the experiment, or in the labor market individuals perceive the alternative 
environments as similarly competitive, then the individuals’ choice in the respective 
domain is less (or not at all) influenced by their preferences for competition and, 
therefore, their choices in the lab cannot be expected to predict their choices in the labor 
market.  
With respect to the labor market I show that entrepreneurs are more likely to 
enjoy competing than non-entrepreneurs (Chapter IV) and that entrepreneurship is 
perceived as substantially more competitive than paid employment (Chapter V). With 
respect to experimental environments findings presented in this thesis confirm that 
winner-take-all tournaments are perceived as substantially more competitive than piece-
rate payments (Chapter V). Consistent with these findings and the result that enjoyment 
of competition drives individuals’ decisions to self-select into competitive environments 
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in an experiment (Chapter II) I show that perceptions of competition within 
occupational environments effectively moderate the relation between competitive 
behavior in an experiment and preferences for these occupations (Chapter V), i.e. 
competitive individuals are attracted to those occupations they perceive as highly 
competitive and vice versa. Investigating the link between individual competitiveness in 
the lab and in the labor market is of primary interest in current research (e.g. Buser et 
al., 2014, 2017; Reuben et al., 2015, 2017). For future studies examining this link it is 
important to note that the link is moderated by individual perceptions of the alternative 
environments in both domains. Examining this link necessarily involves at least four 
different environments and may require elaborating the effects of individual 
heterogeneity in the perceptions of each environment involved. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the concept of individual competitiveness 
defined as a tendency to self-select into competitive environments, whereas I do not 
examine other concepts of competitiveness focusing on individuals’ behavior and 
performance within competitive environments (e.g., van Lange et al., 1997; Manning & 
Taylor, 2001). Investigating the influence of enjoyment of competition as well as 
desires to win, or personal development motives on individuals’ behavior and 
performance within competition is beyond the scope of this thesis, but appears to be a 
natural extension of the research presented here. Some related questions have already 
been studied by other researchers. For instance, Berge and colleagues (2015) examine 
the relationship of competitiveness in the lab with competitive choices (investment and 
employment) and performance (profit and sales) of entrepreneurs in the field. Results of 
economic studies examining effects of exogenously imposed competition on 
performance suggest a high symbolic value of winning a tournament (e.g. Blanes i 
Vidal & Nossol, 2011; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Delfgaauw et al., 2013), which 
points to potential performance effects of individual’s desire to win. Moreover, 
interaction effects of perceived competitive climate and individual competitiveness on 
work performance have been intensely studied (e.g. Brown, Cron, and Slocum, 1998; 
Fletcher, Major, and Davis, 2008; Arnold, Flaherty, Voss, & Mowen, 2009).  
My conclusions are derived from the results of five separate empirical studies. 
Each of these studies is designed and optimized for its narrow research question and 
applies specific measurements. This might be of particular relevance in the light of the 
recent discussion about a replication crisis (e.g. Loken & Gelman, 2017) in behavioral 
188 
sciences (e.g. Camerer et al., 2016). Several aspects of the five studies presented in this 
thesis are mutually replicated in the other studies. For instance, I demonstrate the 
relationship between self-reported and behavioral measures of competitiveness (Chapter 
II) and I show that self-reported and behavioral measures provide the equivalent result
(Chapter V). Moreover, I show that potential and revealed entrepreneurs embrace 
competition (Chapter IV) and I show the moderating effect of perceptions of 
competition for both job intent and revealed occupational choice (Chapter V). I also 
replicate findings of previous experiments by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) as well as 
by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2016a) (Chapter III). Yet, I am not able to include measures 
to replicate all aspects of the respective studies, which is a further limitation of my 
research. For example, in Chapter II I show that a behavioral measure of 
competitiveness is related to a self-reported measure of enjoyment of competition, but 
not to self-reported measures of a desire to win or personal development motives. 
Chapters III and IV use refined behavioral measures that focus even more on enjoyment 
of competition, but these studies do not include additional self-reported measures of 
competitiveness. 
The research presented in this thesis was conducted at a German university and 
the subjects of all five studies were recruited in Germany. Hence, my conclusions may 
not hold for individuals in other countries or cultures. Previous research indicates cross-
cultural differences in individual competitiveness (e.g. Houston et al., 2012; Cárdenas et 
al., 2012). This might also be relevant for individual perceptions of competitive 
intensity as examined in Chapter V, since previous research, for instance, shows 
substantial cross-cultural differences in perceptions of risk (e.g. Weber, Hsee; 1998). 
For a subset of occupations I compare the perceived competitive intensity in two 
German samples with the perception of individuals in the U.S. reported by O*NET and 
find that these perceptions are on average very similar. Moreover, with respect to 
individual competitiveness I replicate the main findings of the experiment by Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007) that was conducted in the U.S. Hence, the German sample 
appears to be not completely different from U.S. samples. Nevertheless, cross-cultural 
studies that also examine enjoyment of competition and perceived competitive intensity 
with samples from e.g. Asian, African, or South American countries are a promising 
extension of my research. 
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6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.2.1 Benefits from interdisciplinary competitiveness research 
In this thesis I present an interdisciplinary approach to individual 
competitiveness and examine three conceptually distinct motives of self-selection into 
competition drawn from psychological research. The study presented in Chapter II 
shows how personality frameworks can be employed to better understand economic 
behavior. My co-authors and I compare multiple competitiveness measures and use 
their respective relations to Big-five personality to confirm the association between the 
enjoyment of competition and self-selection into competition as well as the distinction 
between enjoyment of competition and the other motives. By quantifying an individual 
value of competing that is conceptually derived from the enjoyment of competition in 
Chapter III I demonstrate how economic research can benefit from the inclusion of 
these personality characteristics as model parameters (see Borghans et al., 2008).  
This analysis holds an immediate implication for future experimental 
competitiveness research. Since personal development motives are unrelated to current 
behavioral competitiveness measures, researchers, who intent to cover personal 
development motives in their behavioral measures, need revised experimental designs. 
Likewise, researchers intending to isolate these motives may want to refine their 
experimental designs. In Chapter IV I show a design that allows isolating effects of the 
enjoyment of competition from effects of an individual’s desires to win as well as from 
effects of personal development motives. The presented study indicates that self-
selection into an entrepreneurial career can be predicted based on individuals’ self-
selection into competition in a simple math task and a dice task that are both completely 
unrelated to entrepreneurship tasks. Comparing individuals’ decisions to self-select into 
multiple competitions with unrelated artificial tasks as shown in Chapter IV allows 
isolating the three motives and can further reduce measurement errors and task-specific 
biases. 
In addition to linking economic and psychological competitiveness research, 
Chapter IV integrates the general framework of individual competitiveness presented in 
Chapter I with previous findings from entrepreneurship research. While the 
competitiveness of entrepreneurs has been theorized and two of the three 
competitiveness motives have been indirectly addressed in entrepreneurship research 
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via related constructs, the framework reveals entrepreneurs’ enjoyment of competition 
to be a mutual white spot of both literatures. The presented results suggesting 
entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions to be to some extent explained by individuals’ 
enjoyment of competition point to a fruitful area of future entrepreneurship research. 
Considering a non-monetary value associated with competing itself might also explain 
why entrepreneurs do not give up so easily, once winning becomes less likely, but 
continue competing. 
6.2.2 Measuring competitiveness at the individual level 
This thesis introduces several refinements in the measurement of individual 
competitiveness that have implications for future research seeking to measure an 
individual’s competitiveness. In previous behavioral economic literature the 
identification of competitive preferences typically relies on some kind of group 
heterogeneity in the self-selection into competition (e.g. men vs. women), but without 
such group differences individual competitive preferences could not be identified. In 
this thesis I introduce two different measurement methods future research can use to 
identify competitive preferences of a single individual.  
In Chapter III I present an experimental design that uses multiple behavioral 
measures to quantify a non-monetary value of competing as well as a non-monetary 
value of winning based on the individual’s revealed behavior. These values can be 
interpreted as an individual’s willingness to pay for competing and winning respectively 
within the given experimental environment and the measurement method can be applied 
to various designs of competitive environments. Measuring the value of competing and 
the value of winning allows the identification of individual competitive preferences as a 
comparison between the observed decisions and a utility-based benchmark model, 
which is conceptually and empirically independent from the identification of group 
differences in such preferences53. Moreover, the value of competing and the value of 
winning are corrected for effects of risk preferences and (over-)confidence. Therefore, 
53 This is particularly relevant, since consistent with results of van Veldhuizen (2017) I observe 
gender differences in self-selection into the competitive environment, but I do not observe significant 
gender differences in either the value of competing or the value of winning. 
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these two competitive preferences are not only distinct from each other, but also distinct 
from those typical confounding factors.  
The results of my experiment suggest that individuals value competing. This 
finding confirms that even in the potential absence of group differences in 
competitiveness the estimated effects of individual competitiveness measures on career 
choices (e.g. Buser et al., 2014, Reuben et al., 2015) are informative beyond effects of 
other related measures, such as risk taking and overconfidence, since the former tend to 
reflect a value of competing, i.e. an enjoyment of competition, while the latter do not. 
Further theoretical and experimental examination of competitive preferences is 
therefore a promising field for behavioral economists. Although I do not find evidence 
for a non-monetary value of winning in my experiment, the measurement technique for 
this value may still serve as a tool for future research seeking to understand the role of 
winning for self-selection into competitive environments. 
Moreover, in Chapter II I show how self-reported psychometric measures of 
individual competitiveness are related to self-selection into competitive environments 
within incentivized experiments. The presented findings imply that with all the 
advantages and limitations of self-reported measures discussed in Chapter II future 
research can approximate behavioral measures of individual competitiveness by self-
reported multi-item scales focusing on enjoyment of competition (e.g. Houston et al., 
2002b). These self-reported measures can not only distinguish between different 
motives to enter competition, but also provide an individual-level measurement 
independent from group differences in competitiveness. Self-reported measures of 
individual competitiveness can also be implemented in environments, where 
incentivized economic experiments are difficult to implement or very costly, such as 
large-scale surveys (cf. Bönte & Piegeler, 2013), or for representation in socio-
economic panels, which also address individuals’ psychological backgrounds such as 
risk attitudes (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011). Research on individual competitiveness might 
benefit from the analysis of such representative and large-scale surveys in order to get a 
more comprehensive understanding of how competitive preferences are distributed 
across populations and how it relates to real world behavior. 
Future research can use self-reported measures not only to approximate 
behavioral measures of individual competitiveness, but also to elicit an individual’s 
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perceptions of competitive intensity. The studies reported in Chapter V show that there 
is substantial heterogeneity regarding the perception of competition within the same 
environment by different individuals and that this heterogeneity moderates the influence 
of competitive preferences on career choices. Hence, such individual beliefs regarding 
competition in certain environments may be considered as an additional determinant of 
the individual’s competitiveness that can be assessed with self-reported measures as I 
have shown in Chapter V.  
Future competitiveness research might not only use these measures to separate 
effects of heterogeneous beliefs from effects of heterogeneous competitive preferences, 
but also to explore ways to influence beliefs regarding competition in certain 
environments, e.g. by providing tailored information regarding these environments. This 
approach might be informative for behavioral market design with respect to competitive 
institutions (Niederle, 2017). Targeting subjective beliefs about competitive intensity 
rather than objective rules and institutions can provide alternative design instruments for 
environments, where institutional changes (e.g. Niederle et al., 2013) may have 
unintended consequences (cf. Leibbrandt et al., 2017), or are hard to implement (like in 
entrepreneurship). 
6.2.3 Environments to study individual competitiveness 
Previous research has studied individual competitiveness in various 
environments (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2009; Cárdenas et al., 2012; Shurchkov, 2012; 
Leibbrandt et al, 2013; Buser et al., 2014, 2017; Flory et al., 2015; Reuben et al., 2015). 
The analysis of competitive environments in this thesis provides several implications 
with respect to occupational environments as well as experimental environments in 
which future research might most effectively study individual competitiveness.  
Chapter III introduces a distinction between environments, where individuals 
provide a maximum feasible performance, and environments, where individuals 
optimize their performance by providing a lower performance level. I demonstrate that 
only under the assumption of maximum performance provision competitive preferences 
can be isolated from effects of expected performance differences. This implies that only 
environments, where this assumption holds, e.g. because individuals can only provide 
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restricted effort, allow the quantification of individual values of competing and winning 
without eliciting expected performance differences.  
The dice tasks applied in the studies presented in Chapters III, IV, and V are 
variations of non-agency tasks (see Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2016b) and can be used by 
future research to ensure that the assumption of maximum performance provision holds 
for their experimental environments. In contrast, employing these dice tasks to measure 
risk preferences (cf. Große & Riener, 2010) is likely problematic. While these dice tasks 
can be seen as equivalent to complex lotteries, they still represent interactive, 
competitive environments in the sense that outcomes of one individual depend on 
outcomes of other individuals. Hence, behavior in a dice task likely reflects both risk 
preferences and competitive preferences. Consistently, my findings suggest that 
individuals still value competing in a dice task and that the presented results are robust 
against using either the dice task, or the math task, which is the standard measure of 
individual competitiveness (cf. Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Future research might, 
therefore, favor other measures of risk taking that do not include a competitive 
environment (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002)54.  
I also investigate the perceived intensity of competition within artificial 
scenarios in Chapter V. I show that winner-take-all tournaments are perceived almost as 
competitive as the most competitive occupation (e.g. founders of high-tech start-ups, or 
top managers of large corporations), while the perceived intensity of competition within 
piece-rate payments is similar to the least competitive occupations in the presented 
studied (e.g. busdrivers, or employed childcare workers). These results confirm that 
experimental designs, where subjects choose between those payment schemes, reflect 
the subjects’ deliberate decision to self-select into (or avoid) competition. Moreover, in 
terms of perceived competitive intensity the environments within economic experiments 
seem to represent the extreme points of an individual’s spectrum of potential 
occupational choices.  
With respect to occupational environments, the studies of perceived competitive 
intensity presented in Chapter V provide a systematic approach to the relations between 
self-selection into competition in incentivized experiments and different career choices. 
54 In fact, I use such risk measures (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002 in Chapter III) in addition to the 
dice task in order to isolate the effect of competitive preferences from the effect of risk preferences. 
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I show that perceived competitive intensity moderates this relation. This approach 
enables future research to predict which occupational choices are most likely influenced 
by individuals’ preferences for competition.  
Moreover, Chapter IV shows that entrepreneurs embrace competition more than 
non-entrepreneurs do and Chapter V indicates that entrepreneurship is perceived as 
substantially more competitive than paid employment. These findings imply that future 
research studying the link between competitive behavior in economic experiments and 
selection into particular sectors or industries (e.g. Reuben et al., 2015), might 
additionally control for whether a career will be pursued as an entrepreneur or in paid 
employment, since the relationships may differ substantially. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines individual competitiveness defined as individuals’ general 
tendency to favor competitive over non-competitive environments. I conclude that 
individual competitiveness is driven by an enjoyment of competition itself, rather than a 
desire to win, or personal development motives. An enjoyment of competition is 
suggested to reflect a quantifiable individual value of competing that is distinct from 
subjective expected payoffs (including overconfidence), and risk-preferences.  
I examine the relevance of individual competitiveness for career choices and 
conclude that entrepreneurs are more likely to self-select into competition than non-
entrepreneurs due to their higher enjoyment of competition. Furthermore, not only 
individual competitiveness, but also individual perceptions of competition are relevant 
determinants of career choices. I show considerable individual heterogeneity in the 
perceived competitive intensity of the same occupation and present evidence that the 
effect of individual competitiveness on career choices is moderated by these 
perceptions. Both entrepreneurship and management positions are perceived 
substantially more competitive than other paid employment and competitive individuals 
tend to prefer these occupations due to the differences in perceived intensity of 
competition. 
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This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach linking economic and 
psychological research on individual competitiveness. It contributes to this research by 
offering several refinements to the concept and measurement of individual 
competitiveness, which carry implications and show promising new directions I believe 
to be of relevance for future research on individual responses to competition. 
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APPENDIX 
A – Detailed description of tasks 5 and 6 of my experiment 
German original English translation 
Runde 5 Round 5 
In dieser Runde besteht Ihre Aufgabe noch einmal darin, in 
einem Zeitraum von 5 Minuten (300 Sekunden) Rechen-
aufgaben zu lösen. In jeder dieser Rechenaufgaben sind fünf 
zweistellige Zahlen zu addieren. Für jede richtig gelöste 
Aufgabe erhalten Sie einen Punkt. Für jede falsch gelöste 
Aufgabe erhalten Sie keinen Punkt. Die Darstellung der 
Aufgaben ist identisch zu den vorherigen Runden. 
In this round, your task is once again to solve arithmetic 
problems over a period of 5 minutes (300 seconds). In each 
of these arithmetic tasks, five two-digit numbers are to be 
added. For every correctly solved task you get one point. 
You will not get a point for any task that is solved 
incorrectly. The presentation of the tasks is identical to the 
previous rounds. 
Auch in dieser Runde können Sie auswählen, welche 
Bezahlung Sie erhalten möchten, wenn am Ende des 
Experiments diese Runde ausgewählt wird. Es gibt diesmal 
verschiedene Geldbeträge der individuellen Bezahlung (A) 
und verschiedene Pools von Vergleichspersonen in der 
vergleichenden Bezahlung (B). Sie können sich für jede 
Kombination dieser Merkmale zwischen der individuellen 
Bezahlung (A) und der vergleichenden Bezahlung (B) 
entscheiden.  
In this round you can choose once more, which payment 
you want to receive, if this round is selected at the end of 
the experiment. This time there are different amounts per 
point in the individual payment (A) and different pools of 
comparators in the comparative payment (B). You can 
choose between individual payment (A) and comparative 
payment (B) for each combination of these characteristics. 
Individuelle Bezahlung (A): 
Sie erhalten für jede von Ihnen in dieser Runde korrekt 
gelöste Aufgabe einen fixen Geldbetrag. Der Geldbetrag 
variiert und liegt zwischen 0,00€ und 1,00€. 
Individual payment (A): 
You receive a fixed amount of money for each problem you 
solve correctly in this round. The amount of money varies 
between €0.00 and €1.00. 
Vergleichende Bezahlung (B): 
Die Anzahl der von Ihnen in dieser Runde korrekt gelösten 
Aufgaben ergibt Ihre Punktzahl. Wir vergleichen Ihre 
Punktzahl aus dieser Runde NICHT mit den Punktzahlen der 
drei anderen Personen in Ihrer Reihe, SONDERN mit der 
Punktzahl einer zufällig gezogenen Vergleichsperson. Wenn 
Ihre Punktzahl höher ist, erhalten Sie für jede von Ihnen in 
dieser Runde korrekt gelöste Aufgabe 1,00€. Ist Ihre 
Punktzahl nicht höher als die Punktzahl der Vergleichs-
person, erhalten Sie für diese Runde 0,00€.  
Comparative Payment (B): 
The number of correctly solved problems in this round 
yields your score. We DO NOT compare your score from 
this round with the scores of the other three participants in 
your row, BUT with the score of a randomly drawn 
comparator. If your score is higher, you receive €1.00 for 
each problem solved correctly in this round. If your score is 
not higher than your comparator’s score, you receive €0.00 
for this round. 
Ermittlung der Vergleichsperson: 
Aus allen vorherigen Punktzahlen dieser Runde wurden 
zufällig zehn Punktzahlen ausgewählt. Aus diesen zehn 
Punktzahlen wurden drei Pools gebildet und Ihre 
Vergleichsperson wird aus einem dieser drei Pools gezogen: 
Determination of the comparator: 
From all previous scores achieved in this round, ten scores 
were randomly selected. From these ten scores, three pools 
were formed and your comparator is drawn from one of 
these three pools: 
1. Einfacher Pool 
Die höchste der zehn Punktzahlen wurde durch die niedrigste 
aller zuvor in dieser Runde erreichten Punktzahlen ersetzt. 
Ihre Gewinnchance ist somit 10% höher*, als im normalen 
Pool.  
1st Easy pool 
The highest of the ten scores has been replaced by the 
lowest of all scores previously achieved in this round. Your 
chance of winning is thus 10% higher* than in the original 
pool. 
2. Normaler Pool 
Dieser Pool enthält die zehn ausgewählten Punktzahlen ohne 
Änderungen. 
2nd Original pool 
This pool contains the ten selected scores without any 
changes. 
3. Schwieriger Pool 
Die niedrigste der zehn Punktzahlen wurde durch die höchste 
aller zuvor in dieser Runde erreichten Punktzahlen ersetzt. 
Ihre Gewinnchance ist somit 10% geringer*, als im normalen 
Pool.  
3rd Hard pool 
The lowest of the ten scores was replaced by the highest of 
all scores previously achieved in this round. Your chance of 
winning is therefore 10% lower * than in the normal pool. 
* Dies trifft nicht zu, wenn Sie entweder glauben, dass Ihre 
Punktzahl höher als alle oder niedriger als alle Punktzahlen 
im normalen Pool sein wird. 
* This is not the case if you believe that your score will 
either be higher than or lower than all scores in the 
original pool. 
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German original English translation 
Runde 6 Round 6 
In dieser Runde wird die Aufgabe für Sie vollständig 
automatisch durch das Programm ausgeführt. Sie werden die 
Aufgabe starten und können dann in den Ablauf nicht mehr 
eingreifen. Die Aufgabe dauert insgesamt 40 Sekunden. 
Anschließend werden Sie aufgefordert, mit der nächsten 
Runde fortzufahren. 
Das Programm wird für Sie 10 Mal mit zwei virtuellen 
Würfeln würfeln. Beide Würfel haben jeweils 3 schwarze und 
3 weiße Seiten. Für jeden Würfel, der eine schwarze Seite 
zeigt, erhalten Sie jeweils einen Punkt. Dagegen erhalten Sie 
für jeden Würfel, der eine weiße Seite zeigt, keinen Punkt. Die 
erreichbare Gesamtpunktzahl liegt folglich zwischen 0 und 20 
Punkten. Das Würfelergebnis wurde NICHT vorab 
programmiert, sondern wird bei jedem Wurf zufällig 
ermittelt. 
In this round, the task is performed completely 
automatically by the program for you. You will start the 
task and will not be able to intervene in the procedure. The 
task takes a total of 40 seconds. You will then be asked to 
proceed to the next round. 
The program will roll a pair of virtual dice for you 10 
times. Both dice have 3 black and 3 white sides each. For 
each dice that shows a black side, you receive one point 
each. On the other hand, you do not receive a point for each 
dice that shows a white side. Therefore, achievable total 
scores are between 0 and 20 points. The dice result was 
NOT programmed in advance, but is determined randomly 
at each roll. 
Auch in dieser Runde können Sie auswählen, welche 
Bezahlung Sie erhalten möchten, wenn am Ende des 
Experiments diese Runde ausgewählt wird. Es gibt diesmal 
verschiedene Geldbeträge der individuellen Bezahlung (A) 
und verschiedene Pools von Vergleichspersonen in der 
vergleichenden Bezahlung (B). Sie können sich für jede 
Kombination dieser Merkmale zwischen der individuellen 
Bezahlung (A) und der vergleichenden Bezahlung (B) 
entscheiden.  
In this round you can choose once more, which payment 
you want to receive, if this round is selected at the end of 
the experiment. This time there are different amounts per 
point in the individual payment (A) and different pools of 
comparators in the comparative payment (B). You can 
choose between individual payment (A) and comparative 
payment (B) for each combination of these characteristics. 
Individuelle Bezahlung (A): 
Sie erhalten für jede von Ihnen in dieser Runde korrekt 
gelöste Aufgabe einen fixen Geldbetrag. Der Geldbetrag 
variiert und liegt zwischen 0,00€ und 1,00€. 
Individual payment (A): 
You receive a fixed amount of money for each problem you 
solve correctly in this round. The amount of money varies 
between €0.00 and €1.00. 
Vergleichende Bezahlung (B): 
Die Anzahl der von Ihnen in dieser Runde korrekt gelösten 
Aufgaben ergibt Ihre Punktzahl. Wir vergleichen Ihre 
Punktzahl aus dieser Runde NICHT mit den Punktzahlen der 
drei anderen Personen in Ihrer Reihe, SONDERN mit der 
Punktzahl einer zufällig gezogenen Vergleichsperson. Wenn 
Ihre Punktzahl höher ist, erhalten Sie für jede von Ihnen in 
dieser Runde korrekt gelöste Aufgabe 1,00€. Ist Ihre 
Punktzahl nicht höher als die Punktzahl der Vergleichs-
person, erhalten Sie für diese Runde 0,00€.  
Comparative Payment (B): 
The number of correctly solved problems in this round 
yields your score. We DO NOT compare your score from 
this round with the scores of the other three participants in 
your row, BUT with the score of a randomly drawn 
comparator. If your score is higher, you receive €1.00 for 
each problem solved correctly in this round. If your score is 
not higher than your comparator’s score, you receive €0.00 
for this round. 
Ermittlung der Vergleichsperson: 
Aus allen vorherigen Punktzahlen dieser Runde wurden 
zufällig zehn Punktzahlen ausgewählt. Aus diesen zehn 
Punktzahlen wurden drei Pools gebildet und Ihre 
Vergleichsperson wird aus einem dieser drei Pools gezogen: 
Determination of the comparator: 
From all previous scores achieved in this round, ten scores 
were randomly selected. From these ten scores, three pools 
were formed and your comparator is drawn from one of 
these three pools: 
1. Einfacher Pool 
Die höchste der zehn Punktzahlen wurde durch die niedrigste 
aller zuvor in dieser Runde erreichten Punktzahlen ersetzt. 
Ihre Gewinnchance ist somit 10% höher*, als im normalen 
Pool.  
1st Easy pool 
The highest of the ten scores has been replaced by the 
lowest of all scores previously achieved in this round. Your 
chance of winning is thus 10% higher* than in the original 
pool. 
2. Normaler Pool 
Dieser Pool enthält die zehn ausgewählten Punktzahlen ohne 
Änderungen. 
2nd Original pool 
This pool contains the ten selected scores without any 
changes. 
3. Schwieriger Pool 
Die niedrigste der zehn Punktzahlen wurde durch die höchste 
aller zuvor in dieser Runde erreichten Punktzahlen ersetzt. 
Ihre Gewinnchance ist somit 10% geringer*, als im normalen 
Pool.  
3rd Hard pool 
The lowest of the ten scores was replaced by the highest of 
all scores previously achieved in this round. Your chance of 
winning is therefore 10% lower * than in the normal pool. 
* Dies trifft nicht zu, wenn Sie entweder glauben, dass Ihre 
Punktzahl höher als alle oder niedriger als alle Punktzahlen 
im normalen Pool sein wird. 
* This is not the case if you believe that your score will 
either be higher than or lower than all scores in the 
original pool. 
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Figure A.1: Screenshot of subjects’ payment decision in tasks 5 and 6 
Subjects chose their preferred payment scheme between a piece-rate (A) and a 
winner-take-all tournament (B) for 21 different piece-rate levels ranging from €0.00 per 
point up to €1.00 per point. All 21 choices were displayed vertically in a single column 
with piece-rate levels in ascending order. In all tournaments subjects received a 
payment of €1.00 per point, if they outperformed one anonymous, randomly drawn 
competitor. Subjects fixed their choices for an easy (left column), an original (middle 
column), and a hard (right column) competitor pool (see Section 3.3.4). Subjects were 
only able to proceed to the next screen, when all options were filled in. The payment 
choice screens in tasks 5 and 6 were identical except for the headline indicating the 
respective task. 
218 
Figure A.2: Screenshot of dice-task in task 6 
In task 6 of my experiment subjects participated in a non-agency task (see 
Section 3.3.5). During this task the program rolled ten pairs of virtual two-colored dice, 
where subjects’ score was calculated as the number of black sides. The program 
displayed the result of the respective next pair of dice every 3 sec starting in the upper 
left, filling the left column first, and adding the last pair at the bottom right. The text 
“rolling dice – please wait” was displayed at the respective next pair’s position. All 
previous pairs of dice remained visible, so subjects could track their score. 
Subsequently, the score was calculated and displayed below all the pairs for 10 sec. 
After 40 sec the task ended automatically. During the task subjects could not interfere in 
any way.
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B - Alternative risk adjustment 
Sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 report results for the Values of competing and winning. 
Calculation of these values includes risk adjustment based on Holt’s and Laury’s (2002) 
risk measure, which identifies intervals for individual risk aversion. In the main text I 
report results based on the lower bound of CRRA intervals. Tables B.1 and B.2 show 
robustness of results, when interval midpoints or upper bounds are used instead.  
Table B.1: Values of competing and winning for alternative risk-adjustments 
Variable CRRA mean  (s.e.) median (s.e.) 95% conf. Int. 
Value of competing low 2.19 (.59)*** 2.07 (.12)*** [1.10     3.38] 
mid 2.51 (.56)*** 2.23 (.11)*** [1.49     3.63] 
high 2.82 (.52)*** 2.46 (.11)*** [1.91     3.95] 
Value of winning low -6.63 (4.98) -1.98 (.12)*** [-24.00    -0.59] 
mid -5.98 (5.41) -1.94 (.11)*** [-22.48     1.47] 
high -2.62 (7.99) -1.93 (.10)***  [-14.57    19.35] 
Note: Results for risk-adjustment based on lower bound (low), interval midpoint (mid), and upper bound 
(high) of CRRA parameter. Median test based on the Hodges-Lehmann (1963) percentile difference. 
Table reports bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals based on bootstrapping (10000 
repetitions). ***, **, *, + indicate statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Table B.2: Regression results for alternative risk-adjustments 
Mid point CRRA    Upper bound CRRA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.: WTA task 3 WTA task 3 WTA task 3 WTA task 3 WTA task 3 WTA task 3 
OL S OL S probit mfx OL S OL S probit  mfx 
Value of competing 0.03 (0.02)+ 0.04 (0.02)* 0.05 (0.02)* 0.04 (0.02)+ 0.05 (0.02)* 0.05 (0.02)* 
Value of winning 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Overconfidence Math 0.04 (0.02)+ 0.05 (0.03)+ 0.04 (0.02)+ 0.05 (0.03)+ 
Overconfidence Dice 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
CRRA -0.14 (0.15) -0.16 (0.16) -0.13 (0.15) -0.14 (0.16) 
Constant 0.30 (0.08)** 0.30 (0.12)* 0.28 (0.09)** 0.28 (0.14)* 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.068  0.147 0.073  0.152 
Note: Regression results for risk-adjustment based on interval midpoint and upper bound of CRRA 
parameter. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report coefficients of linear probability models. Columns 3 and 6 
report marginal effects from probit regression.  ***, **, *, + indicate statistical significance at the 0.001, 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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C – Detailed reports of regression analysis and robustness checks 
This appendix provides more detailed reports of regression analysis and 
robustness check of Chapter V. A detailed report of all variables in Model 4 of Section 
5.4.1 is provided in Table C.1. Detailed reports of all variables in Models 1, 2, and 3 of 
Section 5.4.2 are provided in Tables C.2, C.3, and C.4, respectively. Robustness checks 
for interactions of a gender contrast with all other variables are reported in Tables C.5 
(sample 1) and C.6 (sample 2). Robustness checks for interactions with contrast codes 
indicating female vs. male job titles and math vs. dice task are reported in Tables C.7 
and C.8, respectively. Table C.9 shows a robustness check controlling for CRRA. 
Finally, Table C.10 shows a robustness check using a logistic regression instead of a 
linear model. 
Table C.1: Regression results for scenarios (detailed report of Model 4) 
Dependent variable Study 1: Scenario Preference 
Alternatives (base: Scenario A – piece-rate) Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
Model 4 
Competitive preference - - - 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) 0.25 (0.13)* 0.15 (0.15) 0.10 (0.17) 
Age -0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 
Father self-employed -0.25 (0.36) 0.04 (0.36) -0.12 (0.38) 
Mother self-employed -0.44 (0.42) -0.43 (0.63) -0.46 (0.74) 
Abi degree -0.27 (0.24) -0.10 (0.26) -0.08 (0.30) 
# of Siblings -0.08 (0.10) -0.01 (0.12) -0.18 (0.13) 
Constant (scenario fixed effect) -0.56 (0.61) -0.90 (0.72) -1.28 (0.84) 
Perception of competition (PoC) 0.11 (0.05)* 
PoC X Competitive preference 0.05 (0.03)* 
Ind. fixed eff. incl. 
Constant 5.17 (0.12)*** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.237 / 0.083 (8.29)*** 
Observations 890 
Number of Individuals 228 
Notes: Individual and scenario fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific (i.e. scenario-
specific) as well as individual-specific explanatory variables; the latter being entered with alternative-
specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies for alternatives and reported in corresponding 
columns). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Model 4 includes the 
following individual-level control variables: Gender, age, parental entrepreneurship, Abitur degree, No. 
of Siblings. Significance levels: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.5: Regression results – study 1: gender interaction 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference Student Sample 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Emp. Founder 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) -0.70 (0.71) -0.03 (0.64) 0.10 (0.69) 
Age -0.10 (0.04)* -0.01 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) 
Father self-employed -0.01 (0.34) 0.32 (0.28) -0.09 (0.32) 
Mother self-employed 0.20 (0.47) 0.11 (0.52) -0.06 (0.37) 
Abi degree -0.46 (0.28) -0.27 (0.24) -0.38 (0.26) 
# of Siblings -0.09 (0.10) -0.12 (0.11) -0.08 (0.11) 
Gender X Age 0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 
Gender X Father self-employed 0.58 (0.34)+ 0.24 (0.28) 0.27 (0.32) 
Gender X Mother self-employed 0.28 (0.47) -0.67 (0.52) -0.68 (0.37)+ 
Gender X Abi degree 0.33 (0.28) 0.07 (0.24) 0.02 (0.26) 
Gender X # of Siblings -0.08 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11) -0.02 (0.11) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) 3.17 (0.71)*** 2.13 (0.64)*** 2.72 (0.69)*** 
Perception of Competition -0.01 (0.05) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.04 (0.02)+ 
Familiarity 0.05 (0.02)* 
Confidence 0.78 (0.05)*** 
Gender X Perception of Competition 0.07 (0.05) 
Gender X PoC X Competitive Preference 0.03 (0.02) 
Gender X Familiarity 0.04 (0.02)+ 
Gender X Confidence -0.09 (0.05)+ 
Constant -0.84 (0.27)** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.569 /  0.4349 (25.31)*** 
Observations 887 
Number of Individuals 227 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.6: Regression results – study 2: gender interaction 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference General Population 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Empl. Founder 
Risk Preference 0.04 (0.11) 0.15 (0.12) 0.20 (0.11)+ 
Confidence 0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05) 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) 0.15 (0.30) 0.21 (0.27) 0.24 (0.29) 
Age 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Father self-employed -0.23 (0.10)* -0.06 (0.10) -0.06 (0.09) 
Mother self-employed 0.24 (0.12)+ 0.14 (0.10) 0.22 (0.10)* 
Education: Hauptschule 0.01 (0.13) 0.18 (0.14) 0.17 (0.13) 
Education: Realschule 0.09 (0.10) 0.16 (0.12) 0.28 (0.12)* 
Education: Fachabitur -0.03 (0.12) 0.07 (0.15) 0.14 (0.14) 
Education: Abitur -0.10 (0.10) -0.06 (0.10) -0.06 (0.09) 
University Graduation -0.01 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11) 0.02 (0.10) 
Professional Job Training -0.24 (0.08)** -0.02 (0.09) -0.11 (0.09) 
Education: Other 0.13 (0.12) 0.19 (0.17) 0.13 (0.15) 
German native 0.04 (0.09) -0.16 (0.10)+ -0.02 (0.08) 
Day 2 -0.05 (0.09) -0.15 (0.11) -0.11 (0.10) 
Day 3 0.06 (0.10) -0.17 (0.11) -0.18 (0.11)+ 
Gender X Risk Preference -0.07 (0.11) -0.06 (0.12) -0.15 (0.12) 
Gender X Confidence -0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) 
Gender X Age 0.01 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Gender X Father self-employed 0.09 (0.10) 0.19 (0.10)+ 0.07 (0.09) 
Gender X Mother self-employed -0.12 (0.12) -0.15 (0.10) -0.09 (0.10) 
Gender X Education: Hauptschule 0.06 (0.13) 0.25 (0.14)+ -0.04 (0.13) 
Gender X Education: Realschule 0.00 (0.10) -0.03 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 
Gender X Education: Fachabitur 0.10 (0.12) -0.09 (0.15) -0.08 (0.14) 
Gender X Education: Abitur 0.09 (0.10) -0.02 (0.10) -0.07 (0.09) 
Gender X University Graduation 0.04 (0.11) -0.05 (0.11) 0.08 (0.10) 
Gender X Professional Job Training 0.01 (0.08) 0.15 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 
Gender X Education: Other -0.08 (0.12) 0.18 (0.17) 0.15 (0.15) 
Gender X German native 0.11 (0.10) 0.04 (0.10) 0.03 (0.09) 
Gender X Day 2 -0.12 (0.09) -0.11 (0.11) -0.13 (0.10) 
Gender X Day 3 -0.07 (0.10) -0.06 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) -0.70 (0.29)* -0.34 (0.27) -0.71 (0.28)* 
Perception of Competition 0.07 (0.07) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.06 (0.02)** 
PoC X Risk Preference -0.05 (0.03)+ 
PoC X Confidence -0.01 (0.01) 
Gender X PoC -0.01 (0.07) 
Gender X PoC X Competitive Preference -0.01 (0.02) 
Gender X PoC X Risk Preference 0.01 (0.03) 
Gender X PoC X Confidence 0.01 (0.01) 
Constant 0.82 (0.03)*** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.481 /  0.278 (16.62)*** 
Observations 808 
Number of Individuals 202 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.7: Regression results – study 2: job title treatment 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference General Population 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Empl. Founder 
Risk Preference -0.02 (0.11) 0.09 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11) 
Confidence 0.06 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) 
Age 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Father self-employed -0.22 (0.10)* -0.06 (0.10) -0.06 (0.09) 
Mother self-employed 0.22 (0.12)+ 0.13 (0.10) 0.22 (0.10)* 
Education: Hauptschule 0.04 (0.12) 0.24 (0.14)+ 0.13 (0.13) 
Education: Realschule 0.13 (0.10) 0.14 (0.12) 0.27 (0.13)* 
Education: Fachabitur -0.01 (0.11) 0.07 (0.13) 0.10 (0.12) 
Education: Abitur -0.08 (0.10) -0.09 (0.11) -0.08 (0.10) 
University Graduation -0.00 (0.10) 0.13 (0.11) 0.05 (0.10) 
Professional Job Training -0.27 (0.08)** -0.03 (0.09) -0.11 (0.09) 
Education: Other 0.05 (0.15) 0.24 (0.16) 0.16 (0.17) 
German native 0.05 (0.09) -0.15 (0.10) -0.00 (0.08) 
Day 2 -0.04 (0.09) -0.14 (0.10) -0.10 (0.09) 
Day 3 0.10 (0.09) -0.14 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) -0.74 (0.27)** -0.37 (0.26) -0.71 (0.26)** 
Perception of Competition 0.05 (0.06) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.07 (0.02)** 
PoC X Risk Preference -0.04 (0.03) 
PoC X Confidence -0.01 (0.01) 
Job titles X PoC 0.02 (0.03) 
Job titles X PoC X Competitive Preference 0.01 (0.02) 
Job titles X PoC X Risk Preference 0.01 (0.02) 
Job titles X PoC X Confidence -0.00 (0.01) 
Constant 0.81 (0.04)*** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.434 /  0.276 (15.00)*** 
Observations 808 
Number of Individuals 202 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.8: Regression results – study 2: dice vs. math task 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference General Population 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Empl. Founder 
Risk Preference -0.02 (0.11) 0.10 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11) 
Confidence 0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) 
Age 0.01 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Father self-employed -0.24 (0.10)* -0.07 (0.10) -0.08 (0.08) 
Mother self-employed 0.24 (0.12)* 0.14 (0.10) 0.23 (0.10)* 
Education: Hauptschule 0.05 (0.12) 0.27 (0.14)+ 0.14 (0.13) 
Education: Realschule 0.13 (0.10) 0.15 (0.12) 0.30 (0.13)* 
Education: Fachabitur -0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.14) 0.11 (0.13) 
Education: Abitur -0.08 (0.09) -0.06 (0.11) -0.05 (0.10) 
University Graduation 0.02 (0.11) 0.16 (0.11) 0.08 (0.10) 
Professional Job Training -0.27 (0.08)** -0.03 (0.09) -0.11 (0.08) 
Education: Other 0.07 (0.15) 0.27 (0.17) 0.18 (0.17) 
German native 0.07 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 
Day 2 0.01 (0.11) -0.10 (0.12) -0.08 (0.10) 
Day 3 0.12 (0.10) -0.11 (0.11) -0.11 (0.10) 
Dice Task -0.12 (0.24) -0.29 (0.22) -0.31 (0.22) 
Dice Task X Risk Preference 0.01 (0.11) 0.05 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12) 
Dice Task X Confidence 0.04 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)+ 0.06 (0.04) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) -0.78 (0.27)** -0.42 (0.25)+ -0.76 (0.25)** 
Perception of Competition 0.04 (0.06) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.05 (0.02)** 
PoC X Risk Preference -0.03 (0.03) 
PoC X Confidence -0.01 (0.01) 
Dice Task X PoC 0.07 (0.06) 
Dice Task X PoC X Competitive Preference 0.02 (0.02) 
Dice Task X PoC X Risk Preference -0.03 (0.03) 
Dice Task X PoC X Confidence -0.01 (0.01) 
Constant 0.81 (0.04)*** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.441 /  0.279 (11.97)*** 
Observations 808 
Number of Individuals 202 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.9: Regression results – study 2: CRRA 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference General Population 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Empl. Founder 
Risk Preference (CRRA) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 
Confidence 0.05 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04) 
Age 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Father self-employed -0.23 (0.10)* -0.07 (0.09) -0.06 (0.08) 
Mother self-employed 0.23 (0.13)+ 0.14 (0.10) 0.21 (0.10)* 
Education: Hauptschule 0.07 (0.12) 0.25 (0.14)+ 0.16 (0.12) 
Education: Realschule 0.17 (0.09)+ 0.15 (0.12) 0.31 (0.12)* 
Education: Fachabitur -0.00 (0.11) 0.04 (0.13) 0.11 (0.13) 
Education: Abitur -0.04 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11) -0.05 (0.09) 
University Graduation 0.02 (0.11) 0.14 (0.11) 0.07 (0.09) 
Professional Job Training -0.27 (0.08)** -0.04 (0.09) -0.11 (0.08) 
Education: Other 0.04 (0.15) 0.23 (0.16) 0.16 (0.17) 
German native 0.06 (0.10) -0.16 (0.10) -0.01 (0.08) 
Day 2 -0.04 (0.09) -0.15 (0.10) -0.09 (0.09) 
Day 3 0.11 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) -0.11 (0.10) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) -0.78 (0.25)** -0.35 (0.25) -0.64 (0.24)** 
Perception of Competition 0.04 (0.06) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.05 (0.02)** 
PoC X Risk Preference (CRRA) -0.00 (0.01) 
PoC X Confidence -0.01 (0.01) 
Constant 0.81 (0.04)*** 
R2 within / overall (F) 0.430 /  0.274 (12.11)*** 
Observations 808 
Number of Individuals 202 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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Table C.10: Regression results – study 2: logistic regression model 
Dep. Var. = Job Preference General Population 
(base: Non-managerial employees) Manager Self-Empl Founder 
Risk Preference  0.60 (1.14) 2.00 (1.16)+ 2.62 (1.46)+ 
Confidence 0.74 (0.45) 0.15 (0.45) -0.04 (0.56) 
Gender (m=1, f=-1) -0.13 (0.46) -0.4 (0.43) -0.07 (0.53) 
Age 0.06 (0.05) -0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05) 
Father self-employed -4.14 (1.33)** -1.47 (1.15) -2.11 (1.46) 
Mother self-employed 2.91 (1.22)* 0.96 (1.17) 2.56 (1.45)+ 
Education: Hauptschule 0.23 (1.85) 1.32 (1.56) 0.09 (1.83) 
Education: Realschule 0.79 (1.28) 1.08 (1.17) 2.21 (1.27)+ 
Education: Fachabitur 0.44 (1.51) -0.24 (1.47) 0.82 (1.56) 
Education: Abitur -0.01 (1.01) -0.6 (0.91) 0.12 (1.06) 
University Graduation 0.84 (1.14) 1.67 (1.07) 1.84 (1.24) 
Professional Job Training -4.34 (1.38)** -2.03 (1.31) -2.85 (1.43)* 
Education: Other 1.18 (1.49) 2.67 (1.36)+ 3.35 (1.49)* 
German native 1.33 (1.11) -0.14 (0.98) 0.17 (1.20) 
Day 2 0.31 (1.06) -0.8 (0.94) -0.82 (1.19) 
Day 3 0.57 (1.30) -1.62 (1.20) -1.45 (1.32) 
Constant (Job fixed effects) -8.24 (3.12)** -4.22 (3.09) -6.22 (3.48)+ 
Perception of Competition -0.15 (0.63) 
PoC X Competitive Preference 0.52 (0.26)* 
PoC X Risk Preference  -0.54 (0.33) 
PoC X Confidence 0.02 (0.12) 
Log Likelihood (χ2[df=55]) -94.19 (303.43)*** 
Observations 644 
Number of Individuals 161 
Notes: Fixed effects regression analyses with alternative-specific regressors and individual-specific 
regressors; the latter being entered with alternative-specific effects (implemented as interactions with dummies 
for alternatives). Estimated coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
